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Summary (English)
This thesis deals with the development and appliation of models for deision-
making under unertainty to support the partiipation of renewables in eletri-
ity markets.
The output of most renewable soures, e.g., wind, is intermittent and, further-
more, it an only be predited with a limited auray. As a result of their
non-dispathable and stohasti nature, the management of renewables poses
new hallenges as ompared to onventional soures of eletriity. Fousing in
partiular on short-term eletriity markets, both the trading ativities of mar-
ket partiipants (produers, retailers and onsumers) and the deision-making
proesses of system and market operators are hallenged.
As far as produers are onerned, partiipation in eletriity markets imposes
them to make their trading deisions with a ertain advane in time as ompared
to energy delivery. Sine their atual output is unertain at the time of bidding,
the trading problem for a renewable power produer translates into a stohasti
optimization problem, whose objetive is the maximization of the expeted rev-
enues. In this thesis, we onsider the trading problem for a wind power produer
both in markets with low penetration of renewables, where the produer is a
prie-taker, and in markets where the produer ats as a prie-maker.
Owing to the demand response initiatives to be undertaken in future power
systems, the operation of eletriity retailers and the behavior of onsumers are
also going to be inuened by renewable power prodution. Another fous of this
thesis is on time-varying prie mehanisms to make the most of end onsumers'
exibility. In partiular, the problem of managing optimally a virtual power
ii
plant equipped with renewable prodution failities and exible onsumers is
addressed through ontrol-by-prie. In a similar setup, the optimal trading (and
priing) problem for a retailer onneted to exible onsumers is onsidered.
Finally, market and system operators are hallenged by the inreasing penetra-
tion of renewables, whih put stress on markets that were designed to aommo-
date a generation mix largely dominated by onventional soures. Indeed, the
traditional market design, based on the sequential learing of suessive market
oors and on deterministi rules and riteria, is haraterized by higher and
higher degrees of suboptimality and lower reliability as the penetration of re-
newables inreases. This work ontributes to the state-of-the-art by proposing
new mehanisms for day-ahead dispath and reserve determination in markets
with high penetration of renewables, on the basis of stohasti riteria.
Summary (Danish)
Denne afhandling beskæftiger sig med udviklingen og anvendelsen af stokastiske
modeller for beslutningsproesser, som vil understøtte integrationen af vedva-
rende energi i elmarkeder.
Produktionen fra de este vedvarende elkilder, herunder vind, er uregelmæssig
og stokastisk, og derudover kan den kun forudsiges med begrænset nøjagtighed.
Som følge heraf indebærer driften af vedvarende energikilder helt nye udfordrin-
ger i forhold til konventionelle elkilder. Med hensyn til short-term elmarkeder er
der væsentlige udfordringer både i handlingsaktiviteterne for markedsdeltagere,
herunder produenter, detailhandlere og forbrugere, og i beslutningsproesserne
for markeds- og systemsoperatører.
Produenternes deltagelse i elmarkeder kræver, at deres handelsstrategi bestem-
mes, inden leveringen af energi forefalder. Da den fremtidige produktion fra
vedvarende elkilder er usikker, når produktionen bliver udbudt på markedet, er
handelsproblemet et stokastisk optimeringsproblem, hvis mål er maksimeringen
af indtægterne i gennemsnit. I denne afhandling fokuserer vi på handelspro-
blemer for vindenergiproduenterne såvel i markeder med lav penetration af
vedvarende energi, hvor produenterne er prie-takers, som i markeder med en
høj penetration, hvor de er prie-makers.
På grund af de initiativer som skal indføre eksibelt forbrug (demand response)
i fremtidens elsystemer, vil detailhandlernes drift og forbrugernes vaner være
påvirket af vedvarende energiproduktion. Et andet fokusområde i afhandlingen
er anvendelsen af dynamiske priser for at udnytte forbrugernes eksibilitet. Vi
studerer især problemet at styre et virtuelt kraftværk optimalt bestående af
iv
vedvarende energiproduktionsfailiteter og priseksible forbrugere. Desuden er
vi optaget af et lignende problem, hvor en detailhandler, som forsyner prisek-
sible forbrugere, skal optimere sin markedsstrategi.
Endeligt er vi optaget af, hvordan markeds- og systemsoperatører udfordres
af den stigende penetration af vedvarende energi, som belaster de nuværende
elmarkeder, der oprindeligt var konstrueret til at håndtere en blandet produktion
fra konventionelle elkilder. Jo højere en penetration af vedvarende energi, jo mere
suboptimal og mindre pålidelig er den traditionelle markedsstruktur, der baserer
sig på sekventielle markeds learing proedurer og på deterministiske kriterier.
I den forbindelse bidrager denne afhandling til det aktuelle tekniske niveau ved
at foreslå nye stokastiske metoder for fastsættelsen af produktionsplan samt
reservesstørrelse i markeder med høj penetration af vedvarende energi.
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Part I
Summary Report
Chapter 1
Introdution
As far as power systems are onerned, we live in probably the most interesting
years sine the late nineties, when liberalization took plae.
Enouraged by international agreements aiming at reduing CO2 emissions, and
baked by larger and larger shares of the soiety, renewable energy has expe-
riened an unpreedented growth in industrialized ountries during the reent
years. This impressive development an partly be explained by the favorable in-
entives renewables were granted in the early stages of their deployment. Under
these shemes, renewable power produers are allowed to ontribute to power
generation and at the same time sidestep most of the drawbaks and the risks
implied by partiipation in the market.
In parallel to their massive deployment, the per unit ost of renewable energy
has onstantly dereased, and is approahing grid parity for some tehnologies
like wind and solar. Hene, renewables are able to, and asked to, ompete in the
marketplae with onventional soures of energy, despite being fundamentally
dierent from these soures. Indeed, renewable soures, with the exeption
of hydro and biofuels, are non-dispathable, i.e., their output annot or an
only partly be modulated on demand, and their prodution is stohasti, and
therefore hard to predit in advane.
As a result of the large-sale deployment and of the peuliar features of renew-
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ables desribed above, there is an inreasing need for mathematial tools that
an model their impat on, as well as failitate their optimal partiipation in,
eletriity markets.
1.1 Thesis Objetive
This thesis aims at developing tools to eiently manage renewable soures in
the framework of liberalized eletriity markets. In an eonomi perspetive, ef-
ieny an be interpreted as ahieving minimum ost, maximum soial welfare
or maximum revenue. In mathematial terms, this translates naturally into op-
timization problems. Furthermore, owing to the unertain and non-dispathable
nature of renewable soures, their partiipation in eletriity markets an only
be modeled and optimized properly by making use of tools aounting for their
stohastiity. Hene, the natural hoie for tools to attak this type of problems
onsists in methods of optimization under unertainty.
As a motivation to this work, we rst desribe the impat that renewable soures
urrently have on eletriity markets. Owing to their inreasing penetration
in power systems, and to their peuliar harateristis previously mentioned,
renewable soures are expeted to have a substantial impat on the market, e.g.,
on the power owing on transmission lines and on the market-learing pries.
Papers A and B fous on the development of stohasti models based on non-
linear regression tehniques [CD88℄ to quantitatively desribe the underlying
relationships between renewable power and market quantities. The fous of
these two papers is on modeling rather than optimization, whih is the ore
of this thesis. Hene, their ontribution onsists in showing how renewables
already have a signiant impat on eletriity markets.
The management of renewables in eletriity markets omprises two omple-
mentary sides. On the one side are the market partiipants, mainly produers,
retailers and onsumers, who either own renewable prodution apaity or are,
more or less diretly, inuened by it. On the other side are the market opera-
tors and the transmission system operators, whih fae the hallenging problem
of operating the market and the transmission grid eiently and safely as the
ontribution from renewables inreases. Both problems are addressed in this
thesis.
The problem of renewable power produers seeking to optimize their revenues in
eletriity markets is onsidered rst. The unertain nature of their prodution,
oupled with the advane in time required to partiipate in eletriity markets,
result in a problem of optimization under unertainty. Paper C onsiders the
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ase where the produer is a prie-taker in the market, whih has a ertain
anity with the well-known newsvendor problem [RS64℄. Then, we abandon the
prie-taker assumption and onsider the optimization problem of a renewable
power produer having an impat on pries in Paper D. Suh problem is modeled
as a Mathematial Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) [GCF
+
12℄.
As far as retailers and onsumers are onerned, fundamental hanges in the
way they operate and behave will be brought about in the years to ome by
demand response initiatives. Being suh programmes aimed at inreasing the
possibility for integrating renewables, the point of view of demand (retailers and
onsumers) is partiularly relevant to this work. In this respet, Papers E and
F onsider the joint problem of retailers and onsumers that interat by means
of dynami pries, broadast by the former partiipant, and exible demand.
More speially, in Paper E, we model the ase of a retailer optimally man-
aging a virtual power plant omprising both stohasti generation and exible
onsumers exposed to dynami pries. In Paper F, we onsider the hierarhial
relationship between exible onsumers and a prie-setting retailer, whih ex-
hanges power with an innite market. The models in both papers are based
on MPECs.
Market and transmission system operators are also hallenged by the develop-
ment of renewables as they are alled to lear and operate markets eiently,
despite the inreasing share of non-dispathable and stohasti power in the
system. The traditional way of learing subsequent markets, energy-only or
omprising energy and reserve apaity, in a sequential fashion based on de-
terministi priniples is known to be suboptimal when stohasti produers are
involved. In Paper G, we onsider a learing proedure for a two-stage (day-
ahead and balaning) energy-only market, based on MPECs and on stohasti
programming priniples [BL11℄. Furthermore, in Paper H, we onsider the joint
optimization of reserve and day-ahead dispath. Suh a problem is approahed
making use of robust optimization [BBC11℄, in order to guarantee eieny in
the worst-ase realization of the unertain renewable prodution.
As a nal omment, it should be mentioned that most of the papers inluded
in this dissertation are speially targeted to wind power, among all renewable
soures. There are two reasons for this. The rst one is that wind power is
by far the most ommon stohasti, non-dispathable renewable soure in the
world nowadays, partiularly in Denmark where the share of wind power in the
prodution mix is about 30%. The seond reason is that, among these renew-
ables soures, wind was the rst one having to partiipate in markets. However,
the results we present ould be easily generalized to solar, wave and tidal power,
whih share many harateristis of wind power, i.e., the stohasti and non-
dispathable nature rst, along with intermitteny and spatial distribution in
the system.
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1.2 Thesis Outline
The thesis is strutured as follows. Part I is a report introduing and summa-
rizing the papers. Within this part, Chapter 2 omprises a brief introdution to
eletriity markets, in partiular to the Nordi market, Nord Pool, and to how
renewables partiipate in it. Chapter 3 introdues the methodologies employed
in the thesis: Mathematial Programs with Equilibrium Constraints (MPECs),
stohasti programming and robust optimization. A summary of the main re-
sults obtained in the papers is given in Chapter 4. Finally, Chapter 5 onludes
Part I.
Part II is a olletion of publiations inluding the following papers.
Paper A is a journal artile aepted for publiation in IEEE Transations
on Power Systems. It deals with modeling the impat of wind power
prodution in Germany on European ross-border ows, making use of
nonlinear regression oupled with prinipal omponent analysis.
Paper B is an invited paper presented at the IEEE Power and Energy Soiety
General Meeting 2012, whih disusses an analysis similar to the one in
Paper A, also inluding results showing the impat of German wind power
prodution on power ows in Austria, and of the foreast of wind power
prodution on market pries in Western Denmark and in the German EEX
market.
Paper C is a journal artile published in Wind Energy in 2012. This paper
deals with the determination of the optimal trading strategy for a prie-
taker wind power produer, and inludes a realisti test-ast simulating
the trading ativity during a period of 10 months in Eastern Denmark.
Paper D is a journal artile aepted for publiation in IEEE Transations on
Power Systems. This paper deals with the optimal trading strategy for
a wind power produer that is a prie-maker in the balaning market. It
also presents results obtained from a ase study based on Nord Pool.
Paper E is a paper presented at the 12th IAEE European Energy Conferene in
2012. The topi of this paper is the optimal management of a virtual power
plant omprising wind power prodution failities and exible onsumers
responsive to dynami pries.
Paper F is a journal artile published in Energy Eonomis in 2013. It presents
a hierarhial optimization model for determining the optimal market
strategy for a retailer supplying exible demand, whih is responsive to
dynami pries.
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Paper G is a journal artile submitted to European Journal of Operational
Researh. It presents a novel day-ahead market-learing model for energy-
only markets, aounting for the projeted balaning osts of deviations
from stohasti produers, and onstrained by equilibrium onditions that
guarantee ost-reovery for exible produers.
Paper H is a tehnial report, whih deals with the joint determination of
day-ahead energy and reserve dispath making use of robust optimization.
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Chapter 2
Eletriity Markets
Eletriity is a fundamental resoure in modern soieties. We make use of it
ontinuously to satisfy our basi household needs. Besides, eletrial power is the
bakbone of our eonomy, as it is key for the ativity in both the manufaturing
and the servie industry.
Beause of the importane of eletriity in our soiety, it is essential that the
whole hain of proesses from the generation to the delivery of power to the
end onsumers is managed in a reliable and ost-eient manner. In a large
number of industrialized ountries, this is urrently performed in the framework
of eletriity markets.
In this hapter, we review briey the history of liberalization of the eletriity
setor and desribe the main harateristis of eletriity markets in Setion
2.1. Then, the struture of the Nordi power exhange, Nord Pool, is skethed
in Setion 2.2. Setion 2.3 disusses the impat of renewables on eletriity
markets and some of the hallenges they pose. Finally, demand response is
briey introdued in Setion 2.4.
10 Eletriity Markets
2.1 Liberalization of the Eletriity Setor
Until the last two deades of the 20th entury, power systems worldwide were
organized in a entralized fashion. State-owned, vertially-integrated utilities
were in harge of the whole hain of ativity related to eletrial power: genera-
tion, transmission, distribution and retail. Furthermore, suh utilities ated as
monopolies in all these elds.
The organization of power systems as state monopolies remained pratially un-
hallenged until the end of the last entury. The rst steps towards the reation
of modern eletriity markets were taken by the Chiago Boys in Chile in 1982,
during the Pinohet ditatorship, with the separation of generation and distribu-
tion ativities (unbundling), the introdution of ompetition between produers,
as well as of trading and priing of eletriity aording to the prodution ost
(marginal priing).
As far as Europe is onerned, the rst ountries to liberalize the eletriity
setor were the UK, with the reation of an eletriity market in England and
Wales in 1990, and Norway in 1991. Australia (Vitoria and New South Wales
market, 1994) and New Zealand (1996) were also among the rst movers. The
United States followed with the liberalization of markets in California (CalPX),
New York (NYISO), Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland (PJM) by the end
of the entury [Wer06℄. Eletriity markets worldwide have been implemented
in a variety of ways, whih would be impossible to review here. However, these
implementations share a number of ommon features.
The rst ommon feature is the separation of generation, transmission, distri-
bution and retail ativities. Markets promote ompetition in generation and
retail, while transmission remains a monopoly managed by non-ommerial or-
ganizations (System Operators, in short SOs).
Trading of eletriity is organized in pools or exhanges, where produers and
possibly retailers and large onsumers submit bids for energy delivery to, or
withdrawal from, the grid. Commonly, the preferred marketplae for short-
term transations is a day-ahead market, often referred to as forward market
in the United States and as spot market in Europe. Later adjustments of day-
ahead ontrats are possible in intra-day markets, and nally in the balaning
market, whih is also alled real-time or regulation market. Contrat lengths
typially over one hour or half an hour. Furthermore, most markets provide
learing servies for nanial ontrats (forward, options and derivatives).
In general, liberalization is onsidered to have improved the eieny of power
systems' management, leading to lower pries for eletriity, and to have solved
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the overinvestment problem typial of entralized power systems [Wer06℄. How-
ever, the implementation of eletriity markets has not been free of failures,
see for example the risis in California at the beginning of the entury [Bor02℄.
Currently, the traditional market design is hallenged by the growth in installed
renewable apaity, as we disuss in Setion 2.3.
We refer the reader to [Wer06℄ for a more detailed history and desription of
eletriity markets.
In the next setion, we introdue the main features of the Nordi eletriity
market, Nord Pool. This market is ommonly addressed in the researh papers
inluded in Part II of this thesis.
2.2 The Nord Pool Market
The Nord Pool market, originally named Statnett Marked AS, was reated in
Norway in 1991, after the Norwegian parliament imposed the deregulation of
the eletriity setor. The geographial sope of the market has extended grad-
ually during the years. In 1996, Sweden joined the market to form the rst
international power exhange worldwide, whih was then renamed as Nord Pool
ASA. Finland and Denmark joined in 1998 and 2000, respetively. The Balti
ountries are urrently in the proess of being integrated. Estonia and Lithuania
have already joined as bidding areas of Nord Pool in 2010 and 2012, respetively,
while Latvia is planning to join the marketplae in the near future [Nor13a℄.
Nord Pool provides learing servies for the short-term eletriity markets. Fur-
thermore, it also serves as learinghouse for nanial produts (forward, futures,
derivatives, et.). The two types of ativities have been separated in 2010, when
Nasdaq OMX aquired the nanial learinghouse and onsultany servies se-
tions of Nord Pool, now alled Nasdaq OMX Commodities Europe, while the
short-term eletriity market ativities are arried out by Nord Pool Spot ASA.
The latter ompany is jointly owned by the Transmission System Operators
(TSOs) of the ountries partiipating in the exhange.
Being the fous of this thesis on short-term markets, we desribe their funtion-
ing in this setion, while the nanial market is disregarded. First, we present
the energy markets, i.e., the the day-ahead, intra-day and balaning markets,
aording to their sequential order. Then, we deal with apaity markets at the
end of the setion.
More information on the history of Nord Pool, and on the funtioning of the
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dierent markets, an be found in [Nor13b℄ and [Nor13℄.
2.2.1 Day-ahead Market
The day-ahead market in Nord Pool is named Elspot. It is organized as a two-
sided aution where produers, retailers and large onsumers submit bids for
delivery and withdrawal of eletriity throughout the following day. Market
partiipants must submit 24 bids in total, i.e., one for eah hour of the following
day. Eah bid is speied as a set of prie-quantity pairs, indiating the amount
of energy the partiipant is willing to purhase or sell at a given prie.
The deadline for submitting bids is at noon of the day preeding the atual deliv-
ery. After this, Nord Pool lears the market by 12:45, publishing the prie(s) and
ommuniating the prodution and onsumption shedules to eah produer. In
order to lear the market, Nord Pool determines aggregate sale and purhase
urves by sorting the sale bids aording to inreasing pries, and the purhase
bids in the inverse order. The intersetion between the two urves sets the sys-
tem prie. If all transmission onstraints are satised, this prie applies for the
whole system: all the sale (purhase) oers whose prie is not greater (lower)
than this prie are aepted, and this determines the day-ahead shedule. The
market-learing proedure is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Market learing in Nord Pool based on the purhase and sale
urves submitted for the 12th trading period of the 7th September
2011. Data from [Nor13℄
If transmission bottleneks arise as a result of the prodution and onsumption
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Figure 2.2: Market splitting through impliit autions
plan implied by the appliation of a unique system prie, Nord Pool Spot pro-
eeds with the so-alled market splitting proedure. In this proedure, dierent
market pries are alulated in market areas linked by ongested transmission
lines. Area pries are alulated through an impliit aution. Aggregate sup-
ply and demand urves are determined for eah market area where ongestion
arises. If the area is in surplus of prodution, the transmission apaity is on-
sidered as a prie-independent purhase bid, thus shifting the purhase urve to
the right. The result is an inrease in the area prie and, onsequently, a larger
prodution and lower onsumption. On the other hand, if the area is in deit
of prodution, the transmission apaity from other Nord Pool areas enters as
a prie-independent supply bid, thus shifting the sale urve to the right and
dereasing the area prie. The situation is skethed in Figure 2.2.
The number and geographial extension of the prie areas is predened in Nord
Pool. There are ve prie zones in Norway, four in Sweden, two in Denmark
and a single prie area for eah of the other ountries (Finland, Estonia and
Lithuania). Basially, the borders between area pries are drawn where the
main transmission bottleneks are loated in the power grid. The prie zones in
Nord Pool are illustrated in Figure 2.3.
The priing rules in Nord Pool impose that the day-ahead prie be equal through-
out eah individual prie zone, despite the fat that internal transmission lines
may be ongested. Suh a priing system is referred to as zonal priing. In
ontrast, market pries an be dierent at eah node of the grid when the nodal
priing system is employed. In suh a system, the prie of eletriity mirrors
the marginal inrease in the ost for serving load at any given node of the grid.
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Figure 2.3: Bidding areas in Nord Pool Spot. Figure from [Nor13℄
2.2.2 Intra-day Market
The Elbas market allows intra-day trading in Nord Pool after the learing of the
day-ahead market. Trading in Elbas starts at 14:00 on the day before delivery
and is allowed until one hour in advane for any trading period of the day. The
organization of the intra-day market in Nord Pool is dierent from that of an
exhange. Indeed in this market, bid and ask oers are mathed around the
lok on a rst-ome, rst-served basis, rather than being leared in one shot at
the gate losure.
Intra-day markets are indiated by many as a fundamental trading oor to
allow the large-sale integration of renewables [Web10℄. Nevertheless, Elbas has
a very low liquidity, as its trading volume rounds 1% of the total onsumption
in Sandinavia. This gure is in line with the liquidity of most other European
intra-day markets, with the notable exeption of the Iberian MIBEL market.
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2.2.3 Balaning Market
The balaning market ensures that prodution equals onsumption at any time
period in the Nordi region as a whole. This implies that all unwanted devia-
tions from the prodution and onsumption plans resulting from the day-ahead
and intra-day markets are oset by the ativation of regulating power from other
market partiipants. The balaning market failitates trading aross dierent
prie areas of Nord Pool. However, the ativation of regulating bids in a ertain
prie area is responsibility of the relevant national Transmission System Opera-
tor (TSO), whih ensures the stability of the system frequeny at 50Hz within
its prie area(s).
The distintion between regulating and balaning power is fundamental. Balane
Responsible Parties (BRPs) are allowed to submit bids for regulating power until
45 minutes before delivery. These bids an be for up-regulation (prodution
inrease or onsumption derease) or down-regulation (prodution derease or
onsumption inrease). On request of the TSO, these bids must be ativated
within a period of 15 minutes. In Denmark, regulating power is then paid
aording to the marginal priing priniple, with the prie being set as the prie
oer of the highest (lowest) bid ativated for at least 10 onseutive minutes in
ase of prevailing up- (down-)regulation in the system. Bids that are ativated
for less than 10 minutes, or that are in the opposite diretion to that of the
overall system imbalane for the hour, are pried aording to the pay-as-bid
rule.
Unwanted energy deviations from the aggregated shedules after trading in the
day-ahead and intra-day markets onstitute balaning power. These imbalanes
are settled ex post aording to the metered prodution and onsumption of the
market partiipant. In the Nordi market, the one-prie rule applies to devia-
tions in onsumption, while the two-prie rule applies to prodution imbalanes.
In the one-prie model, all power imbalanes are settled at the balaning market
prie, i.e., the marginal ost of regulating power for the hour. This implies that
an unwanted deviation in the opposite diretion as ompared to the system
imbalane is atually rewarded by a prie that is more attrative than the day-
ahead prie (higher for positive deviation, lower for negative). On the ontrary,
in the two-prie system the balaning market prie applies only to deviations in
the same diretion as the system's. This implies that:
• If the system is in deit of power (up-regulation), a produer with a
negative unwanted deviation (underprodution) must pay the balaning
prie, whih is higher than the day-ahead prie, while it reeives the day-
ahead prie for a positive unwanted deviation (overprodution).
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• In the ase of power surplus (down-regulation), a produer pays the day-
ahead prie for an unwanted underprodution, while it reeives the bal-
aning market prie, whih is lower than the day-ahead prie, for positive
unwanted deviations.
The reader is referred to [Ene08℄ for further information.
2.2.4 Capaity Markets
Day-ahead, intra-day and balaning markets are energy markets, in that the
payment to or from the market operator is proportional to the amount of energy
atually delivered to or withdrawn from the grid. In addition to energy markets,
apaity markets are in plae in Nord Pool to guarantee the availability of
suient regulating power in the market.
The apaity markets are managed by the national TSOs. In Denmark, there
exist separate apaity markets for primary, seondary and tertiary (or man-
ual) reserve. The primary reserve market is leared daily at 15:00 on the day
before operation, while the seondary reserve one is leared on a monthly basis.
Instead, the market for tertiary reserve is leared everyday at 9:30. The aep-
tane of a reserve bid in the latter market obliges a produer to submit an oer
in the regulation market of at least the same size.
Produers partiipating in apaity markets are paid proportionally to the avail-
able apaity (MW). The apaity prie is equal to the prie of the most expen-
sive bid aepted in the market.
The interested reader is referred to [Ene12℄ for further details on the funtioning
of apaity markets in Denmark.
2.2.5 On the Clearing Sequene and Proedures
An important aspet of energy and apaity markets is the relationship between
their market-learing proedures.
In Nord Pool, and in many other eletriity markets, the dierent markets de-
sribed above are leared sequentially and in a deterministi fashion. For exam-
ple, the day-ahead market is leared on the basis of the bids reeived from pro-
duers and generators, whih are known with ertainty by the market operator.
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On the other hand, there is no regard to the projetion of the market-learing
deision on the future ost for the system, e.g., in terms of imbalane. The ap-
pliation of suh a straightforward deterministi rule responds to the important
riterion of transpareny of sheduling and priing. However, a stohasti rite-
rion suh as the minimization of the total expeted ost would result in a higher
soial welfare (in expetation) as soon as renewables penetrate the system, as
shown in [PZP10℄. The issue is addressed in Paper G in this thesis.
Similarly, the market for manual reserve is leared before the day-ahead market
and aording to deterministi riteria (e.g., the n−1 riterion). In ontrast, the
joint optimization of day-ahead dispath and reserve is advoated in [MCPR09℄,
whih shows that signiant ost redutions an be ahieved by employing a
stohasti programming approah. In this dissertation, the topi is addressed
in Paper H making use of robust optimization.
2.3 Impat of Renewables on Eletriity Markets
In a global perspetive, renewable power has been growing at an astonishing
pae in the reent years. In partiular, wind power has been a booming industry
that experiened an almost exponential growth in installed apaity worldwide
[Glo12℄.
Denmark has been at the forefront of the development in wind power. Having
enjoyed the rst-mover advantage with respet to the deployment of this pro-
dution tehnology, this ountry has one of the highest shares of wind power
prodution worldwide. Figure 2.4 illustrates the evolution in time of the umu-
lative installed wind power apaity in Denmark, along with the share of wind
in the total annual eletriity generation, whih urrently rounds 30%.
As a side eet of aommodating a large share of renewables, Nord Pool has
experiened the impat that suh soures have on eletriity markets. This is
partiularly true for the Danish prie areas DK1 and DK2, where most of the
wind power prodution failities are installed.
Muh of the impat of renewables on eletriity markets an be explained by the
so-alled merit order eet. Sine their marginal ost is basially zero (or even
negative if inentive shemes award prie premia to renewables on top of the
learing prie), the oer from renewable produers enters the aggregate supply
urve from the left-hand side. This implies that renewables are sheduled before
onventional power produers.
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Figure 2.4: Development of installed wind power apaity and wind power
penetration in Denmark over the last two deades. Figure from
[Ene13b℄
The output from renewables diretly inuenes the market prie as a result.
Sine their prodution is intermittent, the aggregate supply urve for the system
is shifted to the left in ase of low prodution from renewables, and to the right
in ase of high renewable outturn. As illustrated in Figure 2.5, this has an
eet on the intersetion between the supply and demand urves. In periods
with high renewable power prodution, the amount of sheduled prodution and
onsumption inreases, and the market prie is low. On the ontrary, periods
with low renewable power prodution are haraterized by higher pries and
lower prodution and onsumption shedules.
An impliation of the eet of renewable power prodution on pries is that
regions where a high output from renewables is foreast tend to have lower
pries than regions with lower renewable prodution or penetration. In turn,
prie dierentials trigger power ows from low-prie areas to high-prie ones.
Sine renewable power prodution is one of the drivers of the market prie, we
an expet it to have an eet on regional power ows as well.
Given the stohasti nature of renewable power prodution, its impat on ele-
triity markets, e.g., on pries and ows, is also stohasti. Furthermore, these
eets have a nonlinear nature as well. For example, the relationship between
renewable power prodution and the prie is dependent on the shape of the
aggregate supply and purhase urves. Similarly, one an expet a nonlinear
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Figure 2.5: The merit order eet and the impat of renewables on the learing
prie in an eletriity exhange
impat of renewable output on power ows.
In Papers A and B, the impat of renewable power prodution on eletriity
markets is studied by making use of nonlinear regression tehniques presented
in [CD88℄. This allows to determine models desribing the average behavior of
dependent variables (e.g., market pries and power ows) as nonlinear funtions
of explanatory variables (e.g., wind power penetration).
The relation between foreast wind power penetration, dened as the ratio be-
tween the wind power output and load, and the day-ahead prie is one of the
issues explored in Paper B. Figure 2.6, whih is extrated from the paper men-
tioned above, illustrates this relation in the Western Danish (DK1) prie area of
Nord Pool. Notably, the day-ahead prie is dereasing with wind power penetra-
tion, as a onsequene of the merit order eet desribed above. Furthermore,
the relation is nonlinear.
Paper A onsiders the impat of wind power prodution in Germany on the
ross-border power ows among European ountries. Figure 2.7 shows the
model desribing the relationship between foreast wind power penetration in
Germany, time of the day and the power ow in the interonnetion between
Western Denmark (DK1 area) and Norway (NO2 area). As one an see, power
ows on average from Norway towards Denmark when low levels of wind power
penetration are expeted in Germany, while the situation is reversed with high
levels of wind power prodution. Indeed, lower power pries turn Germany and
Denmark into net exporters of eletriity. On the ontrary, the Norwegian gen-
eration mix, nearly entirely onsisting of hydro units [Nor12℄, is exible enough
to lower the prodution, onsequently allowing for power import.
The results in Papers A and B onrm that renewables, and in partiular wind
power, have already beome an important player in eletriity markets. As suh,
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Figure 2.6: Relation between the foreast wind power penetration and day-
ahead market prie in the Western Danish (DK1) area of Nord
Pool. Plot from Paper B
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Figure 2.7: Impat of foreast wind power penetration in Germany on power
ow between the Danish DK1 area and the Norwegian NO2 area.
Plot from Paper A
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they are hallenging the traditional ways markets are operated.
The unertain nature of renewable soures, suh as wind and solar power, in-
reases the need for bakup power to ope with the unpredited utuations
of power prodution. This results in an inreasing need for liquidity in mar-
kets whose gate losure approahes real-time, as well as for an eient use of
the resoures partiipating in these markets. The balaning market is partiu-
larly important to renewable power produers, as it allows them to adjust their
ontrats so that they math their atual output. Similarly to the ase of the
day-ahead prie, renewable power prodution impats the prie at the balan-
ing market, too. Inreasing the liquidity of intra-day markets [Web10℄, and
improving the funtioning of reserve markets [MCPR09℄ are also paramount to
improve the eieny of eletriity markets highly penetrated by renewables.
In partiular, inreasing the eieny of markets through improved deision
making under unertainty is the topi of Papers G and H.
Another feature of renewables, namely their intermitteny, is ontributing to
reshaping eletriity markets. While solar power prodution peaks at noon, wind
power prodution is generally higher during the night. Inreasing renewable
power penetration requires a higher degree of exibility in power systems, as
they must be apable of operating safely even when the output from renewables
is low. As far as the supply side is onerned, this an be aomplished by
installing power plants with large ramping apaity and by deploying storage
failities. Besides, the onsumption side oers great potential to inrease system
exibility through the development of demand response initiatives.
2.4 The Role of Demand Response
Figure 2.8 illustrates a situation that is beoming more and more ommon in
Western Denmark (DK1 area of Nord Pool): wind power prodution exeeds
total onsumption during valley hours. Situations like this normally result in
zero or even negative eletriity pries. In turn, low pries signal that inreasing
power supply during these hours has low value for the soiety, thus disouraging
investment in new renewable prodution apaity.
Demand response has reently emerged as a measure to aommodate inreasing
penetration of renewables in power systems by making use of the available re-
soures more eiently. Basially, ommerial as well as residential onsumers
are to be involved in the eletriity market and inentivized to adapt to an
inreasingly intermittent supply.
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Figure 2.8: Wind power prodution and onsumption in Western Denmark
(DK1) during the last week of February 2012. Data from [Ene13a℄
Generally demand response initiatives are grouped into either diret ontrol or
indiret ontrol. The former group omprises initiatives aimed at granting TSOs,
or other market entities with similar objetives, the right to diretly modulate
the demand by means of rationing or disonneting individual onsumers, or
groups of. Typially onsumers involved in these programmes are proteted by
a ontrat xing how often they an be disonneted or rationed.
Indiret ontrol implies the use of eonomi inentives so that demand adapts to
the stohasti and intermittent prodution. In pratie, this would be done by
broadasting time-varying pries to the onsumers (time-of-use prie or dynami
real-time prie). This topi is onsidered in Papers E and F.
The implementation of demand response requires the installment of infrastru-
ture allowing ommuniation to the onsumers (one way or bidiretional), and
of onsumer applianes able to adapt their onsumption to the broadast sig-
nals. This infrastrutural upgrade of the grid and of the onsumer applianes
is often assoiated with the notion of smart grid.
Besides the tehnial hallenges involved with the infrastrutural developments
just mentioned, demand response poses diult hallenges also in terms of mar-
ket design. First of all, the introdution of prie-inentives will onfer dynami
properties to the demand, by inreasing its ross-elastiity aross dierent time
periods, whih needs to be modeled and aounted for by the poliy-makers.
Furthermore, demand response will require the oordination of a large number
of onsumers and distributed generators spread around the system, with further
ompliations imposed by the tight apaity onstraints that haraterize the
2.4 The Role of Demand Response 23
power grid at the distribution level. For these and other reasons, demand re-
sponse is onsidered one of the most hallenging topis of power systems researh
in the years to ome.
We refer the interested reader to [THL10℄ for a detailed desription of the de-
mand response initiatives urrently implemented and planned in Europe.
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Chapter 3
Optimization Under
Unertainty
Beause of the stohasti nature of renewable soures, their eient management
in eletriity markets alls for the use of tools for optimization under unertainty.
In this hapter, we review some elements of optimization theory that support the
mathematial developments in the papers inluded in this dissertation. Setion
3.1 summarizes some basi notions of optimization and of linear programming.
Mathematial Programs with Equilibrium Constraints (MPECs) are introdued
in Setion 3.2. Then, we introdue the framework of stohasti programming
in Setion 3.3. Finally, Setion 3.4 deals with robust optimization. Examples
fousing on eletriity markets are proposed throughout the hapter to illustrate
how these optimization tools are employed in the papers in Part II.
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3.1 Fundamentals of Optimization
The general mathematial formulation of an optimization problem is the follow-
ing one:
Minimize
x
f(x) (3.1a)
s.t. g(x) ≤ 0 , (3.1b)
h(x) = 0 . (3.1)
Bold fonts indiate vetors, matries and vetor-valued funtions. In order to
avoid tedious denitions for every optimization model, we will hereinafter as-
sume that all the elements are dened properly, i.e., in this ase f(·) : Rn → R,
g(·) : Rn → Rl, h(·) : Rn → Rm, and 0 is a zero-valued vetor of the proper
size.
The simplest instane of the general optimization problem (3.1) is obtained
when the funtions f(·), g(·) and h(·) are linear. A linear program (LP) an be
formulated as follows:
Min.
x
cTx (3.2a)
s.t. AIx ≤ bI , (3.2b)
AEx = bE , (3.2)
where AI, AE, c, bI and bE are matries and vetors of appropriate size.
Linear programs (LPs) model a wide variety of real-world problems. In Ex-
ample 3.1, we show how a network-onstrained market-learing problem an be
modeled as an LP. Notie that very large LPs an be solved using ommerially
available software.
3.1.1 Duality in Linear Programming
Let us assoiate the vetor µ ≤ 0 to the inequalities (3.2b), and the vetor λ,
free in sign, to the equalities (3.2). Both vetors are sized so that one element
of the vetor orresponds to one onstraint. The following problem is the dual
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version of problem (3.2), whih is referred to as primal :
Max.
µ,λ
bTI µ+ b
T
Eλ (3.3a)
s.t. ATI µ+A
T
Eλ = c , (3.3b)
µ ≤ 0 . (3.3)
The dual variables µ and λ an be interpreted as marginal osts. Indeed, they
represent the per unit hange in the optimal value of the objetive funtion
(3.2a) if the right-hand side of the assoiated onstraint is inreased marginally.
Naturally µ ≤ 0, sine a marginal inrease of any element of bI would result in
a larger feasible spae for (3.2).
In a market employing the marginal priing rule, dual variables are of partiular
importane as they serve to prie the traded ommodity.
The following duality results are well known in linear programming. We report
them without proof and refer the reader to [LY08℄ for further detail.
Theorem 3.1 (Weak Duality) If x is feasible for (3.2), and µ,λ are fea-
sible for (3.3), then cTx ≥ bTI µ+ b
T
Eλ.
Theorem 3.2 (Strong Duality) If the primal problem has a nite optimal
solution x∗, so does the dual problem and at optimality it holds that cTx∗ =
bTI µ
∗ + bTEλ
∗
.
Sine the dual of the dual problem is again the primal problem, the onverse of
the previous theorem holds trivially.
3.1.2 Karush-Kuhn-Tuker Conditions
Duality results similar to the ones of linear programming are available for non-
linear onvex optimization problems. However, in this dissertation we only deal
with Karush-Kuhn-Tuker optimality onditions for onvex problems, and refer
to [BSS06℄ for a general introdution to duality theory.
Let us onsider the general formulation (3.1), and suppose that f(·), g(·) are
ontinuously dierentiable and onvex, and h(·) is ane.
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The Lagrangian funtion for problem (3.1) is the following:
L(x,µ,λ) = f(x) + µTg(x) + λTh(x) . (3.4)
Under the assumptions above, as well as some onstraint qualiation
1
, the
following Karush-Kuhn-Tuker (KKT) onditions are neessary and suient
for optimality for problem (3.1):
∇xf(x) + µ
T∇xg(x) + λ
T∇xh(x) = 0 , (3.5a)
g(x) ≤ 0 , (3.5b)
h(x) = 0 , (3.5)
µ ≥ 0 , (3.5d)
µTg(x) = 0 . (3.5e)
Equation (3.5a) are stationarity onditions. Constraints (3.5b) and (3.5) en-
fore feasibility of the primal problem, while (3.5d) is a feasibility ondition of
the dual problem. Finally, (3.5e) enfores omplementary slakness.
The dual vetors µ and λ retain the interpretation of marginal osts disussed
in Setion 3.1.1. It should be underlined, however, that the dual variables as
dened in (3.5) have opposite sign as ompared to the relative denition in
the dual of a linear problem (3.3). These denitions are rather typial of the
literature on the subjet.
In the remainder of this dissertation, we will make use of the ⊥ operator in the
following ompat notation for onstraints (3.5b), (3.5d) and (3.5e)
0 ≥ g(x) ⊥ µ ≥ 0 . (3.6)
Example 3.1 (Network-onstrained market-learing problem) The fol-
lowing LP represents a single-period market-learing problem in an eletriity
pool. Its output is the optimal generation dispath in view of the transmission
1
Constraint qualiations are needed for ensuring that KKT onditions are neessary for
optimality. This is veried, for example, if g(·) is ane. Another ommon onstraint qual-
iation requires linear independene of the gradients of ative inequality onstraints and of
equality onstraints. We refer the reader to speialized books on optimization, for instane
[BSS06℄
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onstraints in the network.
Min.
p,δ
∑
k
ckpk (3.7a)
s.t.
∑
k∈ΦG
i
pk −
∑
j∈ΦN
i
Bij(δi − δj) =
∑
m∈ΦL
i
lm −
∑
q∈ΦW
i
wq : λi , ∀i , (3.7b)
pk ≤ Pk : µk , ∀k , (3.7)
Bij(δi − δj) ≤ Tij : σij , ∀i, j ∈ Φ
N
i , (3.7d)
pk ≥ 0 , ∀k . (3.7e)
In model (3.7), we index with k the oers for prodution, with m the loads, with
q the renewable power produers, with i and j the nodes of the transmission
network. Eah produer bids a set of pairs (Pk, ck), where the former element is
the size of the prodution blok and the latter one the minimum aepted prie
for the blok. Variables pk represent the deision of the market operator on the
energy dispath for eah prodution blok. The parameters lm and wq represent
the load and the renewable power prodution.
The objetive funtion (3.7a) represents the prodution ost for the dispathed
quantities. Constraints (3.7) and (3.7e) enfore that the dispath is within the
limit speied by the bid and nonnegative, respetively. The situation in absene
of transmission onstraints is skethed in Figure 3.1. In this ase, the minimum-
ost dispath is determined by the intersetion between the total net demand and
the aggregate supply urve.
generation
cost
sale
purchase
λ ∗
∑k p∗k = ∑m lm−∑q wq
P1
c1
Energy
Pr
ic
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Figure 3.1: Market-learing in absene of transmission onstraints
In order to model the transmission grid, we dene the set ΦGi of generators
loated at node i. Similarly, ΦWi is the set of renewable power produers at node
i, ΦLi the set of loads at the same node, while the set Φ
N
i ontains the nodes
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j onneted to i by a transmission line. We represent linearly the ow on the
interonnetion between i and j as the produt between the line suseptane Bij
and the dierene between the voltage angles δi − δj at the ends of the line.
Inequality (3.7d) enfores the transmission limit between nodes i and j, whih
must be lower than the line apaity, Tij , in absolute value. Finally, equation
(3.7b) enfores the power balane at eah node i, by setting the dierene between
prodution and power owing out of the node equal to the net nodal onsumption.
The dual problem for the network-onstrained market-learing model writes as:
Max.
λ,µ,σ
∑
i
 ∑
m∈ΦL
i
lm −
∑
q∈ΦW
i
wq
λi +∑
k
Pkµk +
∑
i
∑
j∈ΦN
i
Tijσij (3.8a)
s.t. λs(k) + µk ≤ ck : pk , ∀k , (3.8b)∑
j∈ΦN
i
Bij(−λi + λj + σij − σji) = 0 : δi , ∀i , (3.8)
µk ≤ 0 , ∀k , σij ≤ 0 , ∀i, j ∈ Φ
N
i , (3.8d)
where s(k) is the index of the node where produer k is loated.
The determination of the optimal value of the dual variables λ is of partiular
signiane. At optimality, λ∗i indiates the per unit hange in the objetive
funtion value of (3.7) for a demand inrease at node i. It should be notied
that this is preisely the denition of marginal prie. In a market with nodal
priing, the optimal value of the dual vetor λ∗ provides the prie of eletriity
at eah loation of the power grid.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the situation when no ongestion ours in the grid. The
marginal prie of eletriity is equal to the highest-prie oer aepted. If de-
mand is inreased by a onstant, the purhase urve is shifted to the right. This
implies an inreased ost for the system equal to the size of the shift times the
per unit ost of prodution of the last unit dispathed.
The Lagrangian for the network-onstrained market-learing problem (3.7) is the
following:
L =
∑
k
ckpk +
∑
i
λi
∑
k∈ΦG
i
pk −
∑
j∈ΦN
i
Bij(δi − δj)−
∑
m∈ΦL
i
lm +
∑
q∈ΦW
i
wq

+
∑
k
µk(pk − Pk) +
∑
i
∑
j∈ΦN
i
σij (Bij(δi − δj)− Tij)−
∑
k
αkpk .
(3.9)
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Notie that we assigned the dual variables α ≥ 0 to the nonnegativity denition
of p in the above derivation of the Lagrangian.
From (3.9), we obtain the following stationarity onditions:
∂L
∂pk
= ck + λs(k) + µk − αk = 0 , ∀k , (3.10a)
∂L
∂δi
=
∑
j∈ΦN
i
Bij(−λi + λj + σij − σji) = 0 , ∀i . (3.10b)
The primal equality onstraints∑
k∈ΦG
i
pk −
∑
j∈ΦN
i
Bij(δi − δj) =
∑
m∈ΦL
i
lm −
∑
q∈ΦW
i
wq , ∀i , (3.11)
also appear in the set of KKT onditions.
We an write the omplementarity onditions in a ompat form, inluding the
primal inequality onstraints and the nonnegativity denitions of the dual vari-
ables, as follows:
0 ≤ µk ⊥ pk − Pk ≤ 0 , ∀k , (3.12a)
0 ≤ σij ⊥ Bij(δi − δj)− Tij ≤ 0 , ∀i, j ∈ Φ
N
i , (3.12b)
0 ≤ αk ⊥ −pk ≤ 0 , ∀k . (3.12)
Variables α are in fat slaks. We an get rid of them by reasting onditions
(3.10a) and (3.12) as follows:
0 ≤ pk ⊥ ck + λs(k) + µk ≥ 0 , ∀k . (3.13)
We onlude the example with the following omments.
• Constraints (3.11), the inequalities on the right-hand side of the ⊥ operator
in (3.12a) and (3.12b), as well as the ones on the left-hand side of ⊥ in
(3.13) onstitute the denition of the feasible spae of the primal problem
(3.7).
• Equation (3.10b), the inequalities on the left-hand side of ⊥ in (3.12a)
and (3.12b), as well as the ones on the right-hand side of ⊥ in (3.13)
orrespond to the denition of the feasible spae of the dual problem (3.8),
after a redenition of all the dual variables with a hange in sign.
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• The ⊥ operator implies that either an inequality of the primal (dual) prob-
lem holds stritly, i.e., with the equal sign, or the orresponding dual (pri-
mal) variable is zero, or both. Suh onditions are referred to as omple-
mentary slakness.
3.2 Mathematial Programs with Equilibrium
Constraints
A relatively reent area of optimization where KKT onditions are used ex-
tensively is the one of Mathematial Programs with Equilibrium Constraints
(MPECs). In this setion, we onsider the use of MPECs to model bilevel pro-
grams, i.e., optimization problems onstrained by other optimization problems.
The reader is referred to [LPR96℄ and [GCF
+
12℄ for an in-depth treatment of
the subjet.
3.2.1 MPEC Formulation
The general formulation of a bilevel program is the following:
Max.
x,y
θ(x,y) (3.14a)
s.t. φ(x,y) ≤ 0 , (3.14b)
ψ(x,y) = 0 , (3.14)
y ∈ argmin
z
{f(x, z) s.t. g(x, z) ≤ 0 ,h(x, z) = 0} . (3.14d)
The fundamental dierene with respet to the general optimization problem
(3.1) is the enforement of the optimality onditions (3.14d). This way, we
embed a lower-level optimization problem into another, upper-level one. The
problems are interdependent, sine in general the upper-level objetive funtion
(3.14a) and onstraints (3.14b) and (3.14) depend on the lower-level deision
variables y. Vieversa, the objetive funtion and the onstraints of the lower-
level problem (3.14d) depend on the upper-level variable x. It should be re-
marked that model (3.14) ould aommodate several lower-level optimization
problems, simply by onatenating multiple optimality onditions of the type of
(3.14d).
Under the assumption that KKT onditions are neessary and suient for op-
timality of the lower-level problems, the bilevel program (3.14) an be reast as
a single-level optimization problem. This is ahieved by replaing the optimality
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onditions (3.14d) with the orresponding KKT onditions (3.5). However, the
solution of the single-level program is ompliated by the fat that KKT on-
ditions are in general nonlinear and non onvex, as they involve ross produts
between variables in (3.5e).
If the feasible spae of the lower-level problems is dened by ane equality and
inequality onstraints, and if the partial derivatives of the objetive funtion
with respet to the deision variables are also ane, a linear reformulation of
the KKT onditions involving binary variables is available [FM81℄. For example,
a omplementarity ondition of the type (3.6) an be reast as follows:
g(x) ≤ 0 , (3.15a)
g(x) ≥ −iM1 , (3.15b)
µ ≥ 0 , (3.15)
µ ≤ (1− i)M2 , (3.15d)
i ∈ {0, 1} . (3.15e)
The binary variable i fores at least one between g(x) and µ be equal to 0, as
required by (3.5e).
Notie that for the above reformulation to be valid within a bilevel problem of
the type (3.14), the onstants M1 and M2 must be large enough so as not to
leave its solution out of the feasible spae of (3.15).
If, besides the assumption on the lower-level problems in the paragraph above,
θ(·), φ(·) and ψ(·) are linear, one an reast the bilevel problem (3.14) as a
single-level, Mixed-Integer Linear Program (MILP). Optimization problems of
this type an be solved with ommerially available software.
Example 3.2 (Oering problem in a market with nodal priing) In
this example, we onsider a simplied ase of the trading problem for a renewable
power produer in a single market oor, organized as an eletriity pool where
renewable power enters the supply urve from the left-hand side, by oering
prodution at its zero marginal ost. Without loss of generality, we onsider
produer 1, loated at node s(1). We assume for the sake of simpliity that the
maximum renewable power prodution W1 is known with ertainty at the time
of bidding. However, the produer has the possibility of withdrawing prodution
from the market in order to exerise market power.
Under these assumptions, the optimal oer w∗1 solves the following bilevel prob-
lem. It should be notied that in the formulation below, we employ the denition
of the dual variables in (3.8), whih requires a hange in sign as ompared to
the standard derivation of the KKT onditions in Example 3.1. The former
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formulation is preferred, beause nodal pries are equal to the dual variables λi.
Instead, if the denition of the dual variables as in the KKT formulation were
employed instead, pries would be equal to −λi.
Max.
w1,p, δ,
λ,µ,σ
λs(1)w1 (3.16a)
s.t. 0 ≤ w1 ≤W1 , (3.16b)∑
k∈ΦG
i
pk −
∑
j∈ΦN
i
Bij(δi − δj) =
∑
m∈ΦL
i
lm −
∑
q∈ΦW
i
wq , ∀i , (3.16)
pk − Pk ≤ 0 , ∀k , (3.16d)
Bij(δi − δj)− Tij ≤ 0 , ∀i, j ∈ Φ
N
i , (3.16e)
pk ≥ 0 , ∀k , (3.16f)
ck − λs(k) − µk ≥ 0 , ∀k , (3.16g)∑
j∈ΦN
i
Bij(−λi + λj + σij − σji) = 0 , ∀i, j ∈ Φ
N
i , (3.16h)
µk ≤ 0 , ∀k , σij ≤ 0 , ∀i, j ∈ Φ
N
i , (3.16i)
pk − Pk ≥ −z
1
kM , ∀k , (3.16j)
µk ≥ −(1− z
1
k)M , ∀k , (3.16k)
Bij(δi − δj)− Tij ≥ −z
2
ijM , ∀i, j ∈ Φ
N
i , (3.16l)
σij ≥ −(1− z
2
ij)M , ∀i, j ∈ Φ
N
i , (3.16m)
ck − λs(k) − µk ≤ z
3
kM , ∀k , (3.16n)
pk ≤ (1− z
3
k)M , ∀k , (3.16o)
z1k, z
3
k ∈ {0, 1} , ∀k , z
2
ij ∈ {0, 1} , ∀i, j ∈ Φ
N
i . (3.16p)
The objetive funtion (3.16a) is the prot of renewable power produer 1,
given by the multipliation of the relevant nodal prie λs(1) with the oer w1.
Constraint (3.16b) ensures that the oer is a feasible prodution value. Con-
straints (3.16)(3.16f) dene the feasible spae of the primal problem (3.7).
Furthermore, the onstraints of the dual problem in Example (3.8) are inluded
as (3.16g)(3.16i). Finally, onstraints (3.16j)(3.16p) omprise the lineariza-
tion of the omplementarity onditions.
We remark that the model above is nonlinear, owing to the bilinear produt
between λs(1) and w1 in the objetive funtion.
Trading problems formulated as MPECs are often nonlinear as a result of the
produt between primal and dual variables, where the former are oers, and the
latter pries. In the following example, we show how in some ases the problem
an be linearized by making use of the strong duality results in Theorem 3.2.
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Reformulations of this type are used in Papers D, F and H.
Example 3.3 (Linearization of the objetive funtion via strong du-
ality) Let us onsider the objetive funtions of the primal and of the dual
versions of the market-learing problem (3.7) and (3.8), respetively, presented
in Example 3.1. Owing to the strong duality theorem, the two objetive funtion
values are equal at optimality, i.e.,
∑
k
ckpk =
∑
i
 ∑
m∈ΦL
i
lm −
∑
q∈ΦW
i
wq
λi +∑
k
Pkµk +
∑
i
∑
j∈ΦN
i
Tijσij . (3.17)
Solving the previous equation for λs(1)w1 yields:
λs(1)w1 =
∑
i
 ∑
m∈ΦL
i
lm −
∑
q∈ΦW
i
\1
wq
λi+∑
k
Pkµk+
∑
i
∑
j∈ΦN
i
Tijσij−
∑
k
ckpk .
(3.18)
The expression on the right-hand side of (3.18) is linear, sine lm, ∀m and
wq, q 6= 1 are onstant parameters in the optimization problem of renewable
power produer 1. Therefore, problem (3.16) an be reformulated by replaing
the objetive funtion (3.16a) with the right-hand side of (3.18). The resulting
problem is a MILP.
3.2.2 MPEC Appliations
Bilevel programs and their reformulation as MILPs are used extensively in this
dissertation.
• In Paper D, we model the trading problem of a wind power produer that
is a prie-maker in the balaning market as a bilevel program. The lower-
level problem represents the learing of an aution-based balaning market.
The upper-level problem is the one of a wind power produer optimizing
its oer urve in order to maximize revenues from the day-ahead and the
balaning markets. Example 3.2 presents a simplied formulation similar
to the one in Paper D.
• Paper E models as an MPEC the hierarhial relationship between a vir-
tual power plant operator and the exible onsumers in a demand response
framework. In the upper-level problem, the virtual power plant's operator
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sets the onsumer prie. The lower-level problem is the one of a onsumer
who deides on the optimal onsumption shedule on the basis of a utility,
where the eletriity ost is weighted by the omfort resulting from power
onsumption.
• A similar approah is used in Paper F, where the prie-setting entity in
the upper-level problem is a retailer whose objetive is the maximization
of the prots.
• Paper G onsiders a two-stage market-learing problem aounting for
the projeted osts of the day-ahead dispath on the real-time system
operation in a stohasti programming fashion, see also Setion 3.3. The
learing onditions of a traditional day-ahead market aution are then
imposed, thus rendering the problem a bilevel one.
• In Paper H, we jointly onsider the day-ahead dispath and reserve deter-
mination in a network-onstrained aution in a robust optimization frame-
work. As Setion 3.4 laries, robust optimization aims at determining a
solution that is feasible for any realization of unertain parameters, and
optimal in the worst-ase instane. In mathematial terms, this trans-
lates into multilevel problems of the min-max type, whih an be ast as
MPECs.
3.3 Stohasti Programming
In pratie, it is seldom the ase that all the parameters of an optimization
problem are known with ertainty at the time of making a deision. This is
partiularly true of eletriity markets inluding renewable power generation
failities. Indeed, owing to the struture of the markets desribed in Chapter 2,
some deisions have to be made in advane, e.g., the day-ahead trading deisions
for a produer or sheduling deisions for a market or system operator. This
setion introdues stohasti programming, whih is one of the most established
frameworks for optimization under unertainty.
3.3.1 Formulation of a Stohasti Programming Problem
Under the assumption that unertain parameters take values in a disrete prob-
ability spae, whih is typial of stohasti programming, a two-stage stohasti
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(linear) program with reourse writes as:
Min.
x,yω
cTx+
∑
ω
πω × q
T
ωyω (3.19a)
s.t. Ax = b , (3.19b)
Tωx+Wωyω = hω , ∀ω . (3.19)
In model (3.19), the parameters qω, Tω , Wω and hω are unertain. Model
(3.19) aommodates for a disrete number of realizations or senarios ω of the
unertain parameters, eah of whih ours with probability πω .
The deision variable x represents the vetor of rst-stage or here and now
deisions, whih are made before the realization of the unertainty. Variables yω
are seond-stage or reourse deisions, whih adapt depending on the realization
of the unertainty. Indeed, the subsript ω indiates that there is a set of suh
variables for eah realization of the unertain parameters.
Constraints (3.19b) involve only rst-stage variables, while (3.19) link them
with the reourse deisions. Naturally, there is one set of onstraints of the
latter type for eah realization of the unertainty. First-stage variables have
assoiated ost cTx, while reourse variables have ost qTωyω . The objetive
funtion (3.19a) represents therefore the expeted value of the ost.
Example 3.4 (Two-stage network-onstrained market-learing) As an
example of the use of stohasti programming in relation with eletriity market
modeling, we present a two-stage market-learing model where the day-ahead
dispath represents the rst-stage deision, while the reourse deision is the re-
dispath in the balaning market. Suh a model was originally presented in a
similar form in [PZP10℄, and onstitutes the basis for the model presented in
Paper G.
Min.
p,δ,rUω ,r
D
ω ,δ
B
ω
∑
k
ckpk +
∑
ω
πω
∑
k
(
cUk r
U
kω − c
D
k r
D
kω
)
(3.20a)
s.t.
∑
k∈ΦG
i
pk −
∑
j∈ΦN
i
Bij(δi − δj) =
∑
m∈ΦL
i
l̂m −
∑
q∈ΦW
i
ŵq , ∀i , (3.20b)
pk ≤ Pk , ∀k , (3.20)
Bij(δi − δj) ≤ Tij , ∀i, j ∈ Φ
N
i , (3.20d)
pk ≥ 0 , ∀k , (3.20e)
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∑
k∈ΦG
i
(
rUkω − r
D
kω
)
−
∑
j∈ΦN
i
Bij
(
δBiω − δi − δ
B
jω + δj
)
=
∑
m∈ΦL
i
(
lmω − l̂m
)
−
∑
q∈ΦW
i
(
wqω − ŵq
)
, ∀i, ω ,
(3.20f)
pk + r
U
kω ≤ Pk , ∀k, ω , (3.20g)
pk − r
U
kω ≥ 0 , ∀k, ω , (3.20h)
Bij(δ
B
iω − δ
B
jω) ≤ Tij , ∀i, j ∈ Φ
N
i , ω , (3.20i)
rUkω ≥ 0, r
D
kω ≥ 0 , ∀k, ω . (3.20j)
The rst term in the objetive funtion (3.20a) represents the ost of the day-
ahead dispath. This deision is onstrained by (3.20b)(3.20e), whih orre-
spond to the onstraints in model (3.7). We remark that the load and renewable
power prodution on the right-hand side of the day-ahead balane equation are
foreasts of stohasti values. We indiate this with the symbol ̂ over the pa-
rameters.
Variables rUkω and r
D
kω represent the redispath (prodution inrease and derease,
respetively) of produer k in senario ω at the balaning stage. These variables
are adaptable to the realization of the stohasti load and renewable power pro-
dution, and are therefore reourse deisions. The seond term in the objetive
funtion (3.20a) represents the expeted ost, or benet in the ase of prodution
derease, of redispath at the balaning stage.
The voltage angle at node i in senario ω at the balaning stage is indiated with
δBiω. Furthermore, lmω and wqω are the realizations of load and renewable power
prodution. Hene, onstraint (3.20f) enfores, along with (3.20b), the power
balane ondition at the balaning stage. Constraints (3.20g) and (3.20h) ensure
a feasible redispath for eah prodution blok k. Transmission onstraints at the
balaning stage are enfored by (3.20i). Constraints (3.20j) dene nonnegative
variables.
The framework of stohasti programming is naturally extendable to nonlinear
programs with an appropriate reformulation of the linear terms and onstraints
in (3.19) into the more general nonlinear ase. A partiular instane of interest
for this dissertation is that of stohasti MPECs, whih is relevant when one
or more parameters of the lower-level problem is subjet to unertainty. In
this ase, then, several lower-level problems should be onsidered, i.e., one per
senario. The general formulation (3.14) an be extended in order to aount
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for stohasti parameters as follows:
Max.
x1,x2ω,yω
E
{
θω(x
1,x2ω ,yω)
}
(3.21a)
s.t. φω(x
1,x2ω,yω) ≤ 0 , ∀ω , (3.21b)
ψω(x
1,x2ω,yω) = 0 , ∀ω , (3.21)
yω ∈ argmin
z
{
fω(x
1,x2ω, z) s.t. gω(x
1,x2ω, z) ≤ 0 ,hω(x
1,x2ω, z) = 0
}
,
∀ω , (3.21d)
where x1 is the set of upper-level rst-stage deision variables, x2ω the upper-
level reourse variables and yω the deision variables for eah senario ω. It
should be remarked that there is one lower-level problem (3.21d) for eah se-
nario, whih implies that one set of KKT onditions should be inluded per
senario.
The reader is referred to [KW94, BL11℄ for thorough introdutions to stohasti
programming. Further details on stohasti MPECs are available in [GCF
+
12℄.
3.3.2 Appliations of Stohasti Programming
Several papers presented in this dissertation make use of stohasti programming
models.
• The bilevel model presented in Paper D, whih determines the optimal
trading strategy of a wind power produer that is a prie-maker in the bal-
aning market, is in fat a stohasti MPEC. Indeed, the market-learing
problem at the balaning stage is dependent on the realization of wind
power prodution and system deviation, both of whih are stohasti.
We model this unertainty by inluding the equilibrium onditions of a
market-learing problem for eah senario for these two variables.
• Paper E presents an MPEC where the upper-level problem onsists in the
minimization of the imbalane for a virtual power plant. The latter de-
pends on the stohasti amount of wind power prodution, whih is mod-
eled by employing senarios. The problem is formulated in a stohasti
programming fashion, aiming at the minimization of the expeted imbal-
ane over the senario set.
• The model in Paper F is a stohasti MPEC. Indeed, the lower-level prob-
lem for the onsumers involves the optimization of a utility that depends
on weather-related variables. Therefore, multiple lower-level problems are
onsidered.
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• Paper G presents a stohasti programming model for learing of day-
ahead markets aounting for the ost of ations at the balaning stage (re-
ourse deisions), with the addition of further equilibrium onstraints. The
basi two-stage market-learing model, without equilibrium onstraints, is
introdued in Example 3.4 as an instane of the use of stohasti pro-
gramming in relation with eletriity market modeling. In the ase of
Paper G, the lower-level problem is deterministi, sine the day-ahead
market-learing only depends on the bids submitted by the market players.
Therefore, there is only one instane of this problem. On the ontrary, the
upper-level problem onsiders the projeted ost of the day-ahead deision
at the balaning stage, whih is minimized in expetation in a stohasti
programming fashion.
• Paper C is also related to stohasti programming sine it deals with the
trading problem of a prie-taker wind power produer. However, senar-
ios are not employed in this work, as there exists an analytial solution to
the problem. In pratie, the full probability distribution of wind power
prodution is used to determine the optimal solution. A stohasti pro-
gramming version of the problem would approximate the optimal result
obtained.
3.4 Robust Adaptable Optimization
An alternative framework to stohasti programming when dealing with prob-
lems of optimization under unertainty is robust optimization, whih is the fous
of this setion.
3.4.1 Formulation of a Robust Adaptable Optimization
Problem
In its original formulation, robust optimization aims at determining a solution
to a mathematial program that is feasible under any realization of the stohas-
ti parameters within an unertainty set and/or optimal in their worst-ase
realization [BBC11℄.
In this work, we onsider the framework of robust adaptable optimization, whih
is the natural ounterpart of stohasti programming with reourse in the frame-
work of robust optimization. A linear problem of robust adaptable optimization
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writes as follows:
Min.
x
cTx+ Max.
q,T,W,h
Min.
y
qTy (3.22a)
s.t. Tx+Wy = h , (3.22b)
s.t. (q,T,W,h) ∈ U , (3.22)
s.t. Ax = b . (3.22d)
The multilevel struture of problem (3.22) is typial of problems of robust op-
timization. The deision variables of the upper-level minimization problem are
a set of rst-stage deisions, x. Just as in the ase of stohasti programming,
suh variables annot adapt to the realization of the stohasti parameters q,
T, W and h. The lower-level problem aims at the minimization of the ost
of reourse qTy, provided that the feasibility onstraints (3.22b) are satised
under the urrent realization of the unertainty. It should be notied, though,
that dierently from the ase of stohasti programming, where there is a set
of reourse deisions per senario, there is only one suh set in robust adapt-
able optimization. This represents the optimal reourse deision in response
to the worst-ase realization, i.e., the realization of the unertain parameters
(q,T,W,h) in the set U that yields maximum ost of reourse. This worst-ase
realization is enfored by the mid-level maximization problem.
Naturally, the hoie of a meaningful unertainty set U is just as important to
robust optimization as the generation of realisti senarios is to stohasti pro-
gramming. On the other hand, the strutural omplexity of robust adaptable
optimization problems hinders the use of sophistiated unertainty sets, as mul-
tilevel problems of the type of (3.22) beome quikly intratable. In pratie
polyhedral or elliptial unertainty sets are employed in the literature on the
subjet [BBC11℄.
In the following example we formulate the joint determination of the day-ahead
dispath and reserve as a robust optimization problem. This topi is the fous
of Paper H, whih we refer to for further detail.
Example 3.5 (Robust day-ahead dispath and reserve determina-
tion) Let us onsider the problem of jointly determining the day-ahead dispath
p and the reserves RU for up-regulation and RD for down-regulation. Indiating
with Q(·) the ost of the redispath deision in the worst-ase realization of the
unertainty, whih is a funtion of the rst-stage deision, the problem writes
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as follows:
Min.
p,RU,RD,δ
∑
k
(
ckpk + C
U
k R
U
k + C
D
k R
D
k
)
+Q
(
p,RU,RD, δ
)
(3.23a)
s.t.
∑
k∈ΦG
i
pk −
∑
j∈ΦN
i
Bij(δi − δj) =
∑
m∈ΦL
i
l̂m −
∑
q∈ΦW
i
ŵq , ∀i , (3.23b)
pk +R
U
k ≤ Pk , ∀k , (3.23)
pk −R
D
k ≥ 0 , ∀k , (3.23d)
Bij(δi − δj) ≤ Tij , ∀i, j ∈ Φ
N
i , (3.23e)
RUk ≥ 0 , R
D
k ≥ 0 , ∀k . (3.23f)
The per unit ost assoiated with reserve are indiated in the objetive funtion
(3.23a) with CUk and C
D
k for up- and down-regulation, respetively. The produ-
tion onstraints are updated to (3.23) and (3.23d), so as to guarantee that the
produer an atually deliver the ontrated amount of reserve if neessary.
The funtion Q
(
p,RU,RD, δ
)
embeds the mid- and lower-level problems, whih
is expliit in the general formulation (3.22) for a robust adaptable optimization
problem. This funtion an be expressed in extended form as follows:
Q
(
p,RU,RD, δ
)
= Max.
(l,w)∈U
Min.
rU,rD,δB
∑
k
(
cUk r
U
k − c
D
k r
D
k
)
(3.24a)
s.t.
∑
k∈ΦG
i
(
rUk − r
D
k
)
−
∑
j∈ΦN
i
Bij
(
δBi − δi − δ
B
j + δj
)
=
∑
m∈ΦL
i
(
lm − l̂m
)
−
∑
q∈ΦW
i
(
wq − ŵq
)
, ∀i ,
(3.24b)
rUk ≤ R
U
k , ∀k , (3.24)
rDk ≤ R
D
k , ∀k , (3.24d)
Bij(δ
B
i − δ
B
j ) ≤ Tij , ∀i, j ∈ Φ
N
i , (3.24e)
rUk ≥ 0, r
D
k ≥ 0 , ∀k . (3.24f)
The max-min problem in (3.24a) ensures that the redispath ost is minimized
in the worst-ase realization of load and renewable power prodution in the un-
ertainty set U . Constraints (3.24) and (3.24d) enfore that the redispath is
no greater than the amount of reserve ontrated at the day-ahead stage.
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3.4.2 Appliations of Robust Adaptable Optimization
The only appliation of robust adaptable optimization in this dissertation is
in Paper H. The problem onsidered in this work is very similar to the one
formulated in Example 3.5. The aim is the minimization of the total ost in the
day-ahead and balaning markets in the worst-ase realization of the unertain
wind power prodution at dierent nodes of the network. To solve the resulting
three-level min-max-min problem, we employ a utting-plane algorithm [KJ60℄,
whih onverges to the optimal solution in a nite number of steps.
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Chapter 4
Appliation Results
In this hapter, we gather the highlights of the researh presented in Part II of
this dissertation. The struture of the hapter is the following.
In Setion 4.1, we onsider the problem of determining optimal trading strategies
for wind power produers. Firstly, the prie-taker ase is addressed in Setion
4.1.1, whih disusses results from a simulation based on real data and foreasts
for Nord Pool. This work is fully presented in Paper C. Then in Setion 4.1.2,
we address the trading problem for a produer with the apability of altering the
balaning market outome with its bidding strategy, and summarize the results
of the ase study presented in Paper D.
Setion 4.2 onsiders a market environment that inludes end onsumers respon-
sive to dynami priing. In Setion 4.2.1, we look at the operation problem of a
virtual power plant that onsists of a wind power prodution faility and exible
demand, whih is ontrolled by means of a prie signal. Then, we onsider the
joint bidding and priing model for a retailer trading with an innite eletriity
market and providing eletriity to exible onsumers in Setion 4.2.2. The
highlights we present in this setion summarize the results of the ase studies
in Papers E and F.
Finally, Setion 4.3 is dediated to optimal market dispath with stohasti
renewable soures. In Setion 4.3.1, we onsider the stohasti-programming-
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based model to lear the day-ahead market, aounting for the projeted osts of
regulation in the balaning market, presented in Paper G. Then in Setion 4.3.2,
we onsider the robust optimization model in Paper H, aimed at determining
the day-ahead dispath and the purhase of reserves. Throughout Setion 4.3,
we present the highlights of the simulations inluded in Papers G and H, whih
are based on the IEEE Reliability Test-System [GWA
+
99℄.
4.1 Trading Strategies for Stohasti Power Pro-
duers
Papers C and D address the problem of optimal trading for a wind power pro-
duer in short-term eletriity markets. While the ase of wind power is spei-
ally addressed, most of the onlusions ould easily be extended to other renew-
ables that are stohasti and non-dispathable, suh as solar and wave power.
When onsidering this problem, we make the following two assumptions.
• There is no interdependene between oers for dierent market periods.
This implies that the optimal oer for eah time period an be determined
independently from the others by making use of a stati, single-period
model.
• The intra-day market is disarded from the analysis in view of its very low
liquidity, as disussed in Setion 2.2.2.
Under these two simpliations, we rst disuss the results in a prie-taker
setting in Setion 4.1.1. Then, we onsider the prie-maker ase in Setion
4.1.2.
4.1.1 Trading Stohasti Prodution as a Prie-Taker
When stohasti power produers oer in short-term eletriity markets, they
very rarely trade in a single market oor. Being their prodution unertain,
they most likely need to take orretive measures in the balaning market after
having traded in the day-ahead market, so as to align their ontrats for delivery
with their atual output.
In a prie-taker setting, the main driver in the determination of the optimal
oer is the dierene between the day-ahead and the balaning market pries.
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Atually, sine these pries are stohasti, we are interested in the expeted value
of their dierene. For example, in a market employing the one-prie system
for imbalanes desribed in Setion 2.2.3, the produer's problem of bidding
as a prie-taker redues to a rather trivial arbitrage problem. Indeed, if the
produer expets a higher prie in the balaning market than in the day-ahead
market, then it should not oer at all in the day-ahead market, and sell its whole
prodution in the balaning market. On the other hand, if a lower balaning
market prie is expeted as ompared to the day-ahead one, the produer should
oer as muh as possible in the day-ahead market. Then, it would eventually
buy bak the eletriity it is not able to produe from the balaning market at
a lower prie.
In Paper C, we onsider a two-prie balaning market, whih onstitutes a more
interesting ase than the one-prie system in a prie-taker framework. We as-
sume that the prie dierene between the day-ahead and the balaning market
is unorrelated with the output of the produer, whih is reasonable sine the
produer is a prie-taker. Under the assumptions above, it is shown that the
optimal day-ahead oer is
W˜ ∗k = F
−1
Wk

∣∣∣ψ̂(↓)k ∣∣∣
ψ̂
(↑)
k +
∣∣∣ψ̂(↓)k ∣∣∣
 , (4.1)
where F−1Wk is the quantile funtion for the distribution of stohasti power pro-
dution, and ψ̂
(↓)
k (ψ̂
(↑)
k ) is the expetation of the dierene between the down
(up)-regulation prie and the day-ahead prie.
In the ase study presented in Paper C, we test the strategy (4.1) for a wind
power produer in a realisti setting simulating the funtioning of the Nord
Pool market over a 10 month period. We onsider atual data for pries in the
period between Marh and the end of the year 2008. Furthermore, we employ
probabilisti foreasts for wind power prodution, needed to model the quantile
funtion in (4.1), issued aording to the method in [PK10℄. As far as the market
pries are onerned, foreasts from [Jón12℄ are used.
As a benhmark to test the performane of the optimal oer (4.1), we onsider
a strategy that is traditionally used by wind power produers partiipating in
the day-ahead market: oering the onditional expetation of the distribution
of wind power prodution. Figure 4.1 illustrates the inrease in umulative
revenues per installed MW, as ompared to oering the onditional mean over
the period onsidered in the ase study. The starred solid line indiates the oer
in (4.1). As one an see, this strategy yields a higher revenue ompared to the
ase where the produer oers the onditional mean. The improvement totalls
about e 100 per MW of installed apaity in the 10 months onsidered in the
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test ase.
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Figure 4.1: Inrease in net umulative revenues for a prie-taker produer om-
pared to oering the onditional mean (point foreast) with the
strategies proposed in Paper C
Another result in Figure 4.1 that is worth mentioning is that the strategy (4.1) is
exposed to the risk of signiant losses in single trading periods, whih results in
the vertial drops of the starred solid line in the gure. As disussed in detail in
Paper C, this is due to the prie foreasts being unorret in those trading
periods. This auses the produer, aordingly to (4.1), to take a wrong
position (either long or short) with a large exposure, e.g., by oering lose
to zero or to the nominal apaity at the day-ahead market.
To overome this problem, we propose that the oer (4.1) be onstrained so as
to limit its deviation from the onditional mean foreast. It should be remarked
that the onditional mean foreast is a risk-averse bid by denition, as it min-
imizes the expeted squared deviation of wind power prodution. We propose
two dierent onstraining strategies. In the rst one, the oer (4.1) is bounded
within a band entered around the onditional mean, and whose diameter is
dened as a perentage of the onditional mean itself. In the seond onstrain-
ing strategy, we impose limits in the probability spae, by allowing the quantile
in (4.1) to deviate by at most 0.1 or 0.2 from the quantile orresponding to
the predited onditional mean. In Figure 4.1, the umulative improvement in
revenues is illustrated with lines with irular and square markers for the for-
mer onstraining strategy, and with lines without markers for the latter one.
Furthermore, we employ solid lines for tighter onstraints and dashed lines for
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looser ones. As one an see, onstraining the bid about the onditional mean
redues the risk of losses stemming from single trading periods, resulting in
smoother revenue improvements in the gure. Furthermore, suh onstrained
strategies are not only risk-averse, but they also yield better performane than
the strategy (4.1) in the period onsidered, by reduing the impat of biases in
the foreasts.
Further nanial results for the produer are inluded in Table 4.1. The im-
balane osts in the seond olumn refer to the opportunity osts of a strategy,
ompared to bidding with perfet information on the atual realization of wind
power prodution. As one an see, strategy (4.1) redues the imbalane osts by
over 2%. However, this strategy is outperformed by the onstrained strategies,
whih further ut imbalane osts up to roughly 6% with tighter onstraints and
8% with looser onstraints.
A dierent view of the strategies presented above is given in Table 4.2, whih
illustrates their impat on the wind power produer's imbalane. The total
produer's deviation in the rst olumn is broken down into two parts. The
rst one, whih appears in the seond olumn in the table, represents deviations
that are traded at the day-ahead prie in the balaning market. The seond
part are the imbalanes that are traded at the balaning market prie. These
imbalanes are inluded in the third olumn, whose header is penalty, sine
the produer is worse o with the balaning market prie than with the day-
ahead one. As disussed in Setion 2.2.3, the former type of imbalanes are
beneial to the system, sine ontrarily to the ones of the latter type, they
help it restore balane between prodution and onsumption. As one an notie,
strategy (4.1) and the strategies employing looser onstraints inrease the total
imbalane of the produer. However, none of the onstrained strategies inrease
signiantly the imbalane in the penalized diretion as the strategy in (4.1)
does. This is another pratial reason for preferring a onstrained strategy, as
system operators often monitor the oers of wind power produers to ensure
that their imbalane be not too large.
4.1.2 Trading as a Prie-Maker in the Balaning Market
In Paper D, we abandon the prie-taker assumption and onsider a wind power
produer whose oering strategy impats pries in the balaning market. To this
end, we develop a bilevel model based on stohasti MPECs, see Setions 3.2
and 3.3. The upper-level problem in this model represents the oering problem
of a wind power produer, while the lower-level one is the balaning-market
learing, whih inludes stohasti parameters. In this paper, we onsider a
one-prie system for priing imbalanes. This results in a setup similar to the
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Strategy
Net revenue Imbalane ost Imbalane ost
per installed MW per installed MW redution
(e/MW) (e/MW) (%)
Conditional mean 94436.40 4076.51 0.00
Equation (4.1) 94529.96 3982.95 2.30
Constrained (±10% value) 94684.18 3828.74 6.08
Constrained (±20% value) 94784.27 3728.64 8.53
Constrained (±10% probability) 94670.78 3842.13 5.75
Constrained (±20% probability) 94768.55 3744.37 8.15
Table 4.1: Eonomi results for a prie-taker wind power produer in the test-ase in Paper C
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Strategy
Energy imbalane (h)
Total Day-Ahead prie Penalty
Conditional mean 484.92 277.71 207.21
Equation (4.1) 755.29 498.66 256.62
Constrained (±10% value) 495.91 286.72 209.19
Constrained (±20% value) 519.70 304.85 214.85
Constrained (±10% probability) 488.94 281.93 207.00
Constrained (±20% probability) 514.62 301.74 212.87
Table 4.2: Energy imbalane for a prie-taker wind power produer in the test-
ase in Paper C. Values in hours of operation at nominal apaity
one in Example 3.2, although the lower-level problem models the learing of the
balaning market rather than the day-ahead one. Furthermore, the upper-level
problem is extended by allowing the possibility of oering prie-quantity urves
rather than single quantities.
In order to evaluate the performane of the optimal strategy, we employ three
alternative oers for benhmarking, namely, the onditional mean and median
foreasts, as well as the zero oer. We remark that, as briey explained in the
previous setion, the optimal day-ahead market bid for a prie-taker stohasti
power produer in a one-prie system is either zero or the nominal apaity. In
partiular, the optimal oer is zero if the expetation of the dierene between
the day-ahead and the balaning market prie is negative, while it is the nominal
apaity if it is positive. However, the nominal apaity proves to be highly
suboptimal in the ases we study. We refer to Paper D for a omprehensive
disussion.
The results we summarize here are obtained through a ase study based on
the Nord Pool market. Indeed, we model the system deviation and the supply
urve of the balaning market using atual market data. As far as wind power
is onerned, we employ Beta distributions to model its unertain prodution,
as proposed in [FGRM05℄.
By employing the parameters α = 3.78 and β = 1.62 for modeling the dis-
tribution of wind power prodution, and onsidering an installed apaity of
300MW, we obtain that the optimal oer is totally inelasti (i.e., there is no
prie dierentiation of the oer) and equal to
x = 76.69MWh . (4.2)
Notie that that suh a value is a very low quantile (with proportion 0.01) of
the wind power prodution distribution. However, it is important to remark
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that under the prie-maker assumption, the optimal oer is neither zero nor the
nominal apaity as in the prie-taker ase.
Table 4.3 shows the expeted nanial improvement obtained with oer (4.2) as
ompared to the benhmarks desribed above. Remarkably, this oer improves
the expeted revenues by 1.5% as ompared to the zero oer, and slightly over
3% with respet to the onditional mean or median.
Prot improvement w.r.t.
mean (%) median (%) zero (%)
3.08 3.25 1.58
Table 4.3: Finanial results obtained using the optimal bid for a prie-maker
wind power produer in the ase study in Paper D
Figure 4.2 illustrates how the optimal oering urve hanges as a funtion of the
penetration of the produer in the market. These results are obtained in sim-
ulations where we hange this penetration by resaling the installed generation
apaity of the produer. As one an see in the gure, the oering urve moves
to the right as market penetration inreases. This is onsistent with what one
would expet intuitively. Indeed, the pries a produer gets for deviations in a
one-prie market get loser and loser to the ones of a two-prie market as its
penetration inreases. For example, if the onsidered produer were the only one
ausing imbalane, then its deviation would always be of the same sign as the
system's, beause these two quantities oinide. Therefore, the produer would
always reeive or pay the balaning market prie both in a one-prie system
(by denition) and in a two-prie system (sine its deviation is always in the
same diretion as the system's). As seen in the previous setion, the optimal
oer yielded by (4.1) in a two-prie system is a entral quantile of the distri-
bution of wind power prodution when the expeted prie dierene between
day-ahead and up- and down-regulation prie are omparable. Therefore, we
expet intuitively that the optimal oer of a wind power produer in a one-prie
market tends to the entral quantiles of the predited output distribution as the
penetration of the produer inreases. What we see in Figure 4.2 is a transition
between a low-penetration ase, omparable to a prie-taker ase in a one-prie
market where the optimal oer is zero, to a high-penetration ase, where the
optimal oering urve is loser to the median of the wind power distribution.
A similar sensitivity analysis, performed with respet to the rank orrelation
of the wind power prodution with the aggregate deviation from other market
partiipants, yields interesting results. Figure 4.3 shows the optimal oering
urve with dierent values of rank orrelation between wind power prodution
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Figure 4.2: Day-ahead oer urves with dierent levels of market penetration
of the prie-maker produer in the ase study in Paper D
and residual system deviation. We observe that the oering urve shifts to the
left as the orrelation inreases, whih mathes intuitive reasoning. Indeed, if
the wind power prodution and the system deviation had a rank orrelation
equal to -1, then oering the median would ause the wind power produer to
always have a deviation of a dierent sign ompared to the system's (assuming
a symmetri distribution for system deviation). By doing this, the produer
would always reeive a better prie than the day-ahead one for its imbalane.
Therefore, from an intuitive point of view, quantiles lose to the median would
yield a high performane with negative values of orrelation. As orrelation
inreases, the oer urve moves to the left-hand side of the gure, indiating
that the produer hedges from the penalties for underproduing. In a market
with a hokey-stik supply urve, as the one onsidered in the ase study, the
penalties for underproduing tend to be higher than the ones for overproduing.
This is beause the ost of ativating additional prodution units is higher than
the ost savings for reduing the prodution from already dispathed units.
4.2 Optimal Demand-Side Management
Papers E and F fous on problems of demand-side management with dynami
priing. The problems in both papers are formulated as MPECs, where the
lower-level problem is a utility maximization problem of an end onsumer ex-
posed to dynami pries, and exible as far as the onsumption for heating is
onerned. The upper-level problems are the one of a virtual power plant oper-
ator in Paper E and the one of a retailer ating as an intermediary between the
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Figure 4.3: Day-ahead oer urves with dierent levels of orrelation between
the wind power output of the prie-maker produer and the resid-
ual system deviation in the ase study in Paper D
eletriity markets and the end onsumers in Paper F.
4.2.1 Managing a Virtual Power Plant
In Paper E, we onsider the problem of a virtual power plant (VPP) operator,
whih owns wind power prodution failities and is assoiated to a number of
loads that are exible in their onsumption for heating.
The exible load reeives from the operator of the virtual power plant a dy-
nami prie signal, and solves a utility-maximization problem where the ost of
eletriity prourement is weighted against a quadrati loss funtion that pe-
nalizes the deviation from a referene temperature. The heating dynamis for
the onsumer are modeled by using a disrete-time state-spae model [Mad07℄.
This onstitutes the lower-level problem. The upper-level problem  the VPP
operator's  deides on the optimal dynami prie signal to be sent out to
the onsumers. Its objetive is the minimization of the absolute value of the
eletriity imbalane aused by the deviation of wind power prodution with
respet to the day-ahead foreast. This is aomplished by shifting the exible
onsumption in time through an appropriate prie signal. In pratie, the VPP
operator exploits the exibility of demand response to absorb utuations of
stohasti power prodution, therefore reduing the impat on the system of
wind power's limited preditability.
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Simulations of the model are presented in Paper E, where we make use of se-
narios for wind power prodution issued aording to the method in [PMN
+
09℄.
The optimization is arried out in a rolling horizon fashion. First, the prie
signal is optimized for a ertain time horizon. Then, the deision for the rst
hour is implemented and the horizon is rolled one period forward.
Figure 4.4 shows the dynamis of relevant variables in the simulation during
24 hours by omparing the ase with dynami prie to the ase with a xed
prie equal to e 0.2/kWh. As one an notie in Figure 4.4(a), the variable
prie allows the VPP to smooth out most of the imbalane due to the wind
power foreasting errors. The only imbalanes that annot be absorbed by
the exible onsumption take plae when the load is already zero, see Figure
4.4(b), and annot be redued any further to over the underprodution of wind
power with respet to the day-ahead foreast. Furthermore, the imbalane is
smoothed out without ausing a large dierene in the dynamis of the indoor
temperature for the end onsumer in Figure 4.4(), i.e., without jeopardizing
onsumer's omfort. Figure 4.4(d) shows the dynamis of the prie, whih is
bounded between e 0.1/kWh and e 0.3/kWh. Generally, the day-ahead foreast
overestimates the atual wind power prodution during the onsidered period.
Hene, the VPP operator disourages exessive onsumption by feeding the
onsumer pries in the high end of the range.
Table 4.4 summarizes the results for the day of simulation illustrated in Figure
4.4. Compared to the xed-prie situation, the setup with dynami prie and
exible load redues imbalanes for the VPP by more than half. The onsumer
disomfort aused by deviations of the temperature from the referene inreases
only slightly, as we already pointed out in the disussion above. However, in this
ase the ost for the onsumer inreases sensibly, owing to the high pries on
average to disourage onsumption. Under the assumption that the foreasting
error is symmetri for wind power, we expet as many periods haraterized
by overprodution with respet to the foreast, and therefore by low pries, as
periods where the wind power plant underprodues. Thus, the inreased ost for
the onsumers during the latter periods, whih we highlighted in the example,
should be ounterbalaned by periods where ost is atually redued in the long
run.
4.2.2 Optimal Strategy for Retailers Supplying Prie-
Responsive Demand
A bilevel setup similar to the one presented in the previous setion is onsid-
ered in Paper F. The lower-level problem is still the one of a onsumer whose
eletriity demand for heating is exible, and whose dynamis an be desribed
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Figure 4.4: Dynamis of relevant quantities during the simulation of manage-
ment of a virtual power plant in Paper E
by a state-spae model. However, in the upper-level problem we now look at a
prot-maximizing retailer rather than at a virtual power plant. The retailer ats
as an intermediary: it trades in the day-ahead and in the balaning markets,
and then provides eletriity to its ustomers. The demand from exible on-
sumers is inuened by the dynami prie signal, whih is a deision variable of
the retailer. Furthermore, the retailer deides on the amount of eletriity to be
purhased in the market at eah stage, so as to minimize the ost of providing
power to its ustomers.
The results of a number of simulations are presented in Paper F. The rst ob-
jetive of these simulations is to assess the apability of this setup to shift the
load towards periods of low prie in the wholesale eletriity market. Note that
as a result of the market mehanisms illustrated in Setion 2.3, pries are lower
in periods haraterized by high prodution from renewables. Hene, a shift of
a signiant part of the load to low-prie periods implies a more eient use of
renewables. Figure 4.5 illustrates the prie and the onsumption dynamis for
three load types with dierent exibility, dened as the willingness to aept a
temperature deviation from a referene. In pratie, dierent levels of exibil-
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Unit Fixed prie Variable prie
Expeted total imbalane kWh 6.79 2.98
Consumer ost e 3.57 4.77
Consumer disomfort (e) 0.11 0.13
Table 4.4: Overall results of the simulations of management of a virtual power
plant spanning one day with rolling horizon in the ase study in
Paper E
ity are enfored by dening dierent bands for the indoor temperature, within
whih there is no penalty in the onsumer's utility funtion. In Figure 4.5, the
onsumer types are presented in order of dereasing exibility. It should be
notied that the dynamis in this gure are stohasti, sine we onsider uner-
tainty in the model by employing senarios. As one an see, a signiant part
of the onsumption takes plae at night, when pries are lower in the wholesale
market, indiating that the retailer passes the wholesale market inentive on to
the onsumer.
Furthermore, we ompare the dynami priing setup previously disussed to two
other priing shemes whih are urrently in use: the xed-prie sheme where
the onsumer prie is onstant throughout the day, and the time-of-use (TOU)
sheme, where the prie is higher during peak hours and lower during valley
hours. For onsisteny, we enfore the average dynami and time-of-use pries
be equal to the onstant xed prie.
Table 4.5 summarizes some nanial results of the simulation for the retailer. As
one an notie, the setup with dynami prie yields both the highest revenues
from ustomer payments, and the lowest total osts for the retailer among the
three setups onsidered. In partiular, both the prourement osts (i.e., osts
under perfet information) and the imbalane penalties (i.e., the opportunity
ost for not being able to foreast the onsumption perfetly at the day-ahead
stage) are minimized through the use of dynami priing. As a result, prots
are highest under dynami priing. The setup with time-of-use prie yields the
seond lowest osts in the wholesale market, indiating a rather eient use of
generation resoures ompared to the xed-prie ase. Finally, the retailer rev-
enues under the time-of-use sheme are lowest. This indiates that this sheme
is partiularly favorable to exible onsumers. In ontrast, the setup with dy-
nami priing yields the highest onsumer payment as long as the average daily
prie is onstant aross the onsidered prie shemes. Hene, further rewards
for exibility, e.g., reduing the average dynami prie, should be thought of for
rewarding onsumers under this priing sheme.
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Figure 4.5: Flexible onsumption (l) patterns for the onsumer types with
dynami prie π˜ sent by the retailer in the simulation in Paper F
Table 4.6 sheds light on the impat of dierent levels of onsumer exibility on
the nanial results. To this end, we onsider three dierent distributions of
the onsumers among the three onsumer types haraterized by dierent levels
of exibility. As one an notie, the total ost for the onsumers as a whole in-
reases as the level of exibility dereases. In partiular, the prourement osts
to satisfy the exible part of the load (i.e., heating) are partiularly sensitive,
while the osts for the inexible part of the load (all the other applianes) are
more or less stable. This is not only aused by a redution in onsumption, but
also by the fat that more exible onsumers pay lower pries to the retailer. In-
deed, the average prie paid for heating purposes drops sensibly with inreasing
onsumer exibility.
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Retailer performane
Priing
Fixed TOU Dynami
Revenues 3.4205 3.3164 3.5049
perfet information 1.0970 1.0781 1.0680
Costs imbalane penalties 0.0096 0.0088 0.0083
total 1.1067 1.0868 1.0763
Prots 2.3139 2.2296 2.4286
Table 4.5: Market performane of the retailer in the simulations with xed,
time-of-use and dynami prie in Paper F. All the values are aver-
ages for the onsidered senarios expressed in e
Consumer result index Unit
Flexibility
High Medium Low
exible load e 0.5517 0.7180 0.8757
Costs inexible load e 2.7969 2.7868 2.7767
total e 3.3486 3.5049 3.6524
Prie
exible load e/kWh 0.1870 0.1885 0.1921
inexible load e/kWh 0.2060 0.2053 0.2045
Table 4.6: Consumer results in simulations with dierent demand exibility in
Paper F. All the values are averages for the onsidered senarios
4.3 Market Dispath in Presene of Renewables
Market and system operator's problems are addressed in Papers G and H. The
former of these papers addresses the problem of determining an eient day-
ahead dispath of stohasti produers, aounting for its impat on the balan-
ing operations. In Paper H, we onsider the joint determination of the day-ahead
and reserve dispath in presene of renewables in the market.
4.3.1 Improved Day-Ahead Sheduling of Renewables
As shown in [PZP10℄, there is potential for reduing expeted system opera-
tion osts if the traditional sequential dispath of the day-ahead and balaning
markets desribed in Setion 2.2.5 is replaed by a two-stage day-ahead dis-
path based on priniples of stohasti programming, of the like of the model
presented in Example 3.4. However, models of this type present some issues of
revenue adequay, as onventional exible produers reover their osts only in
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expetation but not under any realization of the unertainty. In Paper G, we
show that similar improvements in the expeted system ost an be ahieved by
a onventional day-ahead market-learing if the dispath of renewable stohasti
produers is arefully hosen, instead of being equal to the mean foreast of wind
power prodution, whih is still the urrent pratie in many markets worldwide.
To determine the optimal dispath of renewable produers, we propose a bilevel
model where unertainty is handled using stohasti programming. This model
is similar to the two-stage one in Example 3.4, with the addition of the equilib-
rium onditions of a lassial day-ahead market-learing as onstraints. Notie
that, as we disuss in Paper G, the latter measure ensures revenue adequay for
onventional produers regardless of the realization of stohasti prodution.
The model is tested on a modied version of the IEEE Reliability Test-System
[GWA
+
99℄, whih inludes two wind power produers, and ompared both to
the sequential day-ahead and balaning market-learing, and to the two-stage
market-learing presented in [PZP10℄. Figure 4.6 illustrates the expeted system
ost, whih aggregates osts at the day-ahead and at the balaning stage, for
the three learing proedures as a funtion of wind power penetration in the sys-
tem, in two dierent ases of orrelation between the stohasti prodution from
the two wind power produers in the system. As one an notie, the onven-
tional sequential market-learing (ConvD) has the worst performane among the
three models in expetation. Naturally, the two-stage market-learing (StohD)
yields the lowest ost in expetation, sine ConvD is suboptimal and the pro-
posed bilevel model (ImpD) is a onstrained version of StohD. However, the
performane of ImpD is rather lose to the optimal one. In partiular, the ex-
peted ost is a dereasing funtion of the penetration of wind power in the
system. This is not the ase with the onventional sequential dispath ConvD.
Indeed, after a ritial point indiated with a dashed vertial line in the gure,
the expeted ost starts inreasing as more wind power apaity is integrated in
the system. Remarkably, the proposed market-learing model (ImpD) is apable
of better oping with situations where the renewable stohasti produers are
positively orrelated with eah other.
Table 4.7 summarizes the results of the ase study presented in Paper G in
terms of prots for some of the exible onventional produers that provide
regulation. As one an see, these produers reover their osts in expetation
in the two-stage market-learing model (StohD), but inur losses in some re-
alizations of the output of stohasti produers. Furthermore, the probability
of inurring losses for the units displayed in the table is remarkably high. With
the sequential market-learing (ConvD) and the proposed sheme (ImpD), the
onventional produers are guaranteed ost reovery in any realization of the
stohasti output of produers in the system. Notie, however, that the model
we propose has a more balaned behavior in terms of expeted revenues for
onventional produers. On the ontrary, the onventional dispath yields very
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Figure 4.6: Impat of the wind power penetration level and spatial orrelation
on the expeted ost of system operation for dierent day-ahead
dispath models in the appliation study in Paper G
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high returns for the exible produers, at the expense of the renewable produ-
ers, whih pay too high regulation osts as a result of the ineient day-ahead
dispath of the market.
Unit
1 6 11 12
ConvD
Expeted
prot ($)
379.8 359.7 724.9 389.1
StohD
Expeted
prot ($)
45.6 48.4 99.7 64.9
Average
losses ($)
−17.4 −10.9 −17.6 −11.5
Probability
prot < 0
0.81 0.71 0.71 0.75
ImpD
Expeted
prot ($)
170.2 263.7 531.6 178.7
Table 4.7: Highlights of prots for some of the produers that provide regula-
tion in the ase study in Paper G, with a wind penetration equal
to 38% and a orrelation ρ = 0.35 between the two wind power
produers
4.3.2 Robust Day-Ahead and Reserve Dispath in Pres-
ene of Renewables
The sequential and deterministi manner with whih the reserve and the day-
ahead markets are leared in the market organization desribed in Setion 2.2.5
beomes more and more suboptimal as stohasti renewable soures penetrate
the market. On the ontrary, the joint determination of the amount of reserve
apaity and the forward shedule in a stohasti programming framework is
advoated in [MCPR09℄ to inrease the eieny of market operation.
Starting from the assumption that the reserve and dispath shedules must be
jointly robust to the unertain realization of stohasti prodution in order to
avoid ostly load-shedding events, Paper H proposes an approah based on ro-
bust adaptable optimization, see Setion 3.4. The proposed model builds on the
one in Example 3.5. Its objetive is the minimization of the total ost inurred
in the reserve, day-ahead and balaning market in the worst-ase realization
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of the unertain prodution from wind power generators. We onsider general
polyhedral unertainty sets to model the stohasti generation for a number of
wind power produers in the grid. In the remainder of this setion, we report
the highlights of a ase study where the proposed model is applied to a modi-
ed version of the 24-bus IEEE Reliability Test-System [GWA
+
99℄ inluding six
wind power produers. The stohasti programming ounterpart of the same
problem is onsidered as a benhmark for disussion.
In Table 4.8, the system ost is reported for both the robust optimization and the
stohasti programming approah. The ost inurred at the balaning stage (for
redispath, load-shedding and their total) is reported both in expetation and in
the worst-ase senario. To guarantee a fair omparison, the input senarios to
the stohasti programming approah follow a trunated Gaussian distribution,
while the model based on robust optimization onsiders the support of this
distribution as the unertainty set.
Let us now omment the results in Table 4.8. Firstly, the robust optimiza-
tion approah yields more onservative results than the stohasti programming
one in terms of upward reserve. Indeed, the latter must be suient to over
the negative deviation, i.e., an underprodution, from wind power produers
in any irumstane envisaged in the unertainty set. On the other hand, the
robust optimization approah dispathes no downward reserve, beause this is
not needed in the worst-ase realization of wind power output, whih is ne-
essarily an underprodution in ases where there is no ost assoiated to wind
spillage like in the onsidered example. In expetation, the robust optimization
approah is not as eient as the stohasti programming one, whih is optimal
and thus ahieves the lowest total ost. However, the proposed approah trades
o a slight inrease in the expeted system ost (about 2.8%) with an inreased
robustness, resulting in a drop in total system ost by over two thirds in the
worst-ase realization of the unertainty.
A similar omparison is presented in Table 4.9. This table reports the sys-
tem ost in a ase where the foreast distribution for the unertainty used in
the stohasti programming approah (a trunated Gaussian) is dierent from
the atual one (a uniform distribution with the same support). Sine the two
distributions share the same support, the dispath obtained with the robust
optimization approah does not hange as ompared to the one in the previous
ase. Remarkably, in this ase the robust optimization model obtains lower osts
in expetation than the stohasti programming one, whih is penalized by a rel-
atively large load-shedding ost. These results suggest that the performane of
the stohasti programming approah degrades more quikly than the one of its
robust ounterpart if the senarios used as input underestimate the probability
in the tail of the atual distribution of the unertainty. However, in the onverse
ase where the senarios overestimate the weight in the tail of the distribution,
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Cost Robust Optimization Stohasti Programming
Dispath 17 897.52 17 512.07
Upward reserve 489.72 355.59
Downward reserve 0 130.28
Total day-ahead 18 387.25 17 997.95
Expetation Worst-ase Expetation Worst-ase
Redispath 339.32 2989.46 147.82 2634.55
Load-shedding 0 0 72.83 43 586.85
Total balaning 339.32 2989.46 220.64 46 221.40
Total aggregate 18 726.56 21 376.72 18 218.59 64 219.34
Table 4.8: Comparison of system ost with the robust optimization and the
stohasti programming approahes based on a simulation in Paper
H. Values in $
stohasti programming may retain lower system ost in expetation. We refer
to Paper H for further results.
Cost Robust Optimization Stohasti Programming
Dispath 17 897.52 17 512.07
Upward reserve 489.72 355.59
Downward reserve 0 130.28
Total day-ahead 18 387.25 17 997.95
Redispath (exp.) 576.75 335.06
Load-shedding (exp.) 0 923.26
Total balaning (exp.) 576.75 1258.32
Total aggregate (exp.) 18 964.00 19 256.27
Table 4.9: Comparison of system ost (only in expetation for the balaning
market) with the robust optimization and the stohasti program-
ming approahes with inaurate predition of the distribution of
the unertainty, based on a simulation in Paper H. Values in $
Chapter 5
Conlusions and
Perspetives
In this dissertation, we address several problems of deision-making under un-
ertainty for the optimal management of stohasti and non-dispathable renew-
ables in eletriity markets. In partiular, we onsider both the point of view of
market players, i.e., produers, virtual power plant operators and retailers, and
the one of market and system operators. By making use of tools of optimization
under unertainty, namely stohasti programming, stohasti bilevel program-
ming and robust optimization, we show that the market value of renewables an
be inreased through improved deision making.
5.1 Overview of the Contribution
Assuming the point of view of renewable power produers employing stohasti,
non-dispathable soures, in partiular wind, we rst fous on the determination
of optimal short-term trading strategies in Papers C and D. The partiipation
in eletriity markets envisages trading in multiple oors with dierent gate
losures, some of them with a substantial advane in time to the delivery of
eletriity. This, oupled with the unertain nature of stohasti renewable
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soures of eletriity, renders the determination of the optimal oering strategy
a problem of optimization under unertainty.
In Paper C, we show that there exists an analytial solution to the trading
problem when the produer partiipates as a prie-taker both in the day-ahead
and in the balaning markets. Similarly to the newsvendor problem [RS64℄,
the optimal solution is a ertain quantile of the predited distribution of the
stohasti prodution, whih depends on the expetation of the pries in the
two market oors. Through a test-ase based on the Nord Pool market, we
onrm the theoretial superiority of this quantile-based strategy with respet
to the onditional mean foreast, whih has been used traditionally by stohasti
power produers. However, we show that better nanial results are obtained
in the test-ase by onstraining the quantile-based strategy in a band entered
about the onditional mean of the output distribution. This result highlights the
exposure of the quantile-based bid to large losses stemming from single trading
periods, and its suboptimality when the foreasts employed for deision-making
are inaurate. Note that this is a pratial problem also typial of stohasti
programming.
To render the prie-taker assumption unneessary, we employ the framework of
mathematial programming with equilibrium onstraints (MPEC) [LPR96℄. In
Paper D, we onsider a similar trading problem, where the impat of the stohas-
ti produer's oer on the balaning market is aounted for by embedding the
equilibrium onditions of the learing problem of this market. Sine the latter
is stohasti, we onsider the optimality onditions for multiple market-learing
problems in a stohasti MPEC [GCF
+
12℄. Beause these optimality onditions
an be linearized by using binary variables [FM81℄, this results in a very large
ombinatorial problem. In Paper D, we show that the model is tratable in a
realisti ase study. Furthermore, the optimal solution results in signiantly
improved revenues in expetation for the produer.
The omplementary point of view of demand-side management is also addressed
in this dissertation. Speially, we onsider how the introdution of dynami
pries for end onsumers would impat the strategy of virtual power plant (VPP)
operators and retailers trading in the wholesale market, and result in a more
eient use of the resoures. We model problems of this type as hierarhial
optimization problems, whih we ast as MPECs where the upper-level opti-
mization problem, i.e., the VPP operator's or the retailer's, sets a dynami prie
signal and the lower-level one, i.e., the onsumer's, optimizes the onsumption
plan.
In Paper E, we onsider the ase of a VPP operator that owns stohasti power
prodution failities and supplies onsumers that are exible in their load for
heating. The dynami prie signal is employed to ontrol the onsumption from
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the exible onsumers, with the objetive of minimizing the expeted value of
the imbalane resulting from the stohasti power prodution. We show that
the need to resort to the balaning market is drastially redued as imbalanes
an be smoothed out by exploiting the onsumers' exibility. However, models
of this type suer from two drawbaks. The rst one is the omplexity of
MPEC models already disussed above. The seond one is the need for a reliable
model of the onsumers' dynamis and preferenes to be used in the lower-level
problem. In pratie, a big modeling and lustering eort is required for a
real-world appliation of models of this type.
A problem similar to the one desribed above, and with the same pratial
drawbaks just mentioned, is onsidered in Paper F. In this work, however, we
onsider a prot-maximizing retailer in the upper-level problem instead of a VPP
operator. Through a ase study, we show that by employing a dynami prie
signal to exploit onsumer exibility, the retailer ost for purhasing eletriity
at the wholesale market is redued. This fat signals that a more eient use of
the prodution resoures is made. However, we highlight that only the retailer
benets from the inreased eieny, while the onsumers are better o with
other prie shemes than the dynami one, e.g., a time-of-use tari.
Finally, this dissertation addresses the hallenges that stohasti, non-
dispathable renewable soures pose to the market and system operators. In-
deed, traditional deterministi tools for solving the day-ahead energy, and pos-
sibly reserve, dispath problems are inreasingly suboptimal as a growing pene-
tration of renewables in the system alls for ostlier operations in the balaning
market. We onsider solutions based on stohasti programming and on robust
optimization to takle problems of this type.
In Paper G, we onsider the optimal day-ahead dispath of stohasti produ-
tion in a two-stage energy-only market. We build on the two-stage stohasti-
programming-based model proposed in [PZP10℄, whih is known to yield the
lowest expeted ost but also to guarantee ost reovery for the produers and
the market operator only in expetation, and not in any realization of the uner-
tainty. The model we propose aims at the minimization of the expeted system
ost, omprising the ost at the day-ahead and at the balaning markets, as the
one in [PZP10℄, and inludes in an MPEC fashion the optimality onditions of a
traditional day-ahead market-learing, where the dispath of the stohasti pro-
duers is xed. This guarantees ost reovery in any realization of the unertain
prodution, while it still retains most of the gains of the stohasti programming
approah in [PZP10℄ ompared to the traditional sequential, deterministi pro-
edure for market-learing urrently employed. Among the disadvantages of the
proposed model, however, is the additional omplexity introdued by embed-
ding the optimality onditions in an MPEC, whih have a mixed-integer linear
reformulation and therefore result in a ombinatorial problem.
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Finally in Paper H, we onsider the problem of jointly determining the day-ahead
energy and reserve dispath, whih is studied using a stohasti programming
approah in [MCPR09℄. With respet to the latter work, we take an alternative
path and formulate the problem in the framework of robust adaptable optimiza-
tion [BBC11℄. This approah is partiularly relevant within this ontext, as the
resulting energy and reserve dispath is immune to the worst-ase realization
of the unertain power prodution, thus resulting in no load-shedding events.
We show that the robust solution is slightly suboptimal in omparison with the
dispath obtained from the orresponding stohasti programming model. How-
ever, the former is not only better immunized to the worst-ase realization of the
unertainty than the latter, but it may also perform better if the atual distribu-
tion of the stohasti prodution is dierent from the foreast one. Notie that
this ase is partiularly relevant, as modeling aurately the stohasti produ-
tion from several renewable power produers spread in the network, aounting
for their orrelation, is a rather hallenging task. Furthermore, we experiene
that the robust optimization model has better omputational performane than
its stohasti programming ounterpart in the ase study onsidered. However,
it should be pointed out that the formulation we propose is limited to polyhedral
sets for the stohasti power prodution, as the use of more omplex unertainty
sets hinders a straightforward solution of the problem.
5.2 Future Researh
The researh works presented in this dissertation open the way to future researh
in dierent diretions.
As far as the problem of trading renewable power is onerned, we an identify
a number of improvements to our models. First of all, it would be of great
interest to extend the prie-maker assumption, whih so far is limited to the
balaning market, to the day-ahead market as well. The assumption in our
model is justied by the larger volumes traded in the day-ahead market than
in the balaning market. However, we an envisage situations in the future
where single renewable power produers will be able to inuene the day-ahead
prie formation. Furthermore, the inlusion of dierent market oors in the
model, e.g., the intra-day and/or the futures and derivatives markets, would be
of great relevane. In partiular, the intra-day market is seen as key to a su-
essful large-sale integration of renewables, and a ombination of trading in this
market and in the nanial markets ould redue the risk exposure of renewable
power produers. Another diretion for future researh is modeling trading as
a prie-maker in a two-prie market. This would onstitute not only a valuable
operational tool for renewable power produers, but also a signiant ontribu-
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tion to the debate on the design of balaning markets. Besides, the inlusion
of a network representation in the oering model would be an improvement of
partiular importane to markets with nodal priing, whih are very popular in
the United States. Finally, it would be espeially interesting to onsider the op-
timal trading strategy of a portfolio inluding both renewable and onventional
soures. This is of partiular relevane nowadays, as the inreasing integration
of distributed generation and the envisaged development of demand response
are promoting the onept of virtual power plant.
Needless to say, extensions of the researh arried out on demand-side manage-
ment for virtual power plant operators and retailers in a dynami-prie frame-
work are also possible. A straightforward improvement of the presented models
would be the development of more sophistiated desriptions of the onsumer
behavior, inluding other soures of exible onsumption than heating. Besides,
building algorithms to luster the large number of onsumers assoiated to a re-
tailer or to a virtual power plant is paramount for the pratial use of bilevel
models of the type we propose, as these models are omputationally expensive.
In view of pratial appliations with short look-ahead time and/or involving
a large number of onsumers, it would also be espeially important to propose
alternative models, e.g., based on ontrol theory, to determine appropriate prie
signals for the onsumers. Finally, modeling ompetition among retailers in a
demand response framework with dynami priing would be a relevant extension
of the presented work. This would be partiularly important as future market
design might not only render residential onsumers prie-responsive, but also
inrease their awareness and market power, as aggregators of onsumers may be
allowed to negotiate diretly with retailers.
The market-learing models proposed in this dissertation open up several di-
retions of future researh as well. First of all, a relevant extension would
be the inlusion of dierent markets in the proposed learing proedures, e.g.,
the reserve market, and/or the exible ramping markets urrently under de-
velopment [AAR
+
12℄, whih ould yield higher eieny and reliability for the
system. Another improvement would be the development of alternative meth-
ods to determine the day-ahead dispath of stohasti produers while reduing
the omputational burden for the market operator. Indeed, the bilevel model
presented suers the omputational problems already mentioned, whih ompli-
ate its pratial appliation to large-sale problems. Finally, the use of robust
optimization in the ontext of the determination of the day-ahead energy and re-
serve dispath opens up interesting researh diretions. Indeed, this framework
requires the denition of unertainty sets for stohasti renewable prodution
in dierent sites of the system. Therefore, there is a need to develop stohasti
tools to model suh sets. Besides, advanes are needed to formulate and solve
optimization models that allow for more sophistiated unertainty sets than
polyhedral ones, e.g., ellipsoidal sets.
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Abstrat
A statistial analysis is performed in order to investigate the re-
lationship between wind power prodution and ross-border power
transmission in Europe. A dataset inluding physial hourly ross-
border power exhanges between European ountries as dependent
variables is used. Prinipal omponent analysis is employed in or-
der to redue the problem dimension. Then, nonlinear relationships
between foreast wind power prodution as well as spot prie in Ger-
many, by far the largest wind power produer in Europe, and power
ows are modeled using loal polynomial regression. We nd that
both foreast wind power prodution and spot prie in Germany have
substantial nonlinear eets on power transmission on a European
sale.
A.1 Introdution
Driven by the need to omply with stringent international agreements, whih
aim at reduing the environmental impat of energy prodution as well as energy
dependene, the deployment of renewable energy in Europe has grown at an
unpreedented pae in the reent years. Among renewable soures, wind power
plays a entral role both for its impressive tehnologial development and for
its expansion. Partiular features of wind power, like its stohasti and non-
dispathable nature and its very low marginal ost, render it very dierent from
the more onventional soures of energy.
Due to its low marginal ost, wind power prodution has the onsequene of
lowering market pries via the so-alled merit-order eet [1℄. This is beause
wind power enters the energy supply funtion from the left, or, in an alternative
1
DTU Informatis, Tehnial University of Denmark, Rihard Petersens Plads, bld. 305,
DK-2800 Kgs. Lyngby, Denmark
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interpretation, redues the load and thus shifts the intersetion between supply
and load to the left, thus pushing more expensive soures of energy out of
the prodution shedule. Simulation with market models in [2℄ and statistial
analysis in [3℄ onrm the prie redution eet of wind power. The latter work
also shows that the driving variable of this mehanism is wind power foreast
rather than atual prodution, sine the former one is used when produers bid
on the market.
The European transmission network is omposed of ve dierent synhronous
zones, whih in turn gather several interonneted national and international
energy markets. These are organized with dierent rules and haraterized
by dierent generation portfolios; furthermore limate onditions vary widely
aross Europe. In these onditions signiant prie dierentials are likely to
develop between areas, and therefore also signiant ows of power from areas
with low power prie to areas where energy is more expensive. Thus by in-
uening energy pries, wind generation also drives ows of power from areas
with temporarily favorable onditions for wind power prodution to areas with
higher prie level, be it due to a high demand or an expensive generation mix
[4℄. Massive investments are planned in order to inrease the transmission limits
between ountries of the EU in the years to ome [5℄.
Among the hallenges for a suessful integration of high penetration of wind
power are the variability of its power output and the limited auray of wind
power foreasting [6, 7℄. Both these problems an be addressed by aggregating
the power output of wind farms distributed over a wide region. Indeed due to the
lower variability of wind power prodution in Europe as ompared to generation
from a single region, more than 20% of the European demand ould be overed
by wind power without signiant hanges in the system [8℄. Furthermore fore-
ast errors an be drastially redued by the so-alled smoothing eet of
aggregation, as disussed in [9℄. Investigations of this type generally assume
innite transmission apaity, while as [10℄ points out, the interation between
wind power prodution and transmission onstraints should be aounted for, if
these phenomena are to be analyzed at a European sale.
In this ontext, modeling how wind power prodution interats with the ow of
energy in large international power systems is partiularly appealing. Models
of this type are needed when planning investments in new wind power or trans-
mission apaity. From an operational point of view, they an help the proess
of sheduling ross-border power exhanges.
Power system models have been developed and simulated in the literature in
order to study the eet of inreasing penetration of wind power on European
ross-border ow. Suh models are simulated in [10℄ in order to study the
ongestion of individual interonnetions in dierent senarios of wind power
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penetration in Europe. A similar intent is pursued in [11℄, with the fous being
on oshore wind power, and in [12℄, where opulas are employed to simulate
wind power prodution at dierent loations. Besides, the eet of wind foreast
errors on the unertainty of ross-border ows has been investigated in [13℄.
As opposed to simulation using market and grid models, this work follows a
top-down statistial approah based on historial data, along the lines of the
method employed in [14℄. Among the advantages of this approah is the rela-
tive simpliity, sine no detailed modeling of the underlying physial struture
of the power system is required. On the other hand, the reliane on historial
data implies the impossibility of extrapolating the analysis out of the range of
observations. In this paper a method for analyzing the impat of wind-related
variables (external variables) on the European ross-border ows (dependent
variables) is developed and employed. The fous is direted towards the ef-
fet of foreast wind power prodution in Germany, whih, besides being the
largest produer of wind energy in Europe, is entrally loated and highly in-
teronneted with the neighboring ountries. As Germanyalong with other
ountries in Northern Europeis setting ambitious targets for installed wind
power apaity already by 2020 [15℄ the presented methodology will allow to
assess how future deployment of wind power in this important region will af-
fet the European transmission grid, pinpointing its limitations and possible
bottleneks.
The methodology proposed in this work follows three steps. First, Prinipal
Component Analysis (PCA) is employed in order to redue the size of the prob-
lem, whih would otherwise require the analysis of a large number of ows. PCA
determines the most signiant modes of the ow dataset, i.e. the diretions in
whih it shows most of its variation. The dimension redution is then performed
by seleting a redued set of modes, whih aount for a large fration of the
variane of the original dataset. At a seond stage, loal polynomial regression
is applied on this basis in order to model the interation between the external
variables and the hosen modes of the ow dataset. The nal step onsists in
mapping the results of the analysis bak from the redued basis to the original
spae, i.e. the individual ross-border ows.
This paper is strutured as follows. The dataset used in this work is briey
introdued in Setion A.2, and the hoie of the explanatory and dependent
variables is motivated. Setion A.3 desribes the employed methodology. In
Setion A.4 we disuss the results of the appliation of this method on the
available dataset. Finally, onluding remarks and possible future extensions of
this work are provided in Setion A.5.
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A.2 Dataset
The dataset employed in this work spans a period of 3 years from January 2006
until the end of Deember 2008. Sine during the winter daylight savings only
one measurement is available for the dupliated hour, 26301 hourly observations
are available in total both for dependent and explanatory variables.
A.2.1 Dependent variables
Physial hourly ross-border power ows between 34 European and bordering
extra-European ountries form the set of the dependent variables used in this
work. This onsists of 70 ows in 2006, 72 in 2007 after the addition of the tie-
lines onneting Bulgaria-Maedonia and Estonia-Finland, and 74 in 2008 after
the addition of the Norway-Netherlands and Greee-Turkey interonnetions.
Sine the analysis to arry out needs data to be available for the whole period
for all the interonnetions, the set of physial ows is restrited to the original
70 interonnetions established as of 2006. Furthermore, data are missing for
signiant parts of the period 20062008 in other two ows. The nal dataset is
therefore restrited to 68 ross-border interonnetions. Given the low number
of disarded ows ompared to the total, suh disard has a limited impat.
Finally, a data leaning proedure indiated the presene of outliers stemming
from phenomena of dierent nature. Exeptionally high or low values for most
European ows were reorded during the UCTE system split on the 4th Novem-
ber 2006, see [16℄. Similarly, unusual ows an be observed during the winter
swith from daylight savings to solar time for most interonnetions. Finally,
a small number of loal, single-hour spikes involving few adjaent ows is ob-
served, possibly stemming from smaller tehnial failures. Suh limited number
of outliers is removed from the dataset leaving 26281 hourly observations.
A.2.2 Explanatory variables
For the reasons mentioned in Setion A.1 the fous of the analysis is direted
towards wind power prodution in Germany. As [3℄ states, the driving variable
to be onsidered when analyzing the eet of wind power is the prodution
foreast rather than the atual prodution. Indeed the former is used when
bidding wind power at the spot market, where the prie is settled. Sine both
wind power foreasts and load aet the spot prie, it is of interest to analyze
their ombined eet on the ross-border ow of power. Therefore the rst
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explanatory variable to be onsidered in the analysis is the foreast wind power
penetration
r̂t =
Ŵt
Lt
, (A.1)
where Ŵt is the wind power prodution foreast and Lt the load, both ag-
gregated for Germany as a whole. Both these variables are available in the
onsidered dataset for the whole 20062008 period. It should be notied that
wind power in Germany developed onstantly in the onsidered period. Indeed,
the installed apaity grew from 18.4 GW at the beginning of 2006 to 23.9 GW
at the end of 2008 [17℄. Nevertheless, the impat on this study is limited owing
to the fat that wind power penetration is employed rather than a saling of the
prodution with respet to the total installed apaity.
An alternative approah is the diret use of the spot prie in Germany as an
explanatory variable. The eet of wind power is then onsidered in an indi-
ret way, under the assumption that wind power foreast, or penetration, is
negatively orrelated with the spot prie, as shown in [3℄. Although the ore
of the analysis presented in this paper onsiders the wind power penetration
as explanatory variable, we provide an example using the eletriity prie in
Setion A.4.2.
The time series of spot pries in the German eletriity market (EEX) is har-
aterized by sparse spikes reahing out to around e2500/MWh. As a way to
solve this issue, among other benets, logarithmi transformation is ommonly
employed when dealing with prie time series, see e.g. [18℄. The time series of
logarithmi pries an be generated through the transformation
P lt = log (1 + Pt) . (A.2)
This way the distane between the sparse high pries is shrunk, while the relative
distane between the denser low pries is inreased. As a side eet, handling
negative pries is not possible under the logarithmi transformation. In the
dataset, 15 pries at the end of the year 2008 turned out to be negative. These
values are disarded from the dataset, whih is therefore further redued to
26266 observations. Alternatively, a shifted log transformation [19℄ ould be
employed without requiring the exlusion of negative pries.
A.3 Methodology
Although the study of a power network ould be performed by independently
analyzing eah single owgate, several reasons point at other options. First,
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studying a wide power system like the European one would require the analysis
of a large number of ows, with negative onsequenes on the dimensionality of
the problem. Furthermore, due to the net struture of power systems several
ows an be highly orrelated due to e.g. loop ows. This means that part
of the analysis arried out by independently onsidering eah interonnetion
would be redundant. On top of that, noise an render less visible the objet
of the investigation. As Setion A.3.1 explains, PCA is used here in order to
overome these issues.
One a redued set of prinipal omponents is indiated by PCA, statistial
regression is employed on the redued basis in order to model the dependene
struture between ows and external variables. As power systems are omplex
and nonlinear, their study requires nonlinear regression tehniques. Loal poly-
nomial regression was suessfully applied in [14℄ to perform an analysis similar
to the one in this work, though only onsidering the Austrian power system.
The same tehnique, whih is introdued in Setion A.3.2, is used in this work.
The reader interested in a deeper presentation of loal polynomial regression is
referred to [20℄.
A.3.1 Prinipal omponent analysis
PCA is a tehnique that is often used when dealing with multivariate data
in order to redue the problem dimension, see [21℄. Problem simpliation is
obtained by seleting a redued basis of orthogonal variables, whih aount for
most of the variane in the dataset. Let us denote with the vetor Xt the values
of the N physial hourly ross-border ows at time t. Let us also assume that
T hourly values are available for eah interonnetion. The entered version X˜t
of the multivariate time-series of the power ows is given by
X˜t = Xt − X¯ , (A.3)
where X¯ is the vetor of the mean values of the N ows. The ovariane matrix
C of the ows an be omputed as
C =
1
T
T∑
t=1
X˜tX˜
T
t . (A.4)
The eigenvetors of the ovariane matrix C form a new orthogonal basis for
the ow dataset. In pratie, suh eigenvetors represent modes of the dataset,
i.e. groups of ows that often exhibit a similar behavior. By ordering the
eigenvetors so that the orresponding eigenvalues are arranged in a dereasing
fashion, one ensures that the higher the ranking of a vetor in the new basis,
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the higher the fration of total variane of the dataset it explains. This is a
trivial result of the fat that these frations and the eigenvalues are linearly
proportional.
The prinipal omponents are obtained by seleting the rst n eigenvetors in
the new ordered basis. Although the hoie of n is arbitrary, there are several
riteria for this seletion, e.g. the method of the average eigenvalue and the sree
graph method, whih are disussed in [21℄. The latter method, whih basially
onsists in a graphial disrimination between small and large eigenvalues, has
been used in this work. As a onsequene of this seletion, only the n diretions
(or modes) of the ow spae with the largest variane are retained in the analysis,
while the remaining N − n are disarded. This is done sine the modes with
larger variane arry most of the statistial information while the ones with
smaller variane an often be assoiated with noise.
Let us denote with Yi, i = 1, . . . , n the prinipal omponents of the dataset.
These form a redued orthonormal basis for the original ows, and one an
always write the entered ow observations X˜t as a linear ombination of the
PCs Yi's plus an error term ǫt, whih has zero mean and nite variane
X˜t =
n∑
i=1
αi,tYi + ǫt ∀t , (A.5)
In other words, we ahieve a similar statistial representation of the original ow
dataset through linear projetion from the redued spae of the PCs. Generally
speaking, the higher the fration of the original variane is retained with the
hosen PCs, the more aurate suh representation will be. More preisely, it is
to be underlined that the variane is a full desription of the statistial informa-
tion ontained in a dataset only under the assumption of joint normality. When
the original variables (ows) do not follow a multivariate normal distribution,
the omparison between the variane of the original dataset and the variane
of its projetion on the PC spae is an indiator of the amount of the retained
statistial information up to moments of order 2. In the ase that higher order
moments of the residuals are large in omparison to the original signal, alter-
natives to PCA should be onsidered, e.g. Independent Component Analysis
(ICA) [22℄.
The advantage of using PCA is now learly visible, as it is possible to represent
every multivariate ow observation X˜t, whih is N -dimensional, with a set of n
oeients αi,t, where n < N .
It should be pointed out that PCA is often arried out on entered and stan-
dardized variables, i.e. by diagonalizing the orrelation matrix R rather than
the ovariane matrix C. The hoie of using the ovariane matrix is motivated
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by the fat that in this way the information on the magnitude of the ows is
not lost in the division rij = cij/(σX˜iσX˜j ). This is learly an advantage in this
ase as all the dependent variables (ows) are measured in the same unit, and,
as Setion A.4 underlines, this hoie allows a more intuitive interpretation of
the prinipal omponents. Furthermore, as [23℄ points out, arrying out PCA
on the ovariane matrix an better isolate the strongest variations in a dataset
with uniform units.
Finally, it is important to remark that data might present signiant trends
when longer datasets (i.e., spanning several years) are employed. For example,
an inrease in demand ould introdue slow variations in power ows. In that
ase, simply entering the multivariate ow dataset as in (A.3) might reveal itself
inadequate to remove suh trends. To this end, one might lter the dataset of
power ows so that low-frequeny dynamis are disarded from the analysis.
A.3.2 Loal polynomial regression
The model of Eq. (A.5), representing the power ows as a linear ombination of
the prinipal omponents of the dataset, an be modied in order to aount for
the eet of explanatory variables ut, e.g. the foreast wind power penetration r̂t
and the transformed eletriity prie P lt . This is done by allowing the oeients
αi of the prinipal omponents to vary as funtions of ut
X˜t =
n∑
i=1
αi(ut)Yi + ǫt ∀t . (A.6)
In this work loal polynomial regression, see e.g. [20℄, is employed in order to
study the funtional forms of the αi(ut) oeients. This tehnique allows to
t a urve or a surfae (depending on whether ut is formed by one or more
explanatory variables) to these relationships by loally approximating them as
low-order polynomials. Although in priniple ut ould be of any dimension m,
for pratial appliations this vetor should be sized reasonably. For example
it is not possible to visualize the oeients αi(ut) if m > 2. Furthermore, the
omputational time inreases with the dimension of this vetor.
The rst step of the tehnique onsists in the denition of a grid in the spae
of the explanatory variable u. The grid is formed here by hoosing l equally
spaed quantiles in eah dimension of u. Let us indiate with ui the time series
of the i-th explanatory variable, sorted in inreasing order. We are interested
in the quantiles with the following probabilities
pk =
k
l
−
1
2l
k = 1, . . . , l . (A.7)
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Let us dene hk = Tpk + 1/2, where T is the sample size. If hk is an integer,
the k-th quantile uki is the hk-th point in the sorted sequene ui. Otherwise, it
an be estimated with the following linear interpolation
uki = ui,⌊hk⌋ + (hk − ⌊hk⌋)
(
ui,⌊hk⌋+1 − ui,⌊hk⌋
)
, (A.8)
where the seond subsript on the u's indexes a ertain element of the vetor
ui.
A grid is then formed by onsidering the lm ombinations of points
(uk11 , u
k2
2 , . . . , u
km
m ) where ki = 1, 2, . . . , l for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Alternatively,
equally spaed uki ould be used with no onsequenes on the remainder of
the methodology presented here.
Weighted least-squares regression is then performed loally at eah point of the
grid. A set of q data points, where 1 ≤ q ≤ T , is used for regression. These
points, alled neighbors, are the q losest points to the onsidered point of the
grid. Naturally the neighbors seletion proedure requires that a suitable metri
ρ is dened on the explanatory variable spae. Hereafter the Eulidean distane
is adopted, after variables measured in dierent units are normalized. The
ratio h = q/T ≤ 1 between the onsidered number of neighbors and the total
number of data points is referred to as bandwidth. High bandwidths inrease
the smoothness of the regression, with the trade-o of an inreased bias of the
regressed model. In this work a bandwidth h = 0.2 is used.
A weight funtion has to be dened in order to assign higher importane to the
observations (X˜t,ut), whose values of the explanatory variables are the losest
neighbors of the grid point. Among the many possibilities, a weight funtion
based on the triube funtion is hosen here
w(z) =
{
(1− z3)3 0 ≤ z < 1 ,
0 otherwise .
(A.9)
One should notie that w(z) is non-inreasing for positive z. Let us name uj#
the j-th point of the grid and with uj its q-th furthest neighbor. Sine ρ(uj ,uj#)
is at a maximum in the onsidered neighborhood, the weight funtion
f j(u) = w
(
ρ(u,uj#)
ρ(uj ,uj#)
)
(A.10)
is well dened. Indeed it assigns non-inreasing weights to points with inreasing
distane from u
j
#. A weight of 1 is assigned to the grid point u
j
#, while u
j
and
all the points outside the neighborhood have 0 weight.
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Weighted least squares regression, see [24℄, is employed loally for eah point
u
j
# of the grid. Eah observation (X˜t,ut) is weighted aording to the weight
funtion in (A.10). The output of weighted least squares regression is a loal
model for αi(ut), approximated as a rst order polynomial of the explanatory
variables. The model is determined aording to a weighted least squares ri-
terion, whih ensures that the modeling error ǫt is minimized in a onsistent
way.
After this proedure is arried out for all the points in the grid, a urve or surfae
α̂i(ut) is tted from the individual loal approximations. Suh a t models the
behavior of the oeients αi(ut) of the prinipal omponents in the whole
spae of interest as funtions of the explanatory variables. Conlusions ould be
drawn diretly from the shape of the regression surfae of the αi(ut)'s, provided
that the prinipal omponents an be easily interpreted. As an alternative, one
an hoose to map the analysis bak to the original spae of the non-entered
ows, obtaining the models X̂(ut)
X̂(ut) =
n∑
i=1
α̂i(ut)Yi + X¯t . (A.11)
This way regression urves or surfaes are obtained for eah individual ow in
the dataset.
A.4 Results
This setion presents the results obtained from the appliation of the method
proposed in Setion A.3 to the dataset desribed in Setion A.2. Clearly, anal-
yses of this type depend heavily on the availability and on the quality of large
datasets, whih are not always publily available. Although datasets for power
ows, wind power prodution and load are available for ertain eletriity mar-
kets, e.g., PJM [25℄ and the European markets [26℄, the olletion of suh
datasets require the oordination of a number of entities so as to ensure onsis-
teny in terms of sampling frequeny, sampling time and time-span. Obviously,
this is a limitation for the readers willing to perform a similar study, but unable
to interat with the entities owning the data.
A.4.1 Prinipal omponent analysis
The results of PCA applied to the dataset of the ross-border ows show that
it is possible to express most of the original variane with a limited number of
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prinipal omponents (PCs). By using the sree-graph method, see [21℄, the 8
PCs with highest variane are seleted. The riterion used ensures that further
inlusion of PCs would not inrease sensibly the umulative fration of variane
explained by the set.
Table A.1 summarizes the harateristis of the seleted omponents. Its se-
ond olumn reports the fration of total dataset variane explained by eah of
the PCs individually, while the third olumn shows the umulative fration of
variane jointly explained by seleting the rst i PCs. It is seen that almost
2/3 of the total variane are explained by the rst 4 PCs. Furthermore, the
seleted set of 8 PCs explains 82.11% of the original variane, despite the dra-
mati redution in size of the problem from the original 68 ows to 8 modes. In
Table A.1: Individual and umulative fration of variane explained by the
i-th prinipal omponent and by the prinipal omponents up to
the i-th one respetively
Prinipal Individual fration Cumulative fration
omponent of variane [%℄ of variane [%℄
1 28.89 28.89
2 18.83 47.73
3 10.55 58.28
4 7.69 65.97
5 5.53 71.50
6 4.83 76.32
7 2.97 79.29
8 2.81 82.11
relation to the disussion on the non-normality assumption in Setion A.3.1, it
is stressed that dierent statistial desriptions, suh as the omparison of the
interquantile ranges of the ows and their residuals, showed a similar behavior
as the one illustrated in Table A.1 for the variane.
The analysis of the struture of the PCs gives further insight into the hara-
teristis of the European power system. Indeed when PCA is arried out on the
ovariane matrix, see the disussion in Setion A.3.1, the struture of the PCs
often oers a physial interpretation. Let us denote with Yi the i-th PC. It is
a vetor of 68 elements
Yi = [Yi,1 . . . Yi,68]
T , (A.12)
where Yi,j represents the weight of the j-th individual ow in the i-th PC. Large
weights of the same sign on a PC show that the orresponding ows tend to
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deviate from their mean in the same diretion; onversely they tend to deviate
in opposite diretions if their weights have dierent signs.
Fig. A.1 shows the struture of the rst PC as an example. In this illustration
the widths of the arrows in the map of Europe are saled, so that eah of them
is proportional to the weight Y1,j of the respetive j-th ross-border ow in the
rst PC. As one an see, the main ontribution to this rst PC is given by the
simultaneous ow of power diretly from Switzerland to Germany, diretly from
Frane to Germany and by the ow from Frane to Germany through Belgium
and the Netherlands. The fat that this mode alone explains almost 30% of
the variation of the dataset signals the importane of the power ow between
Frane and Germany on a European sale.
The seond and third PC, not shown here for the sake of brevity, oer interesting
interpretations, too. The seond PC is mainly omposed of power owing from
Germany to the Nordi region, and internally in Sandinavia from Sweden to
Norway. A possible interpretation ould be that heap power is owing from
ontinental Europe to Norway so that water an be kept stored in the Norwegian
hydro dams, or the other way around when ontinental Europe imports power
from Norway. A seond signiant pattern in this prinipal omponent, although
less important, is the ow of power through Switzerland in the North to South
diretion. Furthermore, the main trend in the third PC is the ow of power
towards Italy from Frane, both diretly and through Switzerland, and from
Germany, through Switzerland and to a lesser extent Austria.
A.4.2 Regression urves for prinipal omponents
Regression urves or surfaes modeling the behavior of the αi(ut) oeients
in (A.6) as funtions of the multivariate input ut are readily obtained by using
loal polynomial regression.
Fig. A.2 shows the urve modeling the behavior of the α1(r̂t) oeient as a
funtion of wind power penetration in Germany. The urve learly represents the
mean trend of the relationship between the two variables, and not a deterministi
model of them. Therefore one should expet observations to be spread around
this urve, due to their stohastiity and dependeny on other variables not
aounted by the model. Nevertheless one an draw some intuitive onlusions
from this mean trend, also as a result of the interpretability of the rst prinipal
omponent. In Setion A.4.1 it is underlined how the main trend in this mode
is the power ow from Frane and Switzerland to Germany. As one an see in
Fig. A.2, the orresponding oeient tends to derease rather sensibly when
wind power penetration in Germany inreases. The impliation is that the
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PC coefficient = 0.4
PC coefficient = 0.3
PC coefficient = 0.2
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PC coefficient = 0.5
Figure A.1: Map of Europe showing the weight of eah single entered physial
ow X˜i in the rst prinipal omponent Y1. The width of the
lines in the gure is proportional to the oeient of the respetive
ow in Y1
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Figure A.2: Regression on the oeient α1(ut) of the rst prinipal ompo-
nent relative to wind power penetration in Germany
higher r̂t in Germany, the lower its import of power
2
.
Similar onlusions an be drawn from the regression on the oeients of the
other PCs, whih are not shown here. For instane, the value of α2 rises as r̂t
inreases, indiating an inreased ow of power from Germany to the Nordi
region and, less markedly, to Switzerland.
Regression urves modeling the behavior of the PC oeients as a funtion of
the logarithmi spot prie in Germany an be obtained in exatly the same fash-
ion. Fig. A.3 shows the α2 oeient modeled as a funtion of this independent
variable. The results an again be interpreted quite intuitively. Indeed, the re-
gression urve shows that high values of ow from Germany to Sandinavia are
in average ahieved with low spot prie level at the EEX market. The oeient
then dereases as pries rise in Germany, and its sign hanges when log(1 + Pt)
approahes 4.
The approah is easily extendable to the ase where the independent variable
ut is multivariate. Fig. A.4 shows the regression surfae modeling α1(ut) as a
funtion of ut = [r̂t, ht], where ht is the day-time. The latter variable appears
to inuene the oeient, too, as higher ow values are obtained during hours
where onsumption peaks. Not surprisingly the dereasing trend relative to
2
It is to be noted that at this time only qualitative onlusions an be drawn. For example,
one annot distinguish when Germany is importing or exporting. Therefore, the statement
ould be rephrased to the higher r̂t in Germany, the higher its export of power.
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Figure A.3: Regression on the oeient α2(ut) of the rst prinipal ompo-
nent relative to the logarithm of spot prie in Germany
wind power penetration is onrmed at every hour of the day.
A.4.3 Regression urves for power ows
So far only intuitive onlusions based on the struture of the PCs have been
drawn, sine the regression was arried out on their oeients αi. By applying
(A.11) it is possible to perform similar analyses on the spae of interest, i.e.
the original spae of power ows. Indeed regression urves or surfaes for the
oeients sum up to urves and surfaes for eah single ow.
Fig. A.5 shows the regression for the ow between the Danish DK1 area, i.e.
the Jutland peninsula and the Funen island, and Norway (NO). The surfae
models the relationship between this ow and wind power penetration in Ger-
many as well as day-time. It is seen that, as wind power penetration inreases,
DK1 passes from importing power from Norway to exporting power. There-
fore the statistial model onrms the intuitive eonomi reasoning aording
to whih the exible Norwegian hydro plants withhold their prodution when
energy pries are low due to signiant wind power penetration, and inrease
their prodution when pries are high.
Models for the total net power ow of a ountry or ontrol area an be de-
termined as the signed sum of the models for individual ows. This an help
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Figure A.4: Regression on the oeient α2(ut) of the rst prinipal ompo-
nent relative to wind power penetration in Germany and day-time
shed some light on the behavior of individual power systems as a reation to
inreased wind power prodution. Fig. A.6 shows the example of the Austrian
power system. It is seen that Austria is on average a net power exporter for
low levels of wind power penetration in Germany, while it is a net importer
with high wind power penetration. This is partly aused by the exibility of
the Austrian generation portfolio, whih is largely dominated by hydro plants.
One more, the statistial model shows how the market pushes hydro power
produers to provide arbitrage servies as wind power prodution inreases the
volatility of market pries.
A.4.4 Sensitivity of the Results to the Presene of Trends
As mentioned in the last paragraph of Setion A.3.1, the presene of trends in
the dataset might be an important pratial issue when performing analyses
based on PCA. Indeed, in the latter methodology, dened in Setion A.3.1, the
dataset is entered by subtrating the mean. When onsidering long datasets
spanning several years, low frequeny dynamis ought to be removed from the
dataset by employing a low-pass lter.
Some relevant gures for the onsidered period 20062008 in Germany are re-
ported in Table A.2. Suh table is useful to get a preliminary assessment of the
presene and of the magnitude of trends. Notably, despite a onstant inrease in
A.4 Results 91
5 10
15 20
25 30
35 40
 6:0012:00
18:0024:00
−800
−400
0
400
800
Forecast wind
power penetration
in Germany [%]
Day time
Po
w
er
 fl
ow
 D
K
1−
N
O
 [M
W
]
Figure A.5: Regression urve modeling the relationship between the power
ow from the ontinental part of Denmark (the Jutland penin-
sula and the Funen island, area ode DK1) and Norway (NO) as
funtion of wind power penetration in Germany and day-time
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Figure A.6: Regression urve modeling the relationship between the net power
ow of Austria as funtion of wind power penetration in Germany
and day-time
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installed wind power apaity in the period, the total annual wind power output
in Germany delined between 2007 and 2008. Besides, the growth in eletriity
demand almost stopped between these two years. As a result, the ratio between
these two quantities is not monotoni in the onsidered period.
Table A.2: Total annual wind energy prodution, total annual load and their
ratio in Germany during the period 20062008
Quantity 2006 2007 2008
Total wind energy prodution [TWh℄ 34.31 42.36 41.67
Total load [TWh℄ 489.03 496.59 497.61
Ratio 0.0702 0.0853 0.0837
Table A.2 shows no steady, slow-dynamis inrease in the ratio between total
demand and wind power prodution, as one may expet intuitively in light of
the onstant inrease in installed wind power apaity. However, the signiant
swings in total annual wind power prodution, e.g., between 2006 and 2007,
might still impat the analysis. The remainder of this setion disusses this
impat through a detailed analysis of the models performed on a year-to-year
basis.
A measure to validate the models (A.11) obtained for the ows is the Normal-
ized Root Mean Squared Error (NRMSE), whih an be alulated for eah
interonnetion j as follows:
NRMSEj =
√∑
T
t=1(X̂j(ut)−Xj,t)
2
T
maxt {Xj,t} −mint {Xj,t}
. (A.13)
The value in the numerator in (A.13) is the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE),
i.e., the average squared deviation of the ow model X̂j(ut) from the atual
observations. The term in the denominator is a saling fator normalizing all
the ows to the range of their observations.
In order to assess the impat of trends in the dataset, NRMSE is alulated for
eah ow in the dataset, rst by employing data for the whole period 20062008,
then onsidering data for one single year at a time. This an be done simply
by modifying the time indies in the sum in (A.13). It should be remarked that
the dominating prinipal omponents obtained in these studies are onsistent
throughout the years.
The results of this analysis are shown in Fig. A.7. The average value of NRMSE
aross the ows is roughly 15-20%. More interestingly, NRMSE seems to be
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rather stable aross the onsidered years for eah interonnetion. This indiates
that the impat of trends in the dataset is not so ritial for the appliation
onsidered. Indeed if this were the ase, one would expet that the performane
of the models would swing signiantly aross subsets of the dataset.
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Figure A.7: Normalized Root Mean Squared Error (NRMSE) for every inter-
onnetion for the whole 20062008 period, and for eah year in
the period individually
A.4.5 Regional Analysis
The models shown up to this point onsent an analysis of the eet of explana-
tory variables on eah individual ow or ountry. We now group the results ob-
tained for individual interonnetions in dierent geographial regions: North,
South, West and East of Germany.
Table A.3 reports the average value of the models for the ows obtained for
Northern Europe for values of wind power penetration in Germany from 0%
to 25% with step inreases of 5%. Spline interpolation of the models at the
desired wind power penetration levels was required, due to the denition of the
grid in the explanatory variable spae, whih is based on quantiles. For the
sake of onsisteny, all the ows are direted in the South to North diretion
(so that negative ows indiate ow of power southwards). The pattern emerg-
ing from the analysis is quite lear. At low levels of wind power penetration,
Germany is importing power from the Nordi ountries through any available in-
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Table A.3: Modeled average ross-border ows North of Germany as funtions
of German wind power penetration
Average Flow Wind Power Penetration [%]
[MWh/h] 0 5 10 15 20 25
DE-DK1 -803 -485 -410 -465 -372 -199
DE-DK2 -276 -86 -39 -63 -24 55
DE-SE -276 -102 -46 -61 -13 67
DK1-NO -636 -255 -119 -83 40 179
DK1-SE -228 -54 14 23 64 116
DK2-SE -510 -117 44 76 210 356
teronnetions, where power ows in the North to South diretion indeed. This
North-South ow tends to drop, though, as wind power penetration inreases
in Germany. For example, the average ow in the two interonnetions between
Denmark and Sweden is reversed at a penetration as low as 10%, also due to
a likely inreased prodution from the Danish wind turbine eet. The same
trend is seen for all the ows shown in Table A.3. When penetration reahes
25%, power is owing in the South to North diretion in all the interonnetions
exept the one between Germany and DK1, where the perentage of installed
wind power on the total prodution apaity is even higher than in Northern
Germany.
Let us now onsider the ows direted southwards from Germany, inluded in
Table A.4. It is lear that the higher the wind power penetration in Germany,
the more this ountry exports to its diret neighbors to the South: Switzer-
land and Austria. As opposed to the situation in the Nordi region, the trend
seems to stop at the diret neighbors. Indeed, there is no lear pattern in the
interonnetion between Switzerland and Italy, whih is somewhat stable at
3000MWh/h. Furthermore, although the power ow between Austria and Italy
inreases, this trend is marginal due to the low apaity of this line. A possible
explanation for this phenomenon is the high installed hydro power apaity in
Switzerland and Austria, whih onfers extra exibility to their power systems
in omparison to e.g. Denmark, whih is similarly loated in the middle between
Germany and the Nordi region. Finally, it appears that there is a loop-ow
in the power transit from Germany to Switzerland through Austria, as the ow
from the last to the seond ountry is positively orrelated with German wind
power penetration.
Clear trends emerge as well from the analysis of power ows to the West of Ger-
many in Table A.5. At null wind power penetration in Germany, the Netherlands
imports power both from this ountry and from Frane through Belgium. When
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Table A.4: Modeled average ross-border ows South of Germany as funtions
of German wind power penetration
Average Flow Wind Power Penetration [%]
[MWh/h] 0 5 10 15 20 25
DE-CH 759 1390 1733 2096 2435 2680
CH-IT 3064 2715 2917 3206 3277 3213
DE-AT 212 423 565 728 930 1136
AT-CH 422 545 618 697 774 836
AT-IT 158 156 161 166 168 168
Table A.5: Modeled average ross-border ows West of Germany as funtions
of German wind power penetration
Average Flow Wind Power Penetration [%]
[MWh/h] 0 5 10 15 20 25
DE-NL 1583 2131 2316 2498 2580 2582
NL-BE -352 132 313 568 810 953
BE-FR -1284 -852 -685 -452 -173 55
DE-FR -1919 -1571 -1510 -1368 -1175 -1029
DE-CH 759 1390 1733 2096 2435 2680
FR-CH 463 760 916 996 1084 1174
penetration reahes 5%, the Netherlands only import power from Germany on
average, as the diretion of the ow to Belgium is reversed. In the same fashion,
the Frenh export of power to Belgium drops, even turning into a slight import
when wind power penetration reahes 25% in Germany. This ountry imports
power from Frane in all the ases shown in Table A.5, but this import is gradu-
ally halved from about 2000MWh/h to 1000MWh/h at the extreme olumns in
the table. This fat disproves the belief that there is a loop ow arrying power
from the North to the South of Germany through Frane, at least on a ountry
level. Aording to Table A.5, the loop ow appears to be a bit souther than
that. Indeed the power ow from Frane to Switzerland appears to inrease as
German wind power penetration rises, while at the same time the diret im-
port of Switzerland from Germany is heightened, as we already ommented on
earlier.
The situation in Eastern Europe is summarized in Table A.6. The trends in
this region are more omplex, also due to the huge number of ross-border
ows. Proeeding in the analysis from North to South, we see that there is an
inreasing power export from Germany to Poland as wind power penetration
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Table A.6: Modeled average ross-border ows East of Germany as funtions
of German wind power penetration
Average Flow Wind Power Penetration [%]
[MWh/h] 0 5 10 15 20 25
DE-PL 414 414 473 582 660 700
PL-CZ 779 819 885 951 947 888
PL-SK 312 330 375 425 452 451
CZ-DE 877 1033 1026 958 902 852
CZ-AT 589 655 720 799 848 874
CZ-SK 784 680 736 834 865 850
SK-HU 801 897 987 1078 1137 1163
HU-HR 488 614 686 759 826 873
HR-SI 113 381 474 531 597 641
SI-IT 365 477 525 561 577 575
SI-AT -176 -44 -23 -19 19 68
rises in the former ountry. Nevertheless, most of the extra power imported
by Poland is exported in turn to Slovakia and the Czeh Republi. The latter
ountry, a net exporter of energy on average, sees an inreasing part of its export
shifting to Austria and, to a lesser extent, to Slovakia from Germany, as wind
power penetration rises in this ountry. The inreased power imported from
North by Slovakia is then exported in the South diretion through Hungary and
Croatia to Slovenia. Finally it is seen that Slovenia imports less and less power
from Austria, and exports more and more power to Italy as the German wind
power penetration inreases.
A.5 Conlusion
In this work a statistial method for analyzing the impat of wind power in
Germany on European ross-border power ows is presented and applied.
The problem dimension is suessfully redued by applying Prinipal Compo-
nent Analysis (PCA). Besides, PCA indiates the most important modes of
physial power ow in the European system. These modes are the ows arry-
ing power from Frane to Germany, both diretly and through Belgium and the
Netherlands, the ow from Germany to Sandinavia and the one from Germany
in the South diretion. This onrms the entrality of Germany in the study of
the European power system.
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Loal polynomial regression is employed on the PCs both with respet to foreast
wind power penetration and spot prie in Germany. It is shown that both the
external variables have a remarkable impat on the ows. Indeed an inrease in
foreast wind power penetration auses a fall in the German import of power (or
rise in the export), while rising spot pries have the opposite eet. Furthermore,
espeially in the ase of EEX spot prie, non-linearities are evident in these
relationships.
From a global perspetive, it is seen that variations of wind power penetration in
Germany have signiant eets on power ows in Europe. Indeed import and
export patterns between ountries hange signiantly, and loop ows originate.
Furthermore, while some of the interonnetions benet from an inreasing fore-
ast wind power penetration in Germany, i.e. the ones linking the main average
exporters to Germany (Frane and, at least at low wind power levels, San-
dinavia), the stress on other interonnetions, e.g. the ones linking Germany
to the South of Europe, inreases as more and more wind power is produed
in Germany. Analyses like the one presented in this paper an ontribute to
the state-of-the-art by quantitatively assessing suh global phenomena, whose
understanding is urrently limited to a qualitative or intuitive level.
Clearly, the study presented in this paper ould be performed thanks to the
availability of datasets for wind power prodution, onsumption and power ows,
whih is in general not straightforward, with the notable exeptions of the PJM
market [25℄ and ENTSO-E [26℄. It is hoped that in the near future, onvined
by the results of data-driven researh studies like this one, TSOs and market
operators will strengthen their eort to make more and more datasets of this
type available to researhers worldwide.
Possible appliations of the methodology proposed in this paper are related to
both long- and short-term problems. Long-term problems that ould benet
from analyses of this type inlude deisions on investment in new wind power
apaity and in grid expansion. As far as the short-term problems are onerned,
this methodology ould support the proess of sheduling ross-border ows as
well as the assessment of risk in interonneted power systems.
The desribed methodology has been employed for analysis only. In the future
though, suh a modeling approah ould also be used in onnetion with power
system models or foreasting tools. Suh tools would have to be alibrated with
the results of data-driven analysis, as the one shown in this paper, for simulating
European power ows as a funtion of appropriate explanatory variables, whih
ould inlude the nominal power apaity of a ertain ountry, market pries,
et.
98 Paper A
Aknowledgment
The authors gratefully aknowledge Austrian Power Grid AG (APG) for the sup-
port through the projet Impat of Stohasti Generation on EU Cross-border
Flows. The European Network of Transmission System Operators for Eletri-
ity (ENTSO-E) is also aknowledged for its role in providing the dataset. Fur-
thermore, we would like to thank the Editor of this Journal and three anonymous
referees for providing onstrutive omments that undoubtedly ontributed to
improving the quality of this manusript. Finally, we thank Peter Meibom for
his valuable omments on this work.
99
Referenes A
[1℄ P. Morthorst, S. Ray, J. Munksgaard, and A. F. Sinner, Wind energy
and eletriity pries, teh. rep., European Wind Energy Assoiation,
2010. http://www.ewea.org/fileadmin/ewea_douments/douments/
publiations/reports/MeritOrder.pdf.
[2℄ P. Giabardo, M. Zugno, P. Pinson, and H. Madsen, Feedbak, ompetition
and stohastiity in a day ahead eletriity market, Energy Eonomis,
vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 292301, 2010.
[3℄ T. Jónsson, P. Pinson, and H. Madsen, On the market impat of wind
energy foreasts, Energy Eonomis, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 313320, 2010.
[4℄ H. Abildgaard, D. Klaar, B. Kriszak, J. Rodriguez, and W. Winter, Euro-
pean Wind Integration Study (EWIS)  Referene study towards a suessful
integration of wind power into European eletriity grids, in Proeedings of
CIGRE Session, (Paris, Frane), 2008.
[5℄ ENTSO-E pilot ten years network development plan, teh. rep., ENTSO-E,
2010. https://www.entsoe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/_library/SDC/
TYNDP/TYNDP-final_doument.pdf.
[6℄ A. Costa, A. Crespo, J. Navarro, G. Lizano, H. Madsen, and E. Feitosa,
A review on the young history of the wind power short-term predition,
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 12, no. 6, pp. 17251744,
2008.
[7℄ G. Giebel, R. Brownsword, G. Kariniotakis, M. Denhard, and C. Draxl,
The state-of-the-art in short-term predition of wind power : A litera-
ture overview, 2nd edition, teh. rep., ANEMOS.plus, 2011. http://www.
prediktor.dk/referen.htm.
100 Paper A
[8℄ G. Giebel, A variane analysis of the apaity displaed by wind energy in
europe, Wind Energy, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 6979, 2007.
[9℄ U. Foken, M. Lange, K. Mönnih, H.-P. Waldl, H. G. Beyer, and A. Luig,
Short-term predition of the aggregated power output of wind farmsa sta-
tistial analysis of the redution of the predition error by spatial smoothing
eets, Journal of Wind Engineering and Industrial Aerodynamis, vol. 90,
no. 3, pp. 231246, 2002.
[10℄ F. van Hulle, P. Kreutzkamp, and S. Uski-Joutsenvuo, Enhaning ross
border exhange to failitate wind power integration at European sale,
in Proeedings of German Wind Energy Conferene (DEWEC), (Bremen,
Germany), nov 2008.
[11℄ J. Tande, M. Korpås, L. Warland, K. Uhlen, and F. van Hulle, Impat
of TradeWind oshore wind power apaity senarios on power ows in
the European HV network, in Proeedings of the 7th International Wind
Integration Workshop, (Madrid, Spain), may 2008.
[12℄ S. Hagspiel, A. Papaemannouil, M. Shmid, and G. Andersson, Copula-
based modeling of stohasti wind power in Europe and impliations for the
Swiss power grid, Applied Energy, vol. 96, pp. 3344, 2012.
[13℄ N. A. Cutululis, P. Sørensen, G. Giebel, M. Korpås, and L. Warland, Un-
ertainty on predited ross border ows aused by wind foreast errors, in
Proeedings of the 7th International Wind Integration Workshop, (Madrid,
Spain), may 2008.
[14℄ B. Klökl and P. Pinson, Eets of inreasing wind power penetration
on the physial operation of large eletriity market systems, in Integra-
tion of Wide-Sale Renewable Resoures Into the Power Delivery System,
CIGRE/IEEE PES Joint Symposium, 2009.
[15℄ Energy onept for an environmentally sound, reliable and aordable
energy supply, teh. rep., Federal Ministry of Eonomis and Tehnol-
ogy (BMWi), 2010. http://www.bmwi.de/English/Navigation/Servie/
publiations,did=367764.html.
[16℄ Final report system disturbane on 4 November 2006, teh.
rep., UCTE, 2007. https://www.entsoe.eu/resoures/publiations/
former-assoiations/ute/other-reports/.
[17℄ DEWI, Statistis arhive. Online, 2012. http://www.dewi.de/dewi/
index.php?id=47&L=%5C%5C%5C%27.
[18℄ A. León and A. Rubia, Modelling pries in ompetitive eletriity markets,
h. 8, pp. 177189. Wiley & Sons, 2004.
REFERENCES A 101
[19℄ R. Weron, Modeling and Foreasting Eletriity Loads and PriesA statis-
tial Approah, h. 4. Wiley, 2006.
[20℄ W. Cleveland and S. Devlin, Loally weighted regression: An approah
to regression analysis by loal tting, Journal of the Amerian Statistal
Assoiation, vol. 83, no. 403, pp. 596610, 1988.
[21℄ A. C. Renher, Multivariate statistial inferene and appliations, h. 9.
Wiley-Intersiene, 1998.
[22℄ A. Hyvärinen, J. Karhunen, and O. Erkki, Independent Component Analy-
sis. Wiley, 2001.
[23℄ D. S. Wilks, Statistial methods in the atmospheri sienes, 2nd edition,
vol. 91 of International Geophysis, h. 11, pp. 469471. Elsevier Aademi
Press, 2006.
[24℄ H. Madsen, Time series analysis, h. 3. Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2008.
[25℄ PJM Eletriity Market. Website, 2012. http://www.pjm.om/home.aspx.
[26℄ ENTSO-E. Website, 2012. http://www.entsoe.net/default.aspx.
102 Paper A
103
Paper B
Statistial Analysis of the
Impat of Wind Power on
Market Quantities and
Power Flows
Authors:
Pierre Pinson, Tryggvi Jónsson, Maro Zugno, Juan Miguel Morales, Henrik
Madsen
Presented at:
IEEE Power and Energy Soiety General Meeting 2012
104 Paper B
B.1 Introdution 105
Statistial Analysis of the Impat of Wind Power
on Market Quantities and Power Flows
Pierre Pinson
1
, Tryggvi Jónsson
2
, Maro Zugno
1
, Juan Miguel Morales
3
,
Henrik Madsen
1
Abstrat
In view of the inreasing penetration of wind power in a number
of power systems and markets worldwide, we disuss some of the
impats that wind energy may have on market quantities and ross-
border power ows. These impats are unovered through statistial
analyses of atual market and ow data in Europe. Due to the di-
mensionality and nonlinearity of these eets, the neessary onepts
of dimension redution using Prinipal Component Analysis (PCA),
as well as nonlinear regression are desribed. Example appliation
results are given for European ross-border ows, as well as for the
impat of load and wind power foreasts on Danish and German
eletriity markets.
B.1 Introdution
Wind power apaities are rapidly expanding in a number of ountries, maybe
most notieably in Europe, the US and China. This is failitated by diret and
indiret inentives, for instane in the form of feed-in taris or of prioritization
in eletriity pools. Both variability and limited preditability of that renew-
able energy soure will yield a radial shift in the paradigms of power systems
management. The parallel development of other forms of renewable energy e.g.
solar and wave, may ontribute to dampen or inversely magnify the undesirable
eets of wind power on the physial operation of power systems as well as
market harateristis. A reent status of the deployment of renewable energy
apaities worldwide is available in [1℄.
1
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Eletriity network and markets were designed based on a long history of dealing
with various forms of dispathable generation, for whih the onepts of unit
ommitment, eonomi dispath, ontingeny analysis made sense in view of
the tehnial harateristis of the physial units. The inreasing penetration of
wind power hallenges these praties, owing to its impat on market quantities
and ross-border ows. As an illustrative example, the impat of wind power
preditability is now regularly aounted for in network expansion and future
oshore grid studies [2, 3℄. It is of utmost importane to properly haraterize
and model the eets of wind on markets and power ows before we may be able
to projet ourselves in the future with senarios of substantial renewable energy
penetration. For the example of Denmark, the objetive is to have 50% of the
eletriity onsumption met by wind energy by 2025 [4℄. This has triggered a
number of tehnial and eonomial analyses foused on market value, invest-
ment and power ows, as in [5℄ for instane. Note that game-hangers may also
appear, most likely in the form of various forms of demand-side management [6℄.
Both meteorologial and eonomial eets are at the roots of this impat: (i)
wind power generation over a region is diretly inuened by the geographial
overage of weather systems, while (ii) wind energy has a diret onsequene on
market quantities due to the so-alled merit-order eet whih plaes wind at
the very left of the market supply urves. Complex network eets then add on
to yield the nal power ows. In view of the omplexity brought in by all these
ombined aspets, system studies of the eet of wind on market quantities and
power ows may neessitate relying on rude simpliations and on simulations.
Reent examples of these detailed system studies partly based on simulations
inlude [7℄ for the ase of the UK system in 2020 and [8℄ onentrating on the
Swiss power system at the horizon 2030. Toy model simulations an atually
highlight some of the eets of wind on eletriity markets, as in [9℄. Simplied
system and toy models may however mask some of the eets that are aimed at
being unovered. This is the reason why inversely, statistial ex-post analyses of
some of the key variables an already give a fair piture, without looking at a
omplete modeling of all meteorologial, market and network eets. Example
statistial analyses of market quantities were for instane performed in [10, 11℄
and [12℄ for the ase of the Danish and Spanish eletriity markets, respetively.
In this paper, we review the methodologial aspets neessary for the statisti-
al analysis of the impat of wind power on market quantities and power ows
(Setion B.2). Espeially, we insist on the nonlinear nature of this impat, and
on its potential nonstationarity. In parallel, owing to the potentially large di-
mensions of datasets to be analysed, we also disuss dimension redution (based
on Prinipal Component Analysis) that may prove neessary when looking at
power ows over the whole eletriity network of a region. Subsequently, an
example appliation to the ase of the Nord Pool (Western Denmark ontrol
zone - DK1) and EEX (Germany) markets onsidered in Setion B.3. Similarly
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in Setion B.4, we look at the ase of power ows related to the Austrian on-
trol blok, and of ross-border power ows over the whole ENTSO-E (European
Network of Transmission System Operators for Eletriity) system. The paper
nally ends in Setion B.5 with onlusions, impliations of the ndings, as well
as perspetives for future work.
B.2 Methodologial aspets
In this Setion we review some statistial modeling onepts neessary for the
various appliations overed in the following, that is, the impat of wind on both
market quantities and power ows. These onepts inlude nonlinear regression
based on loal polynomial models, as well as PCA for dimension redution.
B.2.1 Nonlinear regression with loal polynomial models
Whatever the variables of interest, the set of observations onsists of time-series
of measurements. We denote by {yt}, t = 1, . . . , T , the observed time-series for
the response variable, and by x⊤t = [x
1
t . . . x
i
t . . . x
m
t ] the vetor of m explanatory
variables at time t. In a pratial setup, the response variable may be the day-
ahead eletriity prie or the overall system balane of a TSO's network, and
generated wind power the explanatory variable for instane.
The relationship between explanatory and response variables is written in the
form of a general regression model,
yt = θ(xt) + ǫt, t = 1, . . . , T. (B.1)
The noise term {ǫt}, i = 1, . . . , T , is a sequene of independent and identially
distributed (i.i.d.) random variables with unknown distribution F . It is assumed
that F has a zero mean and a nite variane σ2ǫ . In general, it is assumed that
both x- and y-values an be normalized. Therefore, they are all ontained in
the unit interval, while ǫt ∈ [−1, 1], ∀t.
Based on the onept of loal polynomial regression, it is assumed that θ may
be loally approximated by k-order polynomials. Most ommon instanes of
loal polynomial regression inlude kernel smoothing (k = 0) and loal linear
regression (k = 1). Note that in pratie, the urse of dimensionality imposes
that the dimension of x has to be low, say less than 3 (for a disussion on that
issue, see [13, pp. 83-84℄).
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θ is approximated at a number of tting points, hosen based on a rule of thumb
or after onsideration of the data distribution. Let us fous on a single tting
point x˜ = [x˜1, . . . , x˜m] only. The k-order loal polynomial approximation zt of
the vetor of explanatory variables xt is given by:
z⊤t = p
⊤
k (xt). (B.2)
For instane if k = 1, p1(xt) = [1 xt].
In parallel, write θ the vetor of loal oeients at x˜, so that loally at x˜ one
obtains the following linear model
yt = z
⊤
t θ, t = 1, . . . , T, (B.3)
whih is then tted by minimizing a weighted loss of the form
θˆ = argmin
θ
T∑
t=1
wtρ(yt − z
⊤
t θ) (B.4)
with the wt weights assigned by a Kernel funtion, i.e.
wt = K(xt, x˜) =
∏
i
ω
(
|xit − x˜
i|i
hi
)
. (B.5)
In the above, |.|i denotes a hosen distane on the i-th dimension of x (typially
the Eulidean distane), and h = [h1 . . . hm] is the bandwidth for that par-
tiular tting point x˜. As an example, ω an be dened as a triube funtion,
ω(v) =
{
(1− v3)3, v ∈ [0, 1]
0 , v > 1
, (B.6)
as introdued and disussed in e.g. [14℄. This type of estimation proedure
may also be made adaptive in order to aount for smooth temporal hanges in
the regression, if aiming at aounting for seasonal variations in the eets of
interest for instane. The weights in Eq. (B.4) would then inlude a time deay,
e.g. in the form of exponential forgetting, in order to gradually disount older
observations.
For the tting of these loal linear models, the type of regression will deide
upon the loss funtion to be minimized. In the ase where the mean eet is
to be modelled, they are to be tted using weighted least-squares. ρ then takes
the form of a quadrati loss funtion, suh that
ρ(ǫ) = ǫ2/2. (B.7)
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If aiming to perform quantile regression instead, for a given nominal proportion
τ , τ ∈ [0, 1], one hooses an asymmetri pieewise linear loss funtion ρτ as
ρτ (ǫ) =
{
(τ − 1)ǫ, ǫ < 0
τǫ , ǫ > 0
. (B.8)
For an overview of the theory and appliation of quantile regression, we refer
to [15℄.
Finally when the loal oeients are alulated at all tting points, the om-
plete oeient funtions θˆ(x) an be obtained by linear or spline interpolation
of the loal oeients. This will be illustrated in the example appliations
below.
B.2.2 Generalization to higher dimensions using Prinipal
Component Analysis (PCA)
The ase of a single response variable was onsidered so far only. This setup
may be suitable if looking at the impat of one or more variables (say, wind
and load) on day-ahead market pries. If onentrating however on the eet of
wind power on a set of variables over a network e.g. power ows, the dimension
n of the response variable will be greater than 1, and potentially very large.
The model of Eq. (B.1) therefore needs to be generalized as
yt = θ(xt) + ǫt, t = 1, . . . , T, (B.9)
where yt = [y
1
t . . . y
n
t ] is now a multivariate response.
In order to ease the estimation of the oeient funtions θ, a rst neessary step
onsists in reduing the dimension of the problem. This is done here in a PCA
framework, by summarizing the information from the n-dimensional response
in a q-dimensional basis of Prinipal Components (PCs), q << n. These PCs
are hosen so that they maximize their ability to explain the variane of the
original multivariate response. For an overview of PCA, of the properties of
the PCs, and more generally of multivariate data analysis, we refer to [16℄. A
more applied introdution foused on atmospheri sienes an be found in [17℄.
In the power systems literature, PCA for dimension redution was for instane
employed in [18℄ for studying spatially distributed wind power generation in
Ireland.
Before to apply the PCA itself, the multivariate response is rst entred and nor-
malized. The benets of suh preproessing are disussed in [17℄. Subsequently,
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nding the PCs for the multivariate response y is performed by diagonalizing
the ovariane matrix of the data,
Ry =
1
T
T∑
t=1
yty
⊤
t . (B.10)
After diagonalizing, the PCs are obtained as the eigenvetors of Ry with the
largest orresponding eigenvalues. The number of PCs to be seleted is deided
upon through graphial and/or numerial methods [16℄. The ratio of the sum
of the seleted eigenvalues over that for all eigenvalues gives the share of the
variane in the response data explained by these PCs. In the following we will
use the average eigenvalue method for PC seletion, as in [19℄. We denote by y˜j ,
j = 1, . . . , q the obtained PCs (q << n). All observed values yt for the response
variables an onsequently be written as a linear ombination of the PCs,
yt =
q∑
j=1
αjt y˜j + νt, ∀t, (B.11)
with an additional random noise νt originating from the unexplained variane
in the data. A projetion operator P an then be introdued, permitting to
projet the original response into the spae spanned by the PCs,
P = [y˜1 . . . y˜q ]. (B.12)
P allows projeting standardized response values yt in the basis dened by the
prinipal omponents, sine Eq. (B.11) an be rewritten as
yt = P
⊤αt + νt, ∀t, (B.13)
with αt = [α
1
t . . . α
q
t ].
Finally by ombining the models of Eqs. (B.9) and (B.11), one obtains
yt =
q∑
j=1
θ(xt)y˜j + εt, t = 1, . . . , T, (B.14)
where the noise εt ombines the original noise from the regression model with the
additional one oming from the PCA deomposition. In other words in the basis
formed by the PCs, the oeients αt are replaed by oeient funtions of the
explanatory variables x similar to that of Eq. (B.1). These oeient funtions
an be estimated in the same fashion as in Setion B.2.1.
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B.3 Appliation to eletriity market quantities
A rst and highly relevant appliation to the methodology presented for unov-
ering the nonlinear eet of wind power on some response variable onsists in
looking at the eet of wind power on pries in eletriity markets. This eet
was rst looked at in [10℄, whih attempted to nd a linear relationship between
observed wind power generation and pries in the Nord Pool day-ahead market
in Western Denmark. Sine then, [11℄ argued that (i) the relationship of interest
is atually between day-ahead pries and the predited values for load and wind
power, while (ii) suh a relationship is most surely nonlinear. These aspets are
disussed below, after introduing the set of available data.
B.3.1 Available data
For this study of the impat of wind power on eletriity market quantities,
fous is given to two markets highly penetrated by wind energy, namely the
Nord Pool and EEX ones. More preisely, the Western Denmark area of the
Nord Pool (often referred to as DK1) is looked at sine orresponding to the
ontrol zone with the highest wind power penetration (more than 20% of the
energy onsumption met by wind energy). Long reords of market quantities
(day-ahead and imbalane pries, imbalane sign, et.) are available for those
markets.
In parallel in both ases, relevant foreast and measured data are freely available
at the websites of the orresponding network operators. Energinet.dk is the
TSO in Denmark. In Germany, only the wind information at the ontrol zones
of RWE, Eon and Vattenfall is onsidered, sine aounting for most of the wind
apaities. Overall, the data inlude day-ahead wind power foreasts, as well
as measured wind power generation and load. We simulate the availability of
load foreasts by adding noise to the measurements, with a variane onsistent
to reported auray of load foreasts for a ountry today (between 2 and 4%
Mean Average Perent Error - MAPE).
Overall, the data for the Danish test ase over a period from the 1
st
of January
2008 to the 13
th
February 2008, while those for Germany are for the two years
of 2006-2007.
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B.3.2 Sample results foused on day-ahead pries
We follow the argument of [11℄ suh that the predited values for the load
and the wind power generation are those that impat the day-ahead pries in
these eletriity markets. This argument is diretly motivated by their learing
mehanism based on bids that are in turn based on preditions.
We rst work with a single explanatory variable only, the predited wind power
penetration, dened as the ratio of wind power and load foreasts. It represents
the foreseen share of wind in the day-ahead eletriity mix at the time of market
learing and for eah time unit over the following day. The response variable
is the orresponding day-ahead prie for every time unit. The satter plots
representing the empirial relationship between these explanatory and response
variables in the Nord Pool and EEX markets are gathered in Fig. B.1.
(a) Nord Pool, Western Denmark area (DK1)
- 1.1.2008 to 13.2.2010
(b) EEX - 1.1.2006 to 31.12.2007
Figure B.1: The relationship between predited wind power penetration and
the day-ahead market pries in the Nord Pool and EEX day-ahead
markets.
Loal polynomial regression is employed for haraterizing the evolution of day-
ahead pries as a funtion of predited wind power penetration. On the one
hand, the least-square tting gives the mean trend, while on the other hand
quantile regression with nominal proportions τ = 0.05 and τ = 0.95 yields pre-
dition intervals with a 90% nominal overage rate. Note that for this response
variable the data are log-transformed before tting the regression models, even
though the results are presented in the original spae of the variable. We use
30 tting points, with a nearest-neighbour bandwidths overing loal neighbor-
hoods orresponding to 10% of the data.
The mean trend is qualitatively similar for both markets, with day-ahead pries
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dereasing with inreasing predited wind power penetration, even though there
may be some quantitative dierenes. Maybe the most important one is that
the day-ahead prie appears to tend more rapidly towards 0 in the EEX market,
already at around 35% predited wind power generation, while it is only the ase
in Denmark when this explanatory variable gets loser to 100% penetration. The
bands given by quantile regression also illustrate how the prie variability and
onvergene towards 0 dier for the two markets.
To further detail the dependene between day-ahead pries and predited load
and wind power generation, the loal polynomial regression approah is up-
graded so that both predited variables are simultaneously seen as explanatory
ones (m = 2). We use 20 tting points for eah variable (leading to a total of
400 tting points), with a nearest-neighbour bandwidths overing loal neigh-
borhoods orresponding to 20% of the data. The resulting smooth surfae is
depited in Fig. B.2 for DK1 and for least-square regression only. It onrms
the joint role of predited load and wind power: the former indues an upward
pressure on pries, while the latter pushes them bak down, the impat of wind
being greater at lower load values.
Figure B.2: The relationship between predited wind power generation, pre-
dited load, and the day-ahead market pries in the Nord Pool
day-ahead market, Western Denmark area (DK1), 1.1.2008 to
13.2.2010.
Similar analysis may be performed for other market quantities and other mar-
kets, with fous on the various moments of their distributions. The unovered
dependenies may then be used as additional knowledge for the building of rele-
vant foreast methodologies of market quantities. Example reent works in that
diretion inlude [20℄ fousing on the predition of day-ahead pries aounting
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for wind power preditions, and [21℄ looking at the spei ase of imbalane
sign haraterization and predition.
B.4 Appliation to power ows
A seond relevant appliation of the statistial approahes desribed in the
present paper relates to the analysis of power ows within and over one or more
ontrol zones. The results we gather and disuss in the following are based on
some of the data and work of [22℄ for the analysis of power ows related to
the Austrian ontrol blok, and of [19℄ for the analysis of ross-border power
ows over the whole ENTSO-E system. For ondentiality reasons, some of the
results may not be detailed.
B.4.1 Example fous on the Austrian ontrol blok
The underlying motivation of the work performed in [22℄ was to perform an
ex-post analysis of available power ow data within Austria, as well as of ross-
border power ows, in relation with some of the publily available data from
EEX and the German TSOs. These data basially are the same than those
onsidered in Setion B.3.2, i.e. wind power foreasts, wind power and load
measurements, as well as all market quantities. They over the period of 2006-
2007. A basi question to be answered is how muh the German wind power
and market inuene the power ows experiened by the Austrian TSO.
The Austrian ontrol blok is operated by the TSO APG (Austrian Power Grid),
for an installed generation apaity of more than 19 GW (12 GW in hydro
power units), while the maximum load is less than 10 GW. This ontrol zone is
physially linked to six dierent ontrol bloks and a total of nine ontrol zones.
Two independent analyses were performed foused on (i) all the ross-border
ows, and (ii) the power ows over 23 400kV-systems throughout Austria, in
order to unover the impat of German wind and market quantities on all these
power ows. Dimension redution was neessary in the latter ase: most of the
variane in the power ows of the 23 400kV-systems ould be explained with 4
PCs only.
Let us give here a set of results fousing on the impat of predited wind power
penetration in Germany and of day-ahead pries in the EEX market on the
APG net balane. This ontrasts with the more detailed analysis of individual
ross-border and 400kV-systems power ows whih an be found in [22℄. The
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APG net balane is alulated as the sum of all power export minus the sum
of all import at a given time. It is expressed here in MW. Fig. B.3 gathers
the satter plots for that analysis, while depiting the regression urves for the
mean eet (least-square regression), as well as 90% predition intervals dened
by the quantile regression urves with nominal proportions of 0.05 and 0.95.
(a) Predited wind power penetration in Ger-
many
(b) EEX day-ahead pries
Figure B.3: The impat of predited wind power penetration in Germany and
the EEX day-ahead pries on the APG net balane over 2006-
2007.
Figure B.4: The impat of predited wind power penetration in Germany on
the APG net balane over 2006-2007, as funtion of the time of
the day.
The plots in Fig. B.3 reveals that the Austrian ontrol blok tends to export
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more as the EEX prie gets higher, but also to import more as the predited
wind power penetration in Germany is greater. Atually the mean trend is
that Austria only imports when there is almost no wind power penetration
in Germany. One also observes that obviously these are trends only, with large
intervals around this mean trend, showing that other eets are to be aounted
for. For instane, it may be ruial to aount for daily and seasonal variations in
the power ow patterns. This is illustrated by Fig. B.4 whih depits the mean
impat of predited wind power penetration in Germany on the total balane
of the APG ontrol blok, also as a funtion of the time of the day. It shows
how Austria has a typial yle of importing at night and exporting during the
day, when there is no or almost no wind power penetration in Germany. As this
wind power penetration inreases, even though there still are variations over the
day, the Austrian ontrol blok tends be in an import situation at any hour of
the day. In general, we have observed that it is highly beneial to aount for
potential diurnal and seasonal variations in our analysis of power ows.
B.4.2 General results related to ENTSO-E system
Figure B.5: The impat of predited wind power penetration in Germany on
ross-border power ows between DK1 and Norway over 2006-
2008.
The type of study performed for the Austrian ontrol blok was generalized to
the whole ENTSO-E system. The dataset there onsists of hourly ross-border
power ows between 34 European and bordering extra-European ountries, over
a 3 year period overing 2006 to 2008. After quality hek, the study is restrited
to 68 ross-border interonnetions. The overall question studied is similar to the
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above setion, i.e. related to the impat of German wind and market quantities
on the whole set of European ross-border ows. The analysis performed is fully
overed by [19℄.
For this dataset, 8 PCs were deemed enough to represent the overall dynamis of
the ross-border power ows over the ENTSO-E system, explaining 82% of the
original variane in the data. Loal polynomial models were then used on the
PCs, onditioned by the predited wind power penetration in Germany, EEX
day-ahead pries, as well as the time of the day.
Out of the extensive analysis overed, let us show an illustrative example results
in Fig. B.5, whih depits the impat of predited wind power penetration in
Germany on ross-border power ows between DK1 and Norway over 2006-2008.
As wind power penetration is predited to be greater in Germany, the situation
swithes from DK1 importing power from Norway to exporting. Consistent be-
haviour was observed at the interonnetion between DK1 and Germany. This is
in line with intuitive eonomi reasoning, suh that an hydro-dominated ontrol
zone like the Norwegian one tend to withhold prodution when energy pries are
low due to signiant wind power penetration, and inversely inrease prodution
when pries are high. This result is in fat similar to that of Fig. B.4 for the
ase of Norway. A notieable dierene though is that Austria is diretly inter-
onneted to the German network, while it is not the ase of Norway. Overall in
view of the work of [19℄, the data available today permits to quantify how muh
German wind and market quantities impat ross-border ows over the whole
ENTSO-E system. The identied PCs may be seen as modes of propagation of
power ows, whih are more of less stimulated depending on various explana-
tory variables. This analysis may be rened in the future by also aounting for
wind and market-related variables in other ountries as well.
B.5 Conlusions
The eet of wind power generation on eletriity markets and power ows is
reognized but not always understood and quantied. Owing to the potential
omplexity of modelling all meteorologial, eonomial and network aspets in-
volved, we suggest that an interesting alternative to full system studies onsists
in performing statistial ex-post analyses of the datasets available at market and
network operators. When aknowledging the potentially nonlinear and nonsta-
tionary impat of wind power on these quantities, the regression tehniques
(and related estimation onepts) ome fairly natural. Also the issue of the
dimensionality of the dataset involved may be dealt with based on statistial
dimension redution tehniques e.g. the PCA approah employed here.
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It is not possible to over in a single paper all the analyses that ould be per-
formed based on the datasets available. We have therefore pointed at further
reading for more extensive studies. Overall, it appears that load and wind power
foreast have a signiant impat on today's market quantities. This impat an
be haraterized as nonlinear and nonstationary, and quantied through appro-
priate statistial regression tehniques. Similarly, these variables, or the market
prie used as a proxy, highly inuene power ows within and between ontrol
zones. This eet was evidened and modeled for the ase of the APG ontrol
blok, as well as for the all interonnetors of the ENTSO-E system. Note that
the impat of foreast errors should also be thoroughly studied, as they are
known to indue unsheduled power exhanges.
Here only the eet of some explanatory variables e.g. predited wind power
generation, on market quantities and power ows was onsidered. Interestingly,
the time dimension ould also be aounted for in a straightforward manner
by generalizing the methodologial onepts presented in a time-varying regres-
sion framework. This would then permit to (i) assess the way unovered eets
evolved over the past years, for instane as a funtion of installed wind apa-
ities, and (ii) tentatively predit what the future eets of more substantial
renewable energy penetration levels on eletriity markets and power ows may
be. Obviously, these preditions would be based on stationarity assumptions,
whih would be very weak in view of the non-negligible hanges to be expeted
in market and power systems operations in the foreseeable future.
Suh a statistial approah should be onsidered as part of, or jointly with, other
system studies. They an provide valuable insight to TSOs and poliy makers,
while allowing market partiipants to rene their foreasting and partiipation
strategies. Note that importantly, it is the spatio-temporal dynamis of all types
of renewable energy soures that should be seen as explanatory variables in the
future, in view of the future plans for deployment of renewable energy apaities.
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Abstrat
Wind power is not easily preditable and non-dispathable. Never-
theless, wind power produers are inreasingly urged to partiipate
in eletriity market autions in the same manner as onventional
power produers. The aim of this paper is to propose an operational
strategy for trading wind energy in liberalised eletriity markets
and to assess its performane. At rst the so-alled optimal quantile
strategy is revisited. It is proved that without market power, i.e.
under the prie-taker assumption, this strategy maximises expeted
market revenues. Foreasts of wind power prodution, of day-ahead
and real-time market pries and of the system imbalane are inputs
to this strategy. Subsequently, onstraining of the bid that max-
imises the expeted revenues is proposed as a way to overome the
strategy's disregard of pratial limitations and, at the same time,
of risk. Two onstraining tehniques are introdued: onstraining in
the deision spae and in the probability spae. Finally, the trade
of a wind power produer is simulated in a test-ase for the East-
ern Danish (DK-2) prie area of the Nordi Power Exhange (Nord
Pool) during a 10 month period in 2008. The results of the test-ase
show the nanial benets of the aforementioned strategy as well as
the onsequent interation with the eletriity market. This study
will support a demonstration in the framework of the EU projet
ANEMOS.plus.
1
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hni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Nomenlature
Main symbols
ρk Wind power produer revenues at trading period k
Wk Wind power prodution at trading period k
πk Market prie at trading period k
Ck Negative wind power produer revenues due to imbalane at trading
period k
ψk Unit regulation osts for positive and negative imbalanes at trading
period k
W (max) Installed wind power apaity
rk Quantile of wind power distribution at trading period k
Pk Probability of imbalane diretion at trading period k
av Parameter determining the width of the bound to the optimal bid in
the deision spae
ap Parameter determining the width of the bound to the optimal bid in
the probability spae
Supersripts
(S)
Referring to the day-ahead market
(↑/↓)
Referring to the real-time market
(↑)
Referring to up-regulation in the real-time market
(↓)
Referring to down-regulation in the real-time market
∗
Optimal˜ Contrated at the day-ahead market̂ Foreast
C.1 Introdution
In liberalised eletriity markets, ompetition stands as the fundamental meha-
nism ensuring the eient operation of the system. Competition is implemented
through the establishment of a market (or multiple markets operating under
dierent rules and gate-losures) where energy is traded. Bids for sale and pur-
hase are olleted by the market operators, whih are responsible for optimally
sheduling the dispath of energy and alloating suient power reserve. The
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bakbone of most liberalised eletriity markets are the day-ahead markets, of-
ten referred to as spot markets (in Europe) or forward markets (in the U.S.), on
whih most of the trading takes plae. Typially these markets oer a platform
for trading energy to be delivered/withdrawn within a ertain period during the
upoming day. The minimum period length is referred to as trading period in
this paper; every ontrat overs one or more trading periods.
Although most renewables are not easily preditable and non-dispathable, re-
newable power produers are inreasingly urged to partiipate in eletriity mar-
kets in the same manner as produers of onventional energy. Here we speif-
ially onentrate on wind energy, whih has been the most rapidly growing
renewable energy soure over the last deade. Our developments and onlu-
sions ould however be similarly applied for other types of non-dispathable
renewables e.g.solar energy.
Wind power generation is the typial example of a stohasti and non-dispatha-
ble renewable energy soure. Although the possibility of urtailing power exists,
it is not eonomially sound as long as the eletriity prie (inluding potential
subsidies) remains positive. As a result, trading wind energy in a day-ahead
eletriity market requires foreasts of wind power prodution, whih an be
performed only with limited auray, as disussed in [1℄. Reviews of the state
of the art of wind power foreasting methods and operational tools an be found
in [2, 3, 4℄, while [5℄ disusses their appliation in eletriity markets.
Dierenes between ontrated and atual energy prodution (e.g.due to fore-
asting errors) have to be settled on the intra-day and/or the real-time markets.
Due to shorter lead-time from gate losure to delivery, these markets might re-
due the revenues of produers that ause imbalane, as more exible market
players are alled to equilibrate the system  generally at higher osts. Joint
operation of wind and hydro power has reently emerged as a way to redue
imbalane osts among other benets, see for instane [6℄ or [7℄. However, this
solution is only oneivable for market partiipants having both energy soures
in their portfolio. For other produers, the most pratial option for imbalane
settlement is to rely on the market. Although it is sometimes possible to adjust
ontrats through existing intra-day markets, the volumes exhanged there are
generally low, as illustrated by [8℄ for the main European eletriity markets.
Produers are therefore most often fored to rely on the real-time market, where
bids for regulation are ativated by the TSO lose to real-time, and produers
are harged for their imbalanes, whih are determined post-delivery. Hene,
the only way for them to redue imbalane osts is to bid optimally into the
day-ahead market, so that the risk of faing losses on the real-time market is
minimised. This bid is optimised onditioned upon the information available
at the time of ontrating, both in terms of future wind power prodution and
market pries.
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The penalties faed by eletriity produers in the real-time market are gener-
ally asymmetri, in some ases even single sided, i.e. they are only to be paid
by the produers that inrease the overall imbalane with their own. This in-
ites market partiipants whose portfolio inludes a stohasti omponent to be
more strategi in their approah to bidding, see [9℄. Indeed it an be analyti-
ally shown that under these onditions the optimal day-ahead market bid for
a wind energy produer is a ertain quantile of the distribution of wind power
generation, see for instane [10, 11, 12℄. This optimal quantile is a dynami
funtion of the day-ahead and the imbalane pries, whih are not known a pri-
ori. Market experiene shows that suh optimal bids might signiantly dier
from the point foreasts of wind power prodution (onsisting of the onditional
expetation for eah lead time). In pratie, however, point foreasts are still
ommonly used when ontrating wind power in the day-ahead market. A more
theoretial disussion about quantile foreasts being optimal bids in eletriity
markets an be found in [13℄.
The existing literature has already desribed and analysed a number of strate-
gies for trading wind power in the day-ahead market, with dierent approahes
with regards to the unertainty in prodution and in market pries. As a basi
approah, some authors onsider that traditional point foreasts of wind power
generation may be used for analysing the value of wind energy in eletriity
markets, e.g.[14, 15, 16℄. Furthermore, [17℄ models wind generation unertainty
through Markov probability tables and hooses, in a disrete deision spae, the
bid that minimises the expeted osts. Alternatively, [18℄ suggests the onstru-
tion of a utility ost funtion to model the nanial risk of wind power produers
partiipating in the market, using persistene foreasting of wind power and av-
erage values as prie foreasts. The stohasti optimisation algorithm desribed
in [19℄ uses senarios of wind power prodution as input along with historial im-
balane pries. Besides, [12℄ makes use of probabilisti foreasts of wind power
and yearly or quarterly average values of imbalane pries in order to determine
the optimal quantile bid, in a fashion resembling that of [10℄. The same strategy
is implemented in [20℄, using probabilisti foreasts and measured data for wind
speed and yearly averages as estimates of the day-ahead and real-time pries.
Finally, [21℄ proposes a linear programming tehnique for optimising the trade
of wind energy in day-ahead, intra-day and real-time markets. The unertainty
in both wind power prodution and market pries is modelled through simple
ARIMA/ARMA models. All these works and strategies either only aount for
unertainty in wind power generation but disregard unertainty in the market
quantities, or inlude both but make use of simple foreasting methods.
In this work, we revisit the quantile strategy desribed in [10℄ and [12℄ and
generalise it by onsidering stohasti rather than deterministi market pries.
State-of-the-art probabilisti foreasts both of wind power generation and of
market quantities are onsidered as input. These market quantities inlude the
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regulation sign, whih an be down-regulation, up-regulation or no regulation,
as well as the unit regulation osts. This strategy is formulated in Setion C.2
as a stohasti optimisation problem, whih aims at the maximisation of the
expeted revenues (or utility) of the market partiipant. This approah is here-
after referred to as Expeted Utility Maximisation (EUM). Having the maximi-
sation of the expeted value of the revenues as the objetive, suh an approah
diretly relates to a long-term optimisation of the market performane of the
wind power produer. It is also shown through an example that, due to the
unertainties involved and potentially large foreast errors, suh a strategy may
oasionally lead to severe losses from a single ontrat. For instane this might
our when the regulation sign foreast wrongly assigns a high probability to an
imbalane diretion that is not realised. It is proposed in Setion C.3 to on-
strain the EUM bid in terms of deviations from the point foreasts, either in the
quantity spae or in the probability spae. The two onstraining methods are
proposed with two dierent ranges of the allowed interval in the deision spae.
The motivation for this onstraining is twofold. From a pratial perspetive,
onstraining the bid is beneial, beause system operators are relutant to al-
low large deviations from the point foreasts. This is beause eient system
planning requires market bids to losely reet the atual delivery of energy.
Moreover, sine point foreasts have been used as operational bids sine wind
energy started to be traded on eletriity markets, suh point foreasts at as
anhors in the mind of the operators. From a dierent point of view, this work
shows that by setting a onstraint on the allowed deviation from the point fore-
ast, the trader an redue the impat of foreasting errors and inrease its
risk-aversion. Next, in Setion C.4, the partiipation of a wind power portfo-
lio in the Nord Pool market (Eastern Denmark prie area) over a period of 10
months in 2008 is onsidered in order to evaluate the atual performane of the
aforementioned trading strategies. To our knowledge a test-ase of suh length,
ombining state-of-the-art foreasts of wind power prodution, day-ahead and
imbalane pries, as well as observed wind prodution and market data, has
never been performed. The results of the exerise show the possibility for wind
power produers to signiantly redue their imbalane osts and ontrol the
risk of dramati losses.
The ontribution of this paper to the state-of-the-art on the subjet is threefold.
First of all, the derivation of the optimal quantile strategy is extended to the
ase where market pries are stohasti. Owing to this formulation, probabilisti
foreasts both of wind power prodution and of market quantities are needed by
the deision maker. Seondly, we introdue onstraining of the bid as a way to
aount for issues related to the pratial implementability of the strategy and,
in parallel, risk-aversion. Finally, we present a realisti test-ase simulating wind
power trading, and we assess the market value of state-of-the art probabilisti
foreasts of wind power prodution and of market quantities.
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The derivation of the optimal quantile strategy presented in this paper is valid
under the prie-taker assumption, i.e.the wind power produer annot inu-
ene market pries with its bid. Therefore, the aim of this work is to propose
operational strategies and to assess the market value of foreasts under this
hypothesis. In future markets with inreasing penetration of wind power this
assumption might not hold, sine wind power produers might impat the total
system imbalane and therefore inuene the prie formation mehanisms with
their trading strategy. By introduing the onstraining of the bid, this issue
is partly addressed, sine onstrained strategies result in lower imbalane and,
therefore, limit the impat on pries. The derivations and the results presented
in this paper thus onstitute a valuable starting point and a referene for further
researh on the subjet, where the dependene struture between wind power
prodution and market pries is taken into aount.
The work presented here will support and serve as the basis for a real-world
demonstration of stohasti approahes to wind power partiipation in eletriity
markets in the framework of the EU projet ANEMOS.plus.
C.2 The Expeted Utility Maximisation (EUM)
bidding strategy
This setion is devoted to the introdution of the strategy maximising the ex-
peted utility of a wind power produer partiipating at both the day-ahead and
the real-time energy markets. At rst, the strategy is derived in Setion C.2.1.
Then, the foreasts needed in order to deide on the optimal bid are desribed
in Setion C.2.2. Finally, possible shortomings of the strategy are disussed
based on a test-ase in Setion C.2.3.
C.2.1 Derivation of the EUM strategy
In eletriity day-ahead markets, power produers have to indiate the amount of
energy they are willing to deliver at any trading period through a bid submitted
to the market operator. Bids are olleted with a ertain lead-time to the
physial delivery of energy. For example, at the Nord Pool day-ahead market
the deadline for submission is at noon on the day prior to delivery. Let W˜k
denote the amount of energy ontrated in the day-ahead market and let Wk be
the stohasti prodution of wind energy, both for the k-th trading period. The
power produer will then have to orret the stohasti imbalane Wk − W˜k on
the real-time market. This is beause the possibility of trading on the intra-day
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market is disregarded, due to its general illiquidity. Hene, the total revenues of
the generator, ρk, an be expressed as the sum of the revenues, ρ
(S)
k and ρ
(↑/↓)
k ,
obtained at the day-ahead and the real-time market respetively
ρk = ρ
(S)
k + ρ
(↑/↓)
k (C.1)
The revenues at the day-ahead market an be determined as the multipliation
of the ontrated energy W˜k with the day-ahead market prie π
(S)
k
ρ
(S)
k = π
(S)
k W˜k (C.2)
The real-time market revenues are positive if Wk > W˜k (energy surplus to be
sold) and negative if Wk < W˜k (energy deit to be purhased)
ρ
(↑/↓)
k =
{
π
(↓)
k (Wk − W˜k), Wk ≥ W˜k
π
(↑)
k (Wk − W˜k), Wk < W˜k
(C.3)
In this expression, π
(↓)
k (π
(↑)
k ) represents the unit down(up)-regulation prie
whih is paid to (by) an overproduing (underproduing) generator. At Nord
Pool real-time pries are restrited suh that
π
(↓)
k ≤ π
(S)
k
π
(↑)
k ≥ π
(S)
k
(C.4)
at all times. Then depending on the total imbalane of the system, the inequality
sign is substituted by an equality sign in at least one of the two inequalities in
Equation (C.4). More speially, let the net system imbalane be denoted as
(G˜k −Gk)− (L˜k − Lk) (C.5)
where G˜k and Gk denote the total (i.e.summed over all the produers dis-
pathed at the day-ahead market) energy prodution, ontrated and realised
respetively, for the k-th trading period. Similarly, L˜k and Lk represent the
ontrated and realised onsumption, respetively, for the onsumers and the
retailers sheduled at the day-ahead market. Notie that when the quantity
in Equation (C.5) is dierent from zero, real-time bids have to be ativated in
order to restore energy balane. During hours of power surplus, i.e. when the
net system imbalane in Equation (C.5) is < 0, the following holds for the pries
π
(↓)
k ≤ π
(S)
k
π
(↑)
k = π
(S)
k
(C.6)
This situation is ommonly referred to as down-regulation. Conversely during
hours of power deit (when the system net imbalane in Equation (C.5) is > 0),
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ommonly termed up-regulation, it holds that
π
(↓)
k = π
(S)
k
π
(↑)
k ≥ π
(S)
k
(C.7)
Finally during hours of perfet balane between load and prodution then
π
(S)
k = π
(↓)
k = π
(↑)
k (C.8)
In this way, only the produers ontributing to the overall system imbalane risk
being penalised, while the ones ating to redue it reeive the day-ahead prie
for their realised prodution, when transations on both the day-ahead and the
real-time markets are ombined. The rationale behind this hoie of market
design is that produers should not be allowed to prot from their imbalanes.
However, it should be pointed out that there are exeptions to this. For instane,
the Duth APX eletriity market is just one example of a market where energy
imbalane an atually be rewarded.
Now Equation (C.1) an be reformulated as:
ρk = π
(S)
k Wk + C
(↑/↓)
k . (C.9)
Assuming that the wind power produer is a prie-taker individually, whih is
reasonable if it does not hold a signiant share of the total prodution, the term
π
(S)
k Wk in Equation (C.9) is independent of its deision. That is, neither the
day-ahead prie π
(S)
k nor the wind power prodution Wk are inuened by the
bidding poliy adopted in the day-ahead market. This implies that urtailment
is not onsidered as an option, for the reasons disussed in Setion C.1. The
term π
(S)
k Wk represents the revenues that the produer ould ahieve if it had
perfet information on its future wind power prodution (i.e. if ontrated power
and wind power prodution are equal: W˜k = Wk). The seond term in Equation
(C.9) an be made expliit as
C
(↑/↓)
k =
{
ψ
(↓)
k (Wk − W˜k), Wk ≥ W˜k
ψ
(↑)
k (Wk − W˜k), Wk < W˜k
(C.10)
where the variables ψ
(↓)
k and ψ
(↑)
k represent the unit regulation osts for positive
and negative imbalanes at the real-time market, and are given by
ψ
(↓)
k = π
(↓)
k − π
(S)
k (C.11)
ψ
(↑)
k = π
(↑)
k − π
(S)
k (C.12)
The quantity in Equation (C.10) therefore aounts for negative revenues, whih
represent the losses for the produer ontrating W˜k at the day-ahead market
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in omparison to the ase of perfet information. At Nord Pool it holds that
C
(↑/↓)
k ≤ 0 at all times. Elsewhere (e.g.APX in the Netherlands), C
(↑/↓)
k > 0
might our. Regarding the latter ase, eonomists argue that although situa-
tions where produers an gain from their imbalane are possible, this annot
be exploited in the sense of strategi bidding. The argument is that the expe-
tation E
{
C
(↑/↓)
k |χ
}
of the losses given the information available at the moment
of bidding is negative. As a onsequene, the produers are expeted to suer
losses from their imbalane in the long run, although in some trading periods
they might be able to gain from it. Interested readers are referred to [22℄ for a
detailed disussion.
As one an see from Equations (C.4), (C.11) and (C.12), at Nord Pool ψ
(↓)
k ≤ 0
and ψ
(↑)
k ≥ 0, and they are equal to zero in the ases of up- and down-regulation
respetively. It should also be noted that both the unit regulation osts in
Equations (C.11) and (C.12) are stohasti variables as the day-ahead prie and
the imbalane pries are not known in advane by the power produer.
It is assumed from now on that the wind power produer is rational (see e.g.
[23℄ for a oneptual introdution) and that its objetive is the maximisation
of the expeted value of its total revenues. The set of bids W˜∗ maximising the
total revenues is
W˜∗ = argmax
W˜
E
{
fTP∑
k=iTP
ρk
}
(C.13)
where iTP and fTP are the shortest and the longest lead-times onsidered in
the optimisation, respetively. Here the ommonly aepted assumption of in-
dependene of deisions for dierent trading periods is followed. However it
may be argued that market dynamis should be aounted for, see for instane
[24, 25, 26℄. Under the assumption of time-independent deisions over time, the
maximisation of the sum of the revenues over time is equal to the maximisation
of the revenues obtained at eah single k. The optimal bid at the day-ahead
market is then
W˜ ∗k = argmax
W˜k
E {ρk} (C.14)
Sine the rst term in Equation (C.9) is not dependent on the deision on
the day-ahead market, the maximisation of the expeted revenues in Equation
(C.14) is equivalent to the maximisation of the expetation of the regulation
osts, whih are non-positive
W˜ ∗k = argmax
W˜k
E
{
C
(↑/↓)
k
}
(C.15)
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The problem in Equation (C.15) is a variant of the well known linear termi-
nal loss problem (also alled the newsvendor problem), see for instane [27℄,
in whih the imbalane osts to be borne by the deision maker are stohas-
ti, asymmetri and pieewise linear. Under the assumption that the unit up-
and down-regulation osts are independent of the power produer's imbalane,
these stohasti osts an be replaed by ertainty equivalents in the optimisa-
tion problem. Assuming that the onsidered wind power produer is relatively
small, suh a simpliation seems quite reasonable as the produer is a prie-
taker. Nevertheless, it is lear that some variables ould inuene wind power
prodution and real-time osts at the same time. This ould be the ase of
e.g. weather related variables in a relatively small power system. This issue
goes beyond the sope of this artile, but it ertainly alls for future researh in
modelling variables inuening both pries and wind power prodution.
Aording to the theory of ertainty equivalents, see [27℄, the rational deision
maker an determine the optimal deision without taking into aount the whole
distribution funtion of the unit osts. Instead an equivalent problem is solved,
in whih the stohasti unit osts are substituted by ertain deterministi fun-
tions of the unit osts themselves. It is proved below that maximising C
(↑/↓)
k
in Equation (C.10) is equivalent to maximising the expetation of the following
funtion with deterministi unit osts
C
(↑/↓)
k =
{
ψ̂
(↓)
k (Wk − W˜k) Wk ≥ W˜k
ψ̂
(↑)
k (Wk − W˜k) Wk < W˜k
(C.16)
where ψ̂
(↓)
k and ψ̂
(↑)
k denote the expeted values of the unit regulation osts ψ
(↓)
k
and ψ
(↑)
k . The expetation of the imbalane osts in Equation (C.10) an be
expanded as
E
{
C
(↓/↑)
k
}
=
∫ +∞
0
∫ W˜k
0
ψ
(↑)
k (Wk − W˜k)dPWkdPψ(↑)
k
+
∫ 0
−∞
∫ W (max)
W˜k
ψ
(↓)
k (Wk − W˜k)dPWkdPψ(↓)
k
(C.17)
whereW (max) is the installed apaity of the wind power produer. Still assum-
ing independene between the unit regulation osts and wind power prodution
the integrations an be separated so that one gets to
E
{
C
(↓/↑)
k
}
=
∫ +∞
0
ψ
(↑)
k dPψ(↑)
k
∫ W˜k
0
(Wk − W˜k)dPWk
+
∫ 0
−∞
ψ
(↓)
k dPψ(↓)
k
∫ W (max)
W˜k
(Wk − W˜k)dPWk
(C.18)
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This is by denition equal to
E
{
C
(↓/↑)
k
}
=ψ̂
(↑)
k
∫ W˜k
0
(Wk − W˜k)dPWk
+ ψ̂
(↓)
k
∫ W (max)
W˜k
(Wk − W˜k)dPWk
(C.19)
whih is equal to the expeted value of the equivalent loss in Equation (C.16).
The problem of maximising the expetation of the utility in Equation (C.16)
is a standard linear terminal loss problem, whih an then be treated as the
general ase in [27℄. The proof is omitted here and only the expression for the
Expeted Utility Maximisation (EUM) bid is given
W˜ ∗k = F
−1
Wk

∣∣∣ψ̂(↓)k ∣∣∣
ψ̂
(↑)
k +
∣∣∣ψ̂(↓)k ∣∣∣

(C.20)
where FWk is the umulative distribution funtion of the wind power produ-
tion Wk. Therefore, the EUM bid W˜k is a quantile of the distribution of the
stohasti variable Wk orresponding to the probability given by the fration
r˜∗k =
∣∣∣ψ̂(↓)k ∣∣∣
ψ̂
(↑)
k +
∣∣∣ψ̂(↓)k ∣∣∣ (C.21)
C.2.2 Input foreasts to the EUM strategy
From the treatment in Setion C.2.1 it follows that the determination of the
optimal bid requires foreasts of both wind power prodution and imbalane
osts.
As far as wind power prodution is onerned, a probabilisti foreast is needed,
as the distribution FWk of the generation Wk appears in Equation (C.20). Here
the non-parametri probabilisti tool desribed in [28℄ and [29℄ is onsidered.
This tool provides the user with a set of foreast quantiles of the wind power
distribution for eah trading period. Let us denote the α-quantile of wind power
prodution at time k with qWk(α), suh that
FWk (qWk(α)) = α (C.22)
The provided foreasts are then
q̂Wk(α) = E {qWk(α)|M, θ, χt} (C.23)
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for dierent values α ∈ [0, 1]. The expetation on the right side of Equation
(C.23) is onditioned on the hoie of the modelM , on its estimated parameters
θ and on the information χt available at the time t when the foreast is issued.
It holds trivially that t < k. In the example of Nord Pool t might be 11am
(one hour before the deadline for bidding), while k ould be any of the hours in
the following day. From now on the ondition on the expetation is disarded
in order to lighten the notation. However, the reader should keep this in mind
whenever a foreast is dened. An example of quantile foreast an be seen in
Figure C.1. The omplete foreast of the funtion FWk an then be obtained
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Figure C.1: Example of probabilisti foreast of prodution for a wind power
portfolio in Eastern Denmark. The foreast was issued on the
previous day at 11am.
from the set of foreast quantiles q̂Wk(α) by linear interpolation.
The expeted values of the regulation osts ψ̂
(↓)
k and ψ̂
(↑)
k need to be foreast as
well. Methods for foreasting the day-ahead market prie π
(S)
k , as well as the
unit imbalane osts ψ
(↓)
k and ψ
(↑)
k , onditioned upon the regulation sign
3
, are
desribed in [30℄. The following foreasts are therefore available
π̂
(S)
k = E
{
π
(S)
k
}
(C.24)
ψ̂
(↓)
k|ψ
(↓)
k
<0
= E
{
ψ
(↓)
k |ψ
(↓)
k < 0
}
(C.25)
ψ̂
(↑)
k|ψ
(↑)
k
>0
= E
{
ψ
(↑)
k |ψ
(↑)
k > 0
}
(C.26)
[30℄ also presents a method for estimating onditional posterior probabilities of
3
In [30℄ a given hour is dened as up-regulation hour if ψ
(↑)
k
> 0 and a down-regulation
hour if ψ
(↓)
k
< 0.
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imbalane in eah diretion being penalised at any given time k, dened as
P
(↓)
k = P
{
ψ
(↓)
k < 0
}
(C.27)
P
(↑)
k = P
{
ψ
(↑)
k > 0
}
(C.28)
From a pure trading perspetive this is equivalent to prediting the sign of
the atual imbalane as the trader is indierent to imbalanes he/she is not
penalised for. The models for ψ̂
(↓)
k|ψ
(↓)
k
<0
, ψ̂
(↑)
k|ψ
(↑)
k
>0
and P̂
(↑/↓)
k are all onditional
Holt-Winters models with a diurnal seasonality. For the penalty foreasts, the
models are onditioned upon the foreast system load and the foreast spot
prie for the area, while the diretion probability model is onditioned upon the
foreast wind power penetration (i.e. the ratio between the foreast wind power
prodution in the whole system and the foreast system load).
An example of foreasts of the regulation signs is shown in Figure C.2. It should
be notied that the two probabilities in the gure do not sum to 1. Indeed, the
probability of no regulation P
(0)
k might also be positive, and at any time k it
holds
P
(↑)
k + P
(↓)
k + P
(0)
k = 1 (C.29)
The expeted values ψ̂
(↓)
k and ψ̂
(↑)
k an then be determined aording to the
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Figure C.2: Example of foreast probabilities of up (P̂ (↑)) and down (P̂ (↓))
regulation in DK-2.
law of total expetation
ψ̂
(↓)
k = ψ̂
(↓)
k|ψ
(↓)
k
<0
P̂
(↓)
k + ψ̂
(↓)
k|ψ
(↓)
k
=0
(1− P̂
(↓)
k ) = ψ̂
(↓)
k|ψ
(↓)
k
<0
P̂
(↓)
k (C.30)
ψ̂
(↑)
k = ψ̂
(↑)
k|ψ
(↑)
k
>0
P̂
(↑)
k + ψ̂
(↑)
k|ψ
(↑)
k
=0
(1− P̂
(↑)
k ) = ψ̂
(↓)
k|ψ
(↑)
k
>0
P̂
(↑)
k (C.31)
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In the ases when both ψ̂
(↓)
k and ψ̂
(↑)
k are zero the ratio in Equation (C.21) is
not dened. In these ases the produer might bid the median, orresponding to
the 0.5 quantile, whih maximises the expeted market revenues in the general
ase where the foreast penalties in the two regulation diretions are equal.
Figure C.3 plots an example of foreast, r˜∗k, and measured, rk, ratios in Equation
(C.21) for a power produer in Eastern Denmark partiipating in Nord Pool.
The resulting bid maximising the expeted revenues is shown in Figure C.4.
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Figure C.3: Optimal foreast (r˜∗) and measured (r) ratios for a wind power
portfolio in DK-2 on a seleted day.
As one an see from the sale employed on the y-axis of the gure, the bid is
shown as a fration of the total installed apaity. The point foreast, whih
is urrently the referene for wind power produers partiipating in day-ahead
markets, is also shown for omparison.
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Figure C.4: Example of point foreast (Ŵ ) and EUM bid (W˜ ∗) for a wind
power portfolio in DK-2.
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C.2.3 Testing the EUM bid
This setion presents the setup and the results obtained in a test-ase simulating
energy trading in Nord Pool. Its aim is to assess the performane of the EUM
bidding strategy ompared to the traditional point foreast bidding. Afterwards,
the main drawbaks of the EUM strategy are disussed, along with the reasons
motivating the introdution of more risk-averse strategies, whih are presented
in Setion C.3.
In this test-ase, the DK-2 (Denmark East) market area has been onsidered as
the geographi loation of the wind power plants of a virtual power produer.
Data and foreast availability motivate the hoie of a 10-month period of sim-
ulation, spanning from the 1st Marh 2008 to the 31st Deember 2008. The size
of the produer is not dened, and all the results are saled to its installed a-
paity. It is assumed, though, that the produer is a prie-taker, i.e.that hanges
in its bidding poliy do not inuene the market. This implies that its size is
small relatively to the total installed apaity in the region.
The data set used onsists of measured wind power prodution, point and prob-
abilisti foreasts of wind power prodution, observed regulation osts and the
market foreasts previously desribed. All data refer to the DK-2 market area
and have a temporal resolution of 1 hour. Based on point foreasts issued by
WPPT, see [31, 32℄, probabilisti wind power foreasts are obtained by the
method desribed in [29℄ and [28℄ while market foreasts have been obtained as
outlined in [30℄. All observations used are publily available on www.energinet.
dk.
For the sake of performing a realisti test-ase, the foreasts of wind power
prodution, of day-ahead and real-time market pries and of imbalane dire-
tion probabilities used in this study were issued before 11am of the previous
day. Beause the day-ahead gate losure at NordPool is noon, these foreasts
are preisely the information available for produers bidding on the day-ahead
market.
Table C.1 shows the eonomi results of the wind power produer in both the
ases of point foreast bidding and of EUM bid. The third olumn represents
the redution in the imbalane osts in Equation (C.10) with respet to the
ase of point foreast bidding. Imbalane ost redution is a relevant index
for assessing the quality of a bidding strategy for wind power produers. In-
deed, there is a fatal part, i.e.whih ould be ahieved no matter how bad a
bidding strategy is employed, that is impliitly inluded in the total produer
prots. For example, a produer ould at least earn its realised wind power
prodution times the down-regulation prie just by never partiipating at the
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day-ahead market. On the ontrary, imbalane osts represent what the wind
power produer an atually improve by employing a more advaned strategy.
Furthermore, the imbalane ost redution with respet to a referene bid, the
point foreast in this example, provides with an upper bound for performane
improvement, i.e.the 100% redution that would be ahieved by bidding with
perfet information. The value of imbalane ost redution in the rst row is
trivially 0, while one an notie that the improvement obtained with the EUM
is 2.3%.
Strategy
Net revenue Imbalane ost Imbalane ost Prie
per installed MW per installed MW redution per MWh
(e/MW) (e/MW) (%) (e/MWh)
Point foreast 94436.40 4076.51 0.00 54.48
EUM 94529.96 3982.95 2.30 54.54
Table C.1: Eonomi results for the wind power produer in the test-ase per-
formed from the 1st Marh 2008 to the 31st Deember 2008 with
real market data and foreasts issued for the DK-2 market area.
Figure C.5 shows the subtration of the umulative revenues obtained with the
EUM strategy and the umulative revenues obtained with the point foreast bid
for eah trading period in the test-ase. The dierene in revenues is positive
overall, meaning that the EUM bid is outperforming the point foreast bid in
the long run. On the other hand, the performane of the EUM bid appears
to be rather volatile and haraterised by steep drops, for instane around the
1200th and the 4500th hours in the gure. This suggests that the produer
adopting the EUM strategy is exposed to the risk of signiant losses stemming
from a single ontrat. It an be shown that the losses are due to inaurate
foreasts of the regulation osts or sign. What the EUM aims at is, essentially,
to set the day-ahead market bid on the safe side of the deision spae, i.e.
on the imbalane diretion that will not be penalised at the real-time market
and paid at the day-ahead prie π
(S)
k . As Figure C.3 shows, by doing this the
optimal ratio r˜∗k, and therefore the EUM strategy, results in being somewhat
extreme. In fat, when the foreasts indiate that one regulation diretion is
far more likely than another, r˜∗k tends to the extreme values 0 or 1, as shown in
the early and late hours of the day in Figure C.3. Figure C.4 shows that this
yields a bid that is signiantly dierent from the point foreast during these
hours. Generally situations where the EUM bid is lose to the nominal apaity
or zero are not rare. Hene the produer is in the situation of probably having a
great imbalane in the foreast safe regulation diretion. In the ase that the
foreasts leading to r˜∗k are orret, the imbalane is paid at the day-ahead prie
π
(S)
k , with no loss for the produer. On the other hand, if the foreast turns
out to be inorret the produer will have to pay regulation osts for a high
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Figure C.5: Subtration of the umulative revenues per installed MW using
the EUM bid and the umulative revenues using the point fore-
ast. Its positive value signals an improvement in the perfor-
mane.
amount of energy, resulting in one of the signiant losses shown in Figure C.5.
Furthermore, the wind power produer using the EUM strategy an be expeted
to inur large imbalanes, whih are unwanted by the TSO. This asts doubt
on the possibility of using the EUM strategy in pratie.
C.3 Constraining the EUM bid
As an extension to the EUM strategy, a parameter for onstraining the bid is in-
trodued in this setion as a way to redue the expeted imbalane level. There
are several motivations for doing this. As Setion C.2 disussed, the EUM bid
is often quite far from the point foreast. On the other hand market authorities
require that the energy bid be representative of the atual (or foreast) produ-
tion of a generator. Hene an exessive deviation of the bid from the expeted
prodution ould be seen as a way to take advantage of the market and thus it
ould be penalised. Seondly, a strategy ausing high imbalane levels might in-
uene the prie formation mehanism, espeially with respet to the regulation
pries. If this happens, the prie-taker assumption is violated and, therefore,
the model of the market beomes inonsistent.
As a matter of fat, the point foreast bid is a robust deision when the produer
is seeking to minimise the impat on the system imbalane. Indeed, the point
foreast ommonly minimises the expetation of the squared deviation from the
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energy prodution Wk
Ŵk = argmin
x
E
{
(x−Wk)
2
}
(C.32)
It should be pointed out, though, that dierent riteria ould be employed [33℄.
The most ommonly used least-squares riterion only makes the point foreast
optimal in the sense of minimising imbalane volumes (in squared values), with
no eonomi onsiderations. Therefore, a ompromise between the EUM bid
and the point foreast ould reonile revenue maximisation with pratial im-
plementability of the strategy, with respet both to monitoring of the bid by
the TSO and to potential violations of the prie-taker assumption. Moreover,
seeking a ompromise between these two strategies is intuitively related to the
redution of risk. Indeed, as disussed above, the EUM strategy is exposed
to the risk of large losses under prie-foreasting errors. By trying to render
the bid less extreme, i.e. loser to the point foreast, the produer would re-
due the amount of regulating power, and therefore losses, in these ases. This
will be illustrated in the test-ase in Setion C.4. Finally, energy traders are
somehow bound to the point foreast, whih has traditionally been bid on the
day-ahead market and has proved to be reliable over the years. For this reason
it is desirable for an operational strategy not to deviate too muh from it.
The main idea in this setion is that the bid should somehow be bounded to
some values around the point foreast. In this way extreme bid values - and
hene extreme losses - are avoided. Constraints an be imposed in the deision
spae, so that the bid W˜ ∗k is limited within a ertain interval
[
W k,W k
]
. The
mathematial formulation is desribed in Setion C.3.1. As an alternative, the
limit an be imposed in the probability spae so that the optimal ratio r˜∗k is
limited in a similar interval [rk, rk]. This is introdued in Setion C.3.2.
C.3.1 Constraints in the deision spae
In this setion we propose the determination of the allowed interval for the bid
as a funtion of the expeted value of wind power prodution Ŵk.
The allowed interval of the deision spae is entred around the point foreast
Ŵk = E {Wk} (C.33)
and has radius equal to a ertain perentage of this value itself. Two values
for the radius are used in the appliation ase-study, i.e. 10% and 20% of Ŵk.
Naturally the larger the allowed interval the more risk-neutral the strategy. The
suggested bid in this ase an be determined as
W˜ v,avk = min
{
max
{
W˜ ∗k , Ŵk · (1− av)
}
, Ŵk · (1 + av)
}
(C.34)
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where av is to be set to either 0.1 or 0.2. Figures C.6(a) and C.6(b) show
the EUM bid and the point foreast Ŵk along with the allowed intervals with
av = 0.1 and av = 0.2.
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(a) Constraints in value (av = 0.1)
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Ŵ
W˜
∗
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(b) Constraints in value (av = 0.2)
Figure C.6: Point foreast (Ŵ ), EUM bid (W˜ ∗) and allowed interval with
onstraints on the deision spae.
C.3.2 Constraints in the probability spae
In the seond method proposed here, the ratio r˜∗k in Equation (C.21) is allowed
to span a ertain interval in the probability spae. This interval is entred
around the value of the umulative distribution at the point foreast Ŵk
r̂k = FWk
(
Ŵk
)
(C.35)
The radius of the interval is then to be set to a ertain fration of the probability
spae. In this work the radii 0.1 and 0.2 are used. The onstrained bid an then
be determined as
W˜
p,ap
k = FWk
−1 (min {max {r˜∗k, r̂k − ap} , r̂k + ap}) (C.36)
where ap is to be set to 0.1 or 0.2 aording to the desired risk aversion of the
bid. Figures C.7(a) and C.7(b) show the EUM bid and the point foreast Ŵk
along with the allowed intervals with ap = 0.1 and ap = 0.2.
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(a) Constraints in probability (ap = 0.1)
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Ŵ
W˜
∗
F
-1
w
(r̂ ± 0.2)
(b) Constraints in probability (ap = 0.2)
Figure C.7: Point foreast (Ŵ ), EUM bid (W˜ ∗) and allowed interval with
onstraints on the probability spae.
C.4 Test ase results
In this setion we disuss the results of a test-ase simulating the strategies
presented above in a realisti market situation. The setup of the test-ase is the
same as desribed in Setion C.2.3. Setion C.4.1 disusses the performane of
the bidding strategies from the point of view of the produer and its eonomi
result, while Setion C.4.2 disusses the impliations of the proposed strategies
from a system point of view.
C.4.1 Eonomi advantage of the strategies
The main eonomi results for the power produer are shown in Table C.2. This
shows the total revenues of the produer and its imbalane losses per MW of
installed apaity, the perentage redution in imbalane losses obtained by the
strategy ompared to the ase of point foreast bidding and the average prie
per MWh paid to the produer.
As one an see, the onstrained strategies introdued in the previous setion
produe better results than the plain EUM one. The redution in imbalane
osts amounts to around 6% when the onstraint limit is set to 10% (both in
value and in probability) and to around 8.5% when it is set to 20%. A slightly
better performane is obtained by onstraining in value than in probability. As
far as the last olumn of Table C.2 is onerned it should be mentioned that
with perfet information on wind power prodution the energy would have been
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sold at an average prie of e56.83 in the onsidered period.
The improved prots obtained with these strategies, ompared to that of using
the point foreast bidding, are illustrated in Figure C.8. Indeed, this gure
displays the dierene between the umulative revenues obtained by using the
EUM strategy and its onstrained versions and the revenues obtained by bidding
the point foreast. All the umulative revenues in this plot are expressed in e
per MW of installed wind power apaity. It an be seen how the EUM bid
(W˜ ) is the least eient strategy, apart from the point foreast bidding. The
onstrained strategies, besides performing better than the EUM, are also less
exposed to signiant isolated losses.
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Figure C.8: Improvement of the umulative revenues for the strategies de-
sribed in Setions C.2 and C.3 with respet to the point foreast
bidding strategy.
In view of the results above, there is learly a relationship between range of the
onstraint and net revenues. Intuitively, there is also a relationship with risk,
sine as pointed out in Setion C.3 an inrease in the allowed bid range results
in a higher risk of a large imbalane, and therefore a higher risk of large losses.
In priniple, the full joint probability distribution of wind power prodution and
market pries should be employed in order to assess risk quantitatively. An a
posteriori approah is followed here, in that risk is assessed by analysing the
realised standard deviation of the hourly imbalane losses.
Figures C.9(a) and C.9(b) show the imbalane ost redution obtained in the
test-ase as a funtion of the parameters av and ap. The trend is inreasing in
1
4
6
P
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Strategy
Net revenue Imbalane ost Imbalane ost Prie
per installed MW per installed MW redution per MWh
(e/MW) (e/MW) (%) (e/MWh)
Point foreast 94436.40 4076.51 0.00 54.48
EUM 94529.96 3982.95 2.30 54.54
Constrained (±10% value) 94684.18 3828.74 6.08 54.63
Constrained (±20% value) 94784.27 3728.64 8.53 54.68
Constrained (±10% probability) 94670.78 3842.13 5.75 54.62
Constrained (±20% probability) 94768.55 3744.37 8.15 54.67
Table C.2: Eonomi results for the wind power produer in the test-ase.
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both ases up to a ertain value of the parameter (approximately 0.6 and 0.2 for
av and ap respetively). Inreasing the onstraining parameter further beyond
these ritial values results in less prots. This is beause the distribution of the
produer's hourly revenues is bounded on the upper side by π
(s)
k Wk. By allowing
larger deviations from the point foreasts, this maximum value of the revenues is
reahed during more and more trading periods. In this way the rate of growth of
the revenues slows down, as fewer trading periods oer possible improvements.
Meanwhile, when foreasts are not perfet the risk of losses inreases. When
the ritial level of the onstraining parameter is reahed, the inreased losses
exeed the revenue growth, resulting in the negative slopes on the right sides of
Figures C.9(a) and C.9(b). This deline is only stopped when the allowed bid
interval is large enough to ontain the optimal quantiles for all trading periods,
as in the at part of the urve on the right side of Figure C.9(b). At that point
the onstrained strategy is in pratie equal to the original EUM strategy.
The empirial standard deviation of the hourly imbalane losses is plotted in
Figure C.9() and C.9(d). As one an see in Figure C.9(d), the EUM strategy (to
whih the onstrained strategy onverges when the onstraining parameter ap is
just above 0.6) is the riskiest strategy, sine it inurs the highest standard devia-
tion of hourly losses. Strategies with lower values of the onstraining parameters
are subjet to lower risk, but the trend is not monotoni all the way down to the
point foreast (ahieved with av = ap = 0). The latter strategy would in fat
be very risk-averse in ase of equal penalties for up- and down-regulation. In a
realisti ase with dierent penalties, the most risk-averse onstrained strategy
is obtained for a value av slightly lower than the one delivering best revenues,
while the value ap that delivers the highest revenues is to a good approximation
the one that is minimising the standard deviation of the losses.
Furthermore, Table C.2 and Figures C.9(a) and C.9(b) indiate that the EUM
strategy does not ahieve the best performane among the onsidered strategies
in the simulated market period. One would expet that a 10-month period is
long enough for onsidering the inidene of isolated losses on the umulative
revenues negligible, so that the EUM strategy ahieves the optimal performane.
On the ontrary, this study seems to suggest that the EUM strategy is not
optimal in pratie. Indeed, even from a theoretial point of view the EUM
bid is optimal only under the assumption that probabilisti foreasts of wind
power prodution and of market pries are orret. In pratie, errors in the
probabilisti foreasts might ause the loss of optimality that is observable in
this test-ase. On the other hand the onstrained strategies seem to limit the
negative eets of foreast errors both by reduing the risk of losses stemming
from single hourly-ontrats and by ahieving a better performane in the long
run.
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Figure C.9: Produer's imbalane loss redution and standard deviation in the
test-ase as a funtion of onstraining parameter.
C.4.2 Interation with the system
This setion sheds some light on the eets of the strategies presented in Se-
tions C.2 and C.3 in terms of energy imbalane introdued in the system.
Table C.3 shows the simulation results in terms of imbalane diretion. The rst
three olumns show the energy imbalane brought to the system by the wind
produer in the onsidered 10 months, in total and divided between positive,
i.e. produer being long (seond olumn), and negative imbalane, i.e. produer
being short (third olumn). All the values are expressed in hours of operation at
nominal apaity, i.e.they are obtained by dividing the total energy imbalane
(MWh) over the simulation by the installed apaity (MW). It an be seen that
the more risk-neutral the strategy, the higher the overall energy imbalane. In
this sense, the EUM strategy appears to have an extreme behaviour, pushing the
total imbalane from less than 500 hours of operation, obtained with the point
foreast bid, to over 700 hours. The four onstrained strategies appear to have
a limited eet on the overall imbalane. The strategies with tighter bounds (±
10% in value and ± 0.1 in probability) ause only a negligible inrease, while
when the ones with the less restritive bounds (± 20 % in value and ± 0.2 in
probability) are used the total imbalane rises by 35 hours at most.
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Furthermore, an evaluation of the seond and the third olumns shows that
generally more advaned strategies tend to bid above the atual prodution.
This means that the produer is more often short rather than long. In fat,
one an see that the dierene between the values in the seond and the third
olumns, whih is almost zero with the point foreast bidding, tends to spread
markedly when other strategies are used. This result might at a rst sight look
ounterintuitive, sine penalties are on average higher for up-regulation than
for down-regulation. Nevertheless other fators, i.e.skewness of wind power pro-
dution distribution, have an inuene on this. Aording to expetations, the
prevalene of up-regulation power is more evident when less risk-averse strate-
gies are used.
The fourth and the fth olumns of Table C.3 show the perentage of mar-
ket hours during whih the produer is long and short respetively. It an be
seen that the variation in number of regulation hours, despite the signiant
variation in the imbalane volumes, is at most 1.5%. This indiates that the
proposed strategies hange the volumes of the energy imbalane but not the
general trend in the number of up- or down-regulation periods. Finally, the last
two olumns show the maximum value of energy imbalane, again expressed in
hours of operation at nominal apaity, during a single hour. Interestingly only
the row orresponding to the EUM bid shows a onsiderable inrease, whih
underlines the fat that onstraining the EUM bid is an eetive method to
limit the maximum value of imbalane.
Table C.4 looks at the produer's imbalane from a dierent perspetive. This
table separates the results for the imbalane into two omponents: the ompo-
nent opposite to the overall system imbalane, whih is paid at the day-ahead
market prie and is shown in the seond and the fourth olumns, and the om-
ponent in the same diretion, whih is paid at the day-ahead prie minus the
imbalane ost and is shown in the third and fth olumns. While in the ase
of the EUM bid the third olumn shows a signiant inrease, its values are
roughly unhanged with the tighter onstraints and slightly inreased with the
looser ones. In turn, the seond olumn inreases by a signiant amount in
most ases. These two fats indiate that the inrease in energy imbalane
aused by the use of more advaned strategies, whih has been disussed above,
atually involves only the diretion in whih the produer is not penalised, i.e.
the one paid at the day-ahead prie. There are two impliations of this. On one
hand, part of the energy imbalane is shifted to the opposite diretion with re-
spet to the system imbalane (seond olumn in Table C.4), thus ontributing
to restoring the overall balane  yet on a marginal level due to the prie-taker
assumption. In other words, the proposed onstrained strategies are able to bet-
ter read the feedbak signal sent by the regulation pries and adapt to it, thus
reduing the system imbalane. On the other hand, the variation in imbalane
ould beome signiant if the proposed strategies beome ommon pratie
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Strategy
Energy imbalane (h) Imbalane hours (%) Max value (h/h)
Total > 0 < 0 > 0 < 0 > 0 < 0
Point foreast 484.92 235.94 248.98 45.45 54.47 0.54 0.70
EUM 755.29 269.93 485.35 46.28 53.72 0.66 0.89
Constrained (±10% value) 495.91 236.48 259.43 44.26 55.73 0.56 0.68
Constrained (±20% value) 519.70 244.82 274.88 44.06 55.91 0.58 0.68
Constrained (±10% probability) 488.94 237.82 251.12 46.09 53.91 0.57 0.68
Constrained (±20% probability) 514.62 245.98 268.64 46.60 53.40 0.59 0.68
Table C.3: Energy imbalane of the wind power produer in the test-ase.
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for produers. As a result, this ould inuene the formation of the regulation
pries as well as possibly hange the diretion of the system imbalane. While it
has been shown that the trading behaviour of wind power produers is apable
of aeting day-ahead pries at NordPool even at the urrent level of market
penetration, see [34, 35℄, the relationship with the real-time market penalties,
whih are the quantities that ultimately determine the optimal bid in Equation
(C.20), has not been investigated yet. In the event that the trading strategies
presented above beome ommon pratie, they might inuene the real-time
penalties and no longer be optimal, and ould possibly destabilise the system.
Then, the market power of wind power produers should be aounted for if
eient bidding strategies are to be designed for produers with a large total
apaity or for ombined produers. This an be ahieved by modelling energy
markets as losed-loop systems, see for instane [25, 26℄.
C.5 Conlusions
In this work, the optimal quantile strategy for trading wind power in liberalised
energy market is revisited. It is shown that this strategy maximises the expeted
value of the market revenues (utility), under the assumption that the wind power
produer is a prie-taker, i.e. its market strategy is not apable of inuening
prie formation. The use of the Expeted Utility Maximisation (EUM) strat-
egy in pratie requires probabilisti foreasts of wind power prodution, point
foreasts of day-ahead and real-time market pries and of the imbalane sign
probabilities. All these foreasts an be provided by state-of-the-art foreasting
tehniques.
An evaluation of the EUM strategy in a realisti test-ase in Nord Pool high-
lights both its improved performane and its risk-neutral nature. The former is
underlined by a 2.3% redution of the imbalane osts. As far as the latter is
onerned, the test-ase shows that this strategy is exposed to a number of sig-
niant losses that take plae in short periods of time. These losses are aused
by the use of inaurate foreasts whih ause the bid to dier signiantly from
the atual wind power prodution.
Constraining of the bid is then introdued in two dierent versions: with on-
straints in the deision spae and in the probability spae. The main idea is that
bounding the bid to a ertain interval around the point foreast an help redue
the distane of the bid from the atual wind power prodution. This heuris-
ti an solve some issues, assoiated with the ontrol of market authorities of
the produer's bid as well as with its inuene on the prie formation meha-
nism. Indeed, onstrained strategies generally redue the imbalane introdued
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Strategy
Energy imbalane (h) Imbalane hours (%)
Total Day-Ahead prie Penalty Day-Ahead prie Penalty
Point foreast 484.92 277.71 207.21 62.81 37.19
EUM 755.29 498.66 256.62 65.14 34.86
Constrained (±10% value) 495.91 286.72 209.19 63.16 36.84
Constrained (±20% value) 519.70 304.85 214.85 63.59 36.41
Constrained (±10% probability) 488.94 281.93 207.00 62.72 37.28
Constrained (±20% probability) 514.62 301.74 212.87 63.39 36.61
Table C.4: Energy imbalane of the wind power produer in the test-ase.
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by the wind power produer in the system, thus lowering the potential impat
on real-time pries and the sub-optimality of the strategy in a prie-maker mar-
ket environment. Moreover, the risk of inurring high regulation osts is also
redued by using onstrained strategies.
Furthermore, the test-ase is extended in order to assess the performane of the
onstrained strategies. The results of the simulation show that the onstrained
strategies outperform both the point foreast and the EUM strategies. The
latter fat shows that onstraining the EUM bid is also an eetive way for
reduing the impat of foreast errors on long-term revenues. At a seond stage
in the test-ase, the interations between a produer employing this strategy
and the overall system are analysed. It is shown that only the EUM bid auses
a signiant inrease in the total energy imbalane ompared to the point fore-
ast bid. The onstrained strategies inrease the amount of regulated energy at
most by about 10% in the ase of less restritive bounds, while the inrease is
negligible when the strategies with tighter bounds are adopted. Moreover, it is
pointed out that this inrease in the regulated power involves only the ompo-
nent in the opposite diretion ompared to the overall system imbalane. As a
result, the onstrained strategies might be able to redue the overall imbalane,
thus marginally beneting the system, at least as long as they do not beome
ommon pratie.
We underline that the obtained results hold as long as the wind power produer
does not own a signiant share of the overall prodution apaity. When this
hypothesis is not true, the power produer annot be onsidered a prie-taker.
It is expeted that in this ase the performane of the proposed strategies de-
reases. In addition, the assertion that these strategies may be beneial to
the system by reduing the overall imbalane might prove inorret. This is be-
ause suh a large produer -or many smaller produers using the same bidding
poliy- might hange the diretion of the system imbalane, thus ontributing
positively to it rather than reduing it. For these reasons, an interesting future
development of this work ould be to study the relationship between the bid of
a large wind power produer and the formation of the regulation pries in the
real-time market. This ould then lead to the formulation of optimal bidding
strategies of pratial use for large wind power produers, as well as more stable
from a system point of view.
Similarly, modelling explanatory variables inuening wind power prodution
and energy market pries at the same time is of lear interest for future researh.
This would aount for the situation where a high penetration of wind power in
the system is able to inuene the pries, although the onsidered wind power
produer is too small to have any sort of market power on its own.
Besides, trading on the intra-day market ould also be inluded in the problem
154 Paper C
under the assumption of suient liquidity of this market. As shown in [21℄,
this trading oor gives market partiipants further possibilities for reduing the
risk of losses. Indeed, produers an employ foreasts with a shorter lead-time
(typially one hour) with lear advantages in terms of auray. Therefore, an
assessment of the advantages both for the produers and the system obtained by
inreasing the liquidity of balaning markets would be partiularly interesting.
Finally, another diretion for further researh ould be to aount for the dy-
nami aspets of the market. In this way the assumption of independene of
deisions in dierent trading periods would be overome. The dynami view of
the market ould inlude, for instane, modelling ompetition among produ-
ers as well as the market partiipation of mixed portfolios. In the latter ase
a typial situation ould be the oupling of wind power with hydro power or
energy storage, both of whih allow for shifts in the trade of power between
dierent trading periods. This researh ould lead to the determination of more
advaned bidding strategies in ompetitive market environments, possibly for
produers with a diversied portfolio of energy soures.
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Abstrat
We onsider the problem of a wind power produer trading energy in
short-term eletriity markets. The produer is a prie-taker in the
day-ahead market, but a prie-maker in the balaning market, and
aims at optimizing its expeted revenues from these market oors.
The problem is formulated as a Mathematial Program with Equi-
librium Constraints (MPEC) and ast as a Mixed-Integer Linear
Program (MILP), whih an be solved employing o-the-shelf opti-
mization software. The optimal bid is shown to deliver signiantly
improved performane ompared to traditional bids suh as the fore-
ast onditional mean or median of wind power distribution. Finally,
sensitivity analyses are arried out to assess the impat on the of-
fering strategy of the produer's penetration in the market, of the
orrelation between wind power prodution and residual system de-
viation, and of the shape of the foreast distribution of wind power
prodution.
D.1 Nomenlature
D.1.1 Sets
k Index for up-regulation blok oered at the balaning market, from 1 to NK
j Index for down-regulation blok oered at the balaning market, from 1 to
NJ
ω Index for senario, from 1 to NΩ
1
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D.1.2 Constants
ck Oered ost for up-regulation blok k
bj Oered benet for down-regulation blok j
Ck Prodution limit for up-regulation blok k
Cj Consumption limit for down-regulation blok j
wω Own wind power prodution in senario ω
δω Residual system deviation in senario ω
λDAω Day-ahead market prie in senario ω
CW Installed apaity for wind power produer
D.1.3 Lower-Level Variables
pkω Up-regulation from blok k in senario ω
pjω Down-regulation from blok j in senario ω
λBω Balaning market prie in senario ω
µSkω Dual variable for apaity onstraint at the balaning market for blok k
in senario ω
µDjω Dual variable for apaity onstraint at the balaning market for blok j
in senario ω
D.1.4 Upper-Level Variables
xω Wind power produer's oer in senario ω
D.2 Introdution
In the reent years, the deployment of wind power into power systems worldwide
has inreased with impressive pae. In part this expansion has been supported
by national governments in the form of market inentives, whih resulted in wind
power having a ompetitive advantage with respet to onventional soures of
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energy. In many ases, wind power produers are granted a xed feed-in tari
or a minimum prie for their prodution, so as to hedge them from the prie
utuations of eletriity markets. Furthermore, they are often relieved of their
balane responsibility, whih means that the Transmission System Operators
(TSOs) bear the osts for the deviations of atual prodution from the generation
shedule, whih wind power produers inevitably inur.
As the ost per produed MWh of wind power onstantly dereases, wind power
produers are fored to partiipate in eletriity markets in the same way as
onventional power generators. However, wind generation is haraterized by
peuliar features that distinguish it from most of the other eletriity soures.
First of all, it is stohasti, and thus an be foreast only with a ertain degree
of auray [1℄. Furthermore, it is non-dispathable. These features imply that
deviations of the atual prodution from the shedule must be overed by bak-
up plants.
On the other hand, eletriity markets were oneived at a time when the large-
sale penetration of wind power was not foreseen. Therefore, their design is
better suited to traditional power plants, whih are dispathable and may need
a ertain time-lag between the submission of prodution plans and the atual
delivery of power. In modern eletriity markets, most of the energy trade takes
plae in so-alled day-ahead markets, with an advane in time typially in the
range between 1236 hours. Partiipants are then allowed to ontrat hanges
to their day-ahead shedules either in intra-day or balaning markets. However,
pries in suh markets may involve penalties and are generally less attrative
and more volatile than in the day-ahead market.
In view of the several market oors and of the unertainty involved, both in
prodution and in market quantities, the problem of determining the optimal
bid for a wind power produer is a multi-stage, stohasti optimization problem.
So far the state-of-the-art of researh on the topi has foused on the problem
of trading wind power as a prie-taker. Considering the day-ahead and the bal-
aning market stages only, it an be shown that the optimal day-ahead bid for a
prie-taker wind power produer is a ertain quantile of the foreast wind power
distribution, whih is a funtion of the market pries, see [2℄, as well as [3℄ and [4℄
for the ase with stohasti market pries. Suh quantile-based approah is used
to evaluate the performane of wind power foreasts in [5℄ and [6℄, both of whih
employ historial averages of market pries. Furthermore, the performane of
this approah is analyzed in [4℄ in a realisti test-ase using state-of-the-art fore-
asts of both wind prodution and market pries. Another analytial approah
is proposed in [7℄, where the optimal bid is hosen in a disrete deision spae,
and the unertainty in wind power prodution is modeled using probability ta-
bles. Furthermore, an approah based on utility-funtions is presented in [8℄
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along with the use of persistene foreasting of wind power prodution and his-
torial values for market pries. The stohasti programming approah is also
popular. In [9℄, wind power prodution is modeled using senarios, and histor-
ial averages of pries are used. Furthermore, [10℄ deals with the partiipation
of wind power produers in multiple market stages (day-ahead, intra-day and
balaning). Reently, [3℄ and [11℄ have shown further analytial results on the
problem of trading wind as a prie-taker.
To our knowledge, there are no attempts in the literature to study the optimal
bidding for a wind power produer in a prie-maker setting. However, the
problem is beoming inreasingly interesting as, due to its growing penetration
into power systems, wind power is more and more apable of inuening market
pries [12℄.
This work models the market partiipation of a wind power produer that is a
prie-maker
3
in the balaning market in the framework of Mathematial Pro-
grams with Equilibrium Constraints (MPECs) [13℄. Beause a muh larger vol-
ume is traded in the day-ahead market, we assume that the wind power produer
is a prie-taker at that stage. Therefore, we an employ senarios for the day-
ahead market prie, as well as for wind power prodution and residual system
deviation. We also assume that bids are independent between dierent trading
periods, and therefore onsider a single time period in our formulation. The
output of the optimization model onsists of the optimal day-ahead oer and
the balaning market pries for any realization of wind power prodution and
system deviation. Sine produers are allowed to bid supply urves in the day-
ahead market, the optimal oer is a non-dereasing urve relating quantities of
energy to the orresponding minimum aepted pries.
The struture of this paper is the following. Setion D.3 introdues the setup
of the problem. Then, the mathematial formulation is desribed in detail in
Setion D.4. Results from a series of ase studies are presented in Setion D.5.
Finally, Setion D.6 onludes the paper.
D.3 Problem Desription
This setion introdues the eletriity market framework onsidered and the
setup of the problem as a bilevel model.
3
We dene a produer to be a prie-maker when it is apable of impating the market
result through its oer in a broad sense, not neessarily only by marking up its prie oer
above the marginal ost of prodution
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D.3.1 Market Framework
In this work, we onsider the short-term trade of eletriity in the day-ahead
and the balaning market. In the day-ahead market, wind power produers sell
prodution for eah trading period of the following day with a ertain advane
in time to the atual delivery, typially in the range between 1236 hours. Sine
at the time of oering the atual wind power prodution is unertain, produ-
ers must settle the exess or deit of prodution by trading at the balaning
market. Notie that intra-day markets are not onsidered in this work. This
simpliation is realisti sine these markets have generally low liquidity [14℄.
Furthermore, we onsider a one-prie balaning market, i.e., all deviations are
settled at a unique prie, determined aording to the marginal priing rule. The
so-alled two-prie or dual-prie settlement of imbalanes, where the day-ahead
market prie is applied to unwanted deviations in the opposite diretion to the
overall system imbalane, while the marginal prie at the balaning stage is ap-
plied to all the other deviations, is not onsidered in this work. We remark that
onsidering a two-prie balaning market in this framework would be possible
with some modiations, either by modeling the swith between day-ahead and
marginal prie with binary variables, or by employing supply urves dependent
on the realization of the system deviation. The former option would ome at
the expense of a higher omputational omplexity, the latter of an inreased
modeling burden. We underline that, while some markets (e.g., a part of the
Nordi ountries in Nord Pool [15℄ and the Iberian MIBEL [16℄ in Europe) em-
ploy the two-prie system for imbalanes, there are a number of markets where
the one-prie sheme is adopted (e.g., Norway [15℄, the Duth APX [17℄ and the
German EEX [18℄ markets).
D.3.2 Bilevel Setup
The setup of the problem is skethed in Fig. D.1. The Wind Power Produer
(WPP) seeks to maximize its total revenues from the day-ahead and the balan-
ing market. Sine we assume that the wind power produer is a prie-taker at
the day-ahead stage, but a prie-maker at the balaning market, only the lear-
ing of the latter market is expliitly inluded in the produer's optimization
problem. This is beause the day-ahead prie is not inuened by the deision
of the wind power produer and therefore, it an be modeled exogenously with
a disrete number of senarios. On the ontrary, there is a dependene between
the balaning market learing and the optimization problem of the wind power
produer. Indeed, the balaning market is leared with knowledge on the bid of
the wind power produer; in turn, the latter optimizes its oer on the basis of
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the antiipation of the balaning market prie, given its oer and a foreast of
its prodution and of the residual system deviation.
WPP
Maximize
revenues
Market, scenario 1
Minimize
balancing costs
Market, scenario 2
Minimize
balancing costs
Market, scenario n
Minimize
balancing costs
· · ·
bid
balancing
price
bid
balancing
price
bid
balancing
price
Figure D.1: Sketh of the problem setup
Sine we model the unertainty in future wind power prodution and residual
system deviation with senarios, we need to solve a balaning market learing
problem for eah senario. Suh problem yields, for the partiular realization of
the unertainties onsidered, the optimal dispath of regulating power and the
balaning market prie, whih enters the upper-level optimization problem (i.e.,
the produer's one). In the upper-level objetive funtion, the market outome
orresponding to a ertain senario is weighted by the orresponding senario
probability.
Notie that we model exogenously the market partiipation of players other than
the onsidered wind power produer through senarios for the residual system
deviation. In other words, we make use of a statistial tool able to foreast
the aggregate imbalane from other wind power produers, possibly bidding
strategially, and the load. However, if prodution foreasts for all the other
wind power produers are available, ompetition should be modeled through an
Equilibrium Program with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) [19℄. We leave this
omplex topi for future researh.
D.4 Mathematial Formulation
The bilevel optimization sheme outlined in Setion D.3.2 orresponds to a
stohasti formulation of an MPEC. We rst formulate the problem in the gen-
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eral framework of stohasti MPECs in Setion D.4.1. Then, we present the
formulation of the lower-level problems in Setion D.4.2, and of the upper-level
one in Setion D.4.3.
D.4.1 Stohasti MPEC Formulation
The problem at hand has a bilevel struture where several (lower-level) optimiza-
tion problems are nested in another (upper-level) one. This an be formulated
as a stohasti MPEC as follows.
Max. f(x,λB) (D.1a)
s.t. h(x,λB) ≤ 0 , (D.1b)(
p1, λ
B
1 ,µ1
)
∈ argmin
y∈F1(x)
{g1(x,y)} , (D.1)(
p2, λ
B
2 ,µ2
)
∈ argmin
y∈F2(x)
{g2(x,y)} , (D.1d)
.
.
.(
pNΩ , λ
B
NΩ ,µNΩ
)
∈ argmin
y∈FNΩ(x)
{gNΩ(x,y)} . (D.1e)
The upper-level problem onsists in the maximization of the objetive funtion
f(x,λB) in (D.1a) subjet to the feasibility onstraint (D.1b), and further on-
strained by the optimality onditions of the lower-level problems (D.1)(D.1e).
For a risk-neutral wind power produer, the objetive funtion f(x,λB) is the
expeted value of the total revenues in the day-ahead and balaning markets,
given the information available at the time of bidding. The deision variables of
the upper-level problem are the bid x in the day-ahead market, as well as the
variables of the lower-level problems.
The lower-level problems are represented by (D.1)(D.1e) for all senarios
ω = 1, 2, . . . , NΩ. Suh problems aim at the minimization of the objetive
funtions gω(x,y), provided that the deision vetor y is inluded in the feasi-
ble sets Fω(x). As we will see in the following setion, the objetive funtion
of this problem represents the system balaning osts in the realization ω of
the unertainty, whih are minimized in the balaning market. The learing
of this market results in the dispath of balaning power pω, primal variable
of the lower-level problem, as well as in the dual variables λBω and µω. Notie
that, as the remainder of the setion will larify, we are partiularly interested
in the value of λBω . Indeed, this variable indiates the balaning market prie in
senario ω, whih enters the upper-level optimization problem. Notie also that
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the lower-level problems are parameterized in the wind power produer's oer
in the day-ahead market x, whih enters suh problems as a onstant.
Formulation (D.1) is not suitable for being solved diretly by an optimization
solver, owing to the nested optimization of the lower-level problems in (D.1)
(D.1e). However, suh optimization problems an be replaed by their Karush-
Kuhn-Tuker (KKT) onditions, for whih a mixed-integer linear formulation
exists, under reasonably mild assumptions. Indeed, KKT onditions are ne-
essary and suient for optimality if the lower-level problems are onvex and
their onstraints satisfy some regularity onditions [20℄. If this holds, bilevel
problem (D.1) an be reformulated as a single-level optimization problem. We
derive this formulation expliitly in the remainder of this setion.
D.4.2 Lower-Level Problem
The solution to the problem below for eah senario ω lears the balaning
market.
Min.
pkω ,pjω
NK∑
k=1
ckpkω −
NJ∑
j=1
bjpjω (D.2a)
s.t.
NK∑
k=1
pkω −
NJ∑
j=1
pjω = −(wω − xω)− δω : λ
B
ω , (D.2b)
− pkω ≥ −Ck : µ
S
kω ∀k , (D.2)
− pjω ≥ −Cj : µ
D
jω ∀j , (D.2d)
pkω , pjω ≥ 0 ∀k, j . (D.2e)
The deision variables pkω and pjω represent the dispath of up- and down-
regulation power, respetively, from blok oers k and j. The parameter ck is
the prie oer (per unit ost) assoiated with the deployment of supply power
from blok k. Similarly, bj is the per unit benet assoiated with the power
prodution derease (down-regulation) from blok j. Therefore, objetive (D.2a)
is the balaning ost in senario ω. The balane of supply and demand is
enfored by (D.2b). Indeed, the terms on the right-hand side of the equation
are, after a hange in sign, the sum of the deviation from the wind power
produer (atual prodution wω minus day-ahead bid xω) and from all the other
market partiipants (δω). Notie that the residual system deviation and the
produer's own imbalane are to be onsidered as a perfetly inelasti demand
(or supply) of power, whih must be met at any market prie. Consequently,
these two terms do not appear in the objetive funtion (D.2a), while their
sum is enfored to be equal to the power output of exible generators at the
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balaning stage through (D.2b). Equations (D.2) and (D.2d) ensure that the
dispath of regulating power is not greater than the apaities Ck and Cj , whih
are the sizes of the blok oers in the balaning market. Finally, non-negativity
of the power dispath is enfored by (D.2e). Notie that the dual variables of
the problem are indiated after eah onstraint preeded by a olon. Variable
λBω is of partiular importane, as it indiates the marginal ost of prodution,
whih is the balaning market prie in a one-prie imbalane settlement.
As one an notie, problem (D.2) is linear and thus it an be equivalently rep-
resented by the following set of KKT onditions [20℄
0 ≤ pkω ⊥ ck − λ
B
ω + µ
S
kω ≥ 0 ∀k , (D.3a)
0 ≤ pjω ⊥ −bj + λ
B
ω + µ
D
jω ≥ 0 ∀j , (D.3b)
NK∑
k=1
pkω −
NJ∑
j=1
pjω = −(wω − xω)− δω , (D.3)
0 ≤ µSkω ⊥ Ck − pkω ≥ 0 ∀k , (D.3d)
0 ≤ µDjω ⊥ Cj − pjω ≥ 0 ∀j , (D.3e)
where the ⊥ operator separating two inequalities implies that at least one of
them holds stritly. Conditions (D.3a) and (D.3b) are stationarity onditions;
the inequalities on the right-hand side dene, along with the non-negativity
denitions on the left-hand side of (D.3d) and (D.3e), the feasible spae of the
dual problem. Conditions (D.3d) and (D.3e) are omplementarity slakness
onditions; the inequalities on the right-hand side dene, along with (D.3) and
the non-negativity denitions on the left-hand side of (D.3a) and (D.3b), the
primal feasible spae.
Sine the ⊥ operator is equivalent to requiring that the multipliation between
two linear expressions be equal to 0, the KKT onditions (D.3) inlude nonlin-
earities. However, it is possible to linearize suh onditions by employing binary
variables [21℄, yielding the following set of optimality onditions
0 ≤ ck − λ
B
ω + µ
S
kω ≤M
SS
1 z
S1
kω ∀k , (D.4a)
0 ≤ pkω ≤M
SS
2
(
1− zS1kω
)
∀k , (D.4b)
0 ≤ −bj + λ
B
ω + µ
D
jω ≤M
SD
1 z
D1
jω ∀j , (D.4)
0 ≤ pjω ≤M
SD
2
(
1− zD1jω
)
∀j , (D.4d)
NK∑
k=1
pkω −
NJ∑
j=1
pjω = −(wω − xω)− δω , (D.4e)
0 ≤ Ck − pkω ≤M
S
1 z
S2
kω ∀k , (D.4f)
0 ≤ µSkω ≤M
S
2
(
1− zS2kω
)
∀k , (D.4g)
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0 ≤ Cj − pjω ≤M
D
1 z
D2
jω ∀j , (D.4h)
0 ≤ µDjω ≤M
D
2
(
1− zD2jω
)
∀j , (D.4i)
zS1kω, z
D1
jω , z
S2
kω, z
D2
jω ∈ {0, 1} ∀k, j , (D.4j)
where the M onstants are large enough to guarantee that the inequalities are
never binding when the right-hand side is dierent from 0. Notie that, as
long as suh assumption holds and in view of the binary variable denitions
in (D.4j), we have that onstraints (D.4a) and (D.4b) are equivalent to (D.3a);
(D.4) and (D.4d) to (D.3b); (D.4f) and (D.4g) to (D.3d); (D.4h) and (D.4i)
to (D.3e). Eah balaning market learing problem, i.e., for every senario, an
be replaed by its KKT onditions (D.4).
Furthermore, for reasons that will beome apparent later in this setion, it is
interesting to notie that the dual of the lower-level problem (D.2) is, for every
senario ω,
Max.
µS
kω
,µD
jω
,λBω
− λBω [(wω − xω) + δω]−
NK∑
k=1
Ckµ
S
kω −
NJ∑
j=1
Cjµ
D
jω (D.5a)
s.t. λBω − µ
S
kω ≤ ck ∀k , (D.5b)
− λBω − µ
D
jω ≤ −bj ∀j , (D.5)
µSkω , µ
D
jω ≥ 0 ∀k, j . (D.5d)
The optimal objetive funtion values of (D.5) and (D.2) are equal.
Finally, we stress that the network is not onsidered in this balaning market
learing model. This simpliation, however, is justied in a European ontext,
sine the vast majority of European eletriity markets employ zonal priing.
D.4.3 Upper-Level Problem
In a one-prie system, all deviations from the day-ahead shedule are settled
at the marginal ost, i.e., the dual λBω of the balane equation (D.2b) at the
balaning market. Hene, the optimization problem of a wind power produer
writes as
Max.
xω, pkω , pjω ,
λBω , µ
S
kω , µ
D
jω
E
{
λDAω xω + λ
B
ω (wω − xω)
}
(D.6a)
s.t. 0 ≤ xω ≤ C
W ∀ω , (D.6b)
xω = xω′ ω, ω
′ ∈ Ωi, ∀i , (D.6)
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xω ≤ xω′ ω ∈ Ωi, ω
′ ∈ Ωj , i < j , (D.6d)
KKT onditions of the lower-level problems .
The objetive funtion (D.6a) is the expetation of the sum of two terms. The
rst term represents the revenues in the day-ahead market in senario ω, sine it
is given by the multipliation of the day-ahead market prie λDAω with the oer
xω in the same market. In an analogous fashion, the seond term represents
the revenues at the balaning stage in senario ω. Therefore, the objetive
funtion is the expeted total revenues at the two market oors. Notie that,
sine the wind power produer is a prie-taker in the day-ahead market, λDAω is a
parameter and not an optimization variable. Furthermore, sine the leared day-
ahead prie is dislosed prior to the realization of the stohasti prodution and
the residual system deviation in real-time, senarios for the day-ahead prie an
be onsidered as rst-stage senarios, while the other senarios an be regarded
as seond-stage. This implies that the senario set Ω an be partitioned in a
number of subsets Ωi, aross whih the day-ahead prie is onstant, i.e.,
λDAω = λ
DA
ω′ , ∀ω, ω
′ ∈ Ωi, ∀i . (D.7)
Furthermore, sine the order of the partitions Ωi is arbitrary, we assume that
they are sorted so that the orresponding day-ahead prie is inreasing, i.e.,
λDAω ≤ λ
DA
ω′ , ∀ω ∈ Ωi, ∀ω
′ ∈ Ωj , i < j . (D.8)
Constraint (D.6b) enfores that the bid of the wind power produer be inluded
in the range between 0 and the installed apaity CW. Furthermore, market
praties usually allow produers to submit bids in the form of non-dereasing
supply urves, i.e., prie-quantity pairs indiating howmuh energy the produer
is willing to deliver at a ertain day-ahead prie. Constraints (D.6) and (D.6d)
together ensure that the wind power produer's oer is onsistent with suh
praties, based on the partitioning of the senario set Ω imposed by (D.7)
and (D.8). Equation (D.6) is a non-antiipativity onstraint, whih imposes
that a single quantity is oered for every rst-stage senario (realization of
the day-ahead prie). Constraint (D.6d) enfores that the oer urve is non-
dereasing.
The problem is ompliated by the bilinear terms λBωxω in the objetive fun-
tion (D.6a), whih an be linearized by applying the strong duality theorem on
the lower-level (market-learing) problem. At optimality, the objetive value of
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the primal (D.2) and the dual (D.5) problems are equal, i.e.,
NK∑
k=1
ckpkω −
NJ∑
j=1
bjpjω =− λ
B
ω [(wω − xω) + δω]
−
NK∑
k=1
Ckµ
S
kω −
NJ∑
j=1
Cjµ
D
jω .
(D.9)
We an therefore reformulate the term inside the expetation operator in (D.6a)
as follows
λBω (wω − xω) =−
NK∑
k=1
(
Ckµ
S
kω + ckpkω
)
+
NJ∑
j=1
(
−Cjµ
D
jω + bjpjω
)
− λBωδω ,
(D.10)
where the expression on the right-hand side is linear.
The nal optimization problem, inorporating the linearization of the bilinear
terms in (D.10) and of the KKT onditions of the lower-level problem in (D.4), as
well as using a nite number of senarios for desribing the unertainty, so that
the expetation operator in (D.6a) redues to a sum weighted by probabilities,
writes as
Max.
Θ
NΩ∑
ω=1
πω
{
λDAω xω −
NK∑
k=1
(
Ckµ
S
kω + ckpkω
)
+
NJ∑
j=1
(
−Cjµ
D
jω + bjpjω
)
− λBωδω
} (D.11a)
s.t. (D.6b)(D.6d) ,
(D.4a)(D.4j) ∀ω .
The set of deision variables inludes variable xω of the upper-level problem, the
variables of the primal and the dual lower-level problems, as well as the binary
variables needed for the linearization of the omplementarity onditions, i.e.,
Θ =
{
xω, pkω, pjω , λ
B
ω , µ
S
kω , µ
D
jω,
zS1kω, z
D1
jω , z
S2
kω , z
D2
jω , ∀k, j, ω
}
.
(D.12)
Notie that model (D.11) is a Mixed-Integer Linear Problem (MILP), whih an
be solved employing o-the-shelf optimization software.
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D.5 Appliation Studies
This setion desribes a series of studies on the appliation of the presented
model in a realisti setup. At rst, the models employed in the examples for
random variables are desribed in Setion D.5.1. Then, results obtained in a
single example are ommented on in Setion D.5.2. Finally, Setions D.5.3,
D.5.4 and D.5.5 present the results of sensitivity analyses assessing the impat
of the produer's market penetration, of the orrelation between its output and
the residual system deviation, and of the shape of the foreast wind power
probability density funtion, respetively.
D.5.1 Modeling the Unertainty
The unertainties in the system, i.e., day-ahead prie, wind power prodution
and system deviation, are modeled using a disrete set of senarios. It is assumed
that the rst-stage variable (day-ahead prie) is independent of the seond-stage
ones (wind power prodution and residual system deviation). This basially
means that we an build the senario tree by generating rst-stage and seond-
stage senarios independently, and assoiating a opy of the seond-stage se-
narios to eah rst-stage senario. Note that this assumption implies no loss of
generality for the proposed method, sine it ould be overome by employing
a senario generation method aounting for the possible dependeny struture
between rst-stage and seond-stage variables. We underline that this ould be
ahieved without inreasing the size of the optimization problem, and therefore,
it is merely an issue linked to the senario generation method, whih is out of
the sope of this paper. Finally, we point out that this independene assump-
tion might be not valid in pratie in markets with high penetration of wind
power prodution, espeially as far as the relationship between the day-ahead
prie and the foreast wind power distribution is onerned [12℄. In this regard,
however, we would like to underline that this simpliation does not result in
an overestimation of the eonomi improvement obtained with the proposed of-
fering model, but quite the opposite. In fat, negleting the possible orrelation
between these variables would result in onservative performane results in om-
parison to more traditional trading strategies (e.g., oering the foreast mean
or a ertain quantile), whih do not allow dierentiated oers on the basis of
the realization of the day-ahead prie, as the proposed method does.
Day-ahead prie senarios were generated by random sampling from the prob-
abilisti foreast of the spot prie in Nord Pool for the 12th trading period of
the 7th September 2011. The probabilisti foreast is obtained by employing
the semi-parametri approah extensively desribed in [22℄. That method om-
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bines a nonparametri desription of the entral part of preditive distributions
based on quantile regression for quantiles with nominal proportion between 5%
and 95%, and a parametri (exponential) desription of the distribution tails.
The quantile regression models use the predited onditional expetations of
day-ahead prie and load as input. The parameters in the quantile regression
models are adaptively estimated using the method of [23℄, while the parameters
for the exponential tails are estimated one and for all under the maximum
likelihood riterion.
As far as the seond-stage variables are onerned, we employ Beta distributions
to model wind power generation, as advoated in [24℄. In pratial appliations
it would be desirable to make use of a state-of-the-art foreasting tool employ-
ing a non-parametri model for the distribution of wind power prodution [25℄.
However, Beta distributions are suiently realisti to the purpose of this paper.
Furthermore, notie that this assumption implies no loss of generality, as draw-
ing senarios from a non-parametri distribution would result in no additional
omplexity for the proposed optimization method.
For the residual system deviation we onsider a Student's t-distribution, whih
provides a good t for the hourly data for net system deviation in Western Den-
mark (DK-1 area prie in Nord Pool) during the year 2011, whih are available
at [26℄. A histogram of the atual data and an illustration of the parametri
t are provided in Fig. D.2. One again, in a pratial appliation it would
be desirable to employ a state-of-the-art probabilisti model to desribe this
stohasti variable, possibly getting rid of the stationarity assumption impliit
in our approah.
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Figure D.2: Histogram for system deviation in Western Denmark (DK-1 prie
area of Nord Pool) during 2011, and t using a Student's t dis-
tribution
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The parameters employed for these distributions are shown in Table D.1. Fur-
thermore, notie that when sampling senarios for the system deviation from
the Beta distribution, we disarded senarios lower (greater) than the 0.001
(0.999) quantile. This is done beause arbitrarily low (or high) values of sys-
tem deviation ould be sampled, whih is not realisti and ould potentially
destabilize the results of the analysis. Furthermore, it should be notied that
the standard deviation of the Student's t-distribution used for the residual sys-
tem imbalane is 217.57MWh, whih is omparable to the installed wind power
apaity CW = 300MW owned by the produer. On the ontrary, the total
installed apaity in Denmark is approximately 14GW. These two gures are
in line with the assumption that the produer is a prie-taker at the day-ahead
market, where a signiant share of the total installed apaity is supposed to
partiipate, and a prie-maker at the balaning market, whose trading volume
orresponds to the total system imbalane.
Table D.1: Information on stohasti input parameters
Stohasti Distribution
Parameters
# senarios
variable type original redued
λDA non-parametri - 10 000 12
w Beta
α = 3.78
10 000 100β = 1.62
CW = 300
δ Student's t
µ = −0.96
10 000 100σ = 161.14
ν = 4.43
As one an see in Table D.1, 10 000 senarios were generated independently for
eah stohasti variable. In order to impose dierent rank orrelation levels be-
tween wind power prodution and system deviation, we employed the method
in [27℄: rst, we generated two random permutations of 10 000 Normal sores;
then, we imposed the desired orrelation (notie that Pearson and Spearman
orrelation almost oinide for Gaussian variables) by multiplying the permuta-
tions by the Cholesky fator of the desired rank orrelation matrix; nally, we
reordered the random samples for wind power prodution and system deviation
aording to the order of this produt.
After this, we made use of the fast-forward senario redution tehnique [28℄ to
derease the number of rst-stage and seond-stage senarios to 12 and 100, re-
spetively. This proedure is based on a heuristi that iteratively adds senarios
to a redued set, so as to minimize the maximum mutual distane between ele-
ments. Then, probabilities of the redued senarios are determined by assigning
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the probability of eah senario in the original set to the losest element in the
redued set.
The last variables to be set are the ones haraterizing the bids of partiipants
at the balaning market, i.e., the per unit osts (benets) of oered prodution
inrease (derease), ck (bj), and the size of the respetive bloks Ck (Cj). Data
of individual bids at the balaning market are hardly available, owing to the
ondentiality poliies of market and transmission system operators. However,
Nord Pool Spot publishes historial supply urves for the day-ahead Sandina-
vian market [29℄.
We employed the supply urve for the 12th trading period on the 7th September
2011 and the senarios generated for the day-ahead prie in Nord Pool for the
same day and time to build bids for up- and down-regulation. First of all, we
halved the apaity of the day-ahead bids in order to aount for the fat that
not all the generators trading in the day-ahead market are partiipating at the
balaning market. This results in the marginal ost urve illustrated in Fig. D.3.
Assuming that all the produers whose marginal ost is below the day-ahead
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Figure D.3: Marginal ost urve at the balaning market
prie senario are dispathed at the day-ahead market, and the ones whose
ost is above suh prie are not, we onsider that down-regulation (prodution
derease from shedule) is supplied by the former partiipants and up-regulation
by the latter ones. This way, we obtain a set of balaning market bids that is
dependent on the rst-stage senario, i.e., the realization of the day-ahead prie.
In total we employedNK+NJ = 159 oer bloks in the ase study, with variable
total numbers of up- and down-regulation bloks depending on the level of the
day-ahead prie, as a result of the splitting of the urve explained above.
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Notie that, despite we derive the bids from a supply urve, demand ould
provide regulation as well at the balaning market by inreasing or dereasing
the sheduled onsumption.
D.5.2 Results with Optimal Bidding
In the rst ase study, we employ the dataset generated as desribed in the
previous setion and impose a orrelation ρ = 0.3 between the out-turn of the
wind power produer and the residual system deviation using the method in [27℄,
whih is briey skethed in Setion D.5.1.
Dening the produer's penetration in the balaning market, ψ, as the ratio
between the standard deviation of the wind power distribution and its sum with
the standard deviation of the residual system imbalane, we obtain
ψ =
σw
σw + σδ
= 19.88% . (D.13)
Notie that this denition of penetration is only one among several possible
ones. However, as laried later, it is intuitive as an inrease in ψ is obtained
by saling up the wind power produer's apaity, and saling down the total
system deviation.
In this ase, a totally prie-insensitive day-ahead oer is optimal, onsisting of
the following optimal quantity
x = 76.69MWh . (D.14)
First of all, it seems that the possibility of oering a urve does not lead to
improved market results in this ase, as the produer prefers a single quantity
bid. We link this feature to the hoie of a mostly onvex supply urve, see
Fig. D.3. Indeed, for inreasing pries, the penalty given by the prie spread
between the day-ahead and the balaning markets tends to be higher for a
short produer (i.e., produing less than the day-ahead oer). This implies
that the higher the day-ahead prie, the lower the optimal bid for the produer.
However, this is not possible sine onstraint (D.6d) enfores that the bid urve
be not dereasing.
Seond, the optimal quantity bid in (D.14) appears to be a rather low quantile
of the wind power distribution. Indeed, it lays just below the lowest senario for
wind power prodution. However, notie that this bid is far from being trivial.
Indeed, for a prie-taker wind power produer in a market with one-prie settle-
ment of imbalanes, the optimal bid would be either 0 or the nominal apaity,
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depending on whether the expetation of the balaning prie is higher or lower
than the day-ahead prie [3℄. Besides, wind power produers often bid the fore-
ast onditional mean of wind power distribution in pratie, whih is pereived
as a safe strategy. Among the reasons for this is the fat that there is a well
established literature on point foreasting for wind power prodution, and the
fat that point foreasts have been used for years sine wind generation beame
a ontributor to the eletriity generation mix in power systems. Furthermore,
point foreasts suh as the onditional mean are reognized as risk-averse, as it
minimizes the expeted squared deviation from atual prodution [4℄. Remark-
ably, none of these possible oers are optimal.
Table D.2 reports the main nanial results obtained by bidding the optimal
quantity (D.14). The rst and seond olumns represent the improvement in
average market revenues as ompared to the strategies of oering the onditional
mean and median of wind power distribution in the day-ahead market. The
third olumn, instead, ompares with the ase where the atual prodution is
traded exlusively at the balaning market. Notie that the nominal apaity
oer is not inluded in the table, as this oer is far from being optimal with a
hokey-stik supply urve suh as the one depited in Fig. D.3.
The improvement is above 3% as ompared to bidding the mean or the median,
and above 1.5% better than with a null day-ahead bid. The last olumn re-
ports the average energy prie (e 54.26/MWh) obtained by averaging the ratio
between revenues and wind power prodution over the senario set.
Table D.2: Finanial results obtained using the optimal bid
Prot improvement w.r.t. Average prie
mean (%) median (%) zero (%) (e/MWh)
3.08 3.25 1.58 54.26
Finally, it should be notied that, while the oer in (D.14) is aimed at max-
imizing the expeted revenues, no aount is taken of the possible impat on
the produer's imbalane. Indeed, this oer results in an expeted average im-
balane (in absolute value) equal to 122.06MWh. On the other hand, a known
result is that the expeted absolute value of the imbalane is minimized by oer-
ing the foreast median, whih in this ase would yield an expeted imbalane
of 44.82MWh. We refer the reader to [4℄ for further disussion on the topi as
well as for quantitative results obtained in a prie-taker setting.
The optimization desribed above was performed using CPLEX 12 in GAMS.
The model size is reported in Table D.3. The algorithm onverged in 1680 s
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on a laptop equipped with a 4-ore proessor loking at 2.66GHz. Despite
the model size, the problem was solved relatively fast. In this respet, it is
worth mentioning that the algorithm was warm-started by setting the binary
variables to the values resulting from the market-learing proedure when the
wind power produer's oer is set to the mean of the senario set for prodution
at any prie level. Notie that the latter problem is an LP, and therefore solves
rather quikly.
Table D.3: Redued model size in CPLEX
Size
Rows 57 353
Columns 35 748
Non-zeros 150 797
Binaries 17 885
D.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis: Market Penetration
As mentioned in the previous setion, we expet the optimal bid for a small
wind power produer to be either 0 or the nominal apaity when the latter
quantity is small ompared to the residual system deviation. On the ontrary,
in the idealized situation where the produer is the only partiipant inurring
deviations from the day-ahead shedule, we would expet that the optimal bid be
lose to the median of the onditional wind power distribution. This is beause
the resulting balaning market prie would always be less favorable than the
day-ahead market prie. In the ases in between these two extremes, we expet
the bid to have an intermediate behavior.
Dierent levels of penetration ψ, as dened in (D.13), of the wind power pro-
duer in the balaning market an be obtained simply by saling the wind
power prodution (D.15) and the residual system deviation (D.16), so as to
satisfy (D.17). Sine there is one degree of freedom left, we an hoose the
saling fators A and B that leave unhanged the sum between the installed
wind power apaity and the maximum absolute value of system deviation, as
enfored by (D.18).
wiω = Awω , (D.15)
δiω = Bδω , (D.16)
ψi =
σwi
σwi + σδi
=
Aσw
Aσw +Bσδ
, (D.17)
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ACW +max
ω
{∣∣δiω∣∣} = CW +max
ω
{|δω|} . (D.18)
This makes omparisons more onsistent, sine we an expet similar pries with
similar total deviation levels in the balaning market. We onsider penetration
levels spanning from 10% to 25% with an interval of 2.5%.
Fig. D.4 shows the optimal bids obtained for the penetration levels mentioned
above. As one an notie, the optimal oer in the day-ahead market is 0 with
the lowest value of penetration ψ = 10%. Then, the urve tends to inrease
with the value of ψ, as we expeted from our intuitive analysis.
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Figure D.4: Day-ahead oer urves with dierent levels of market penetration
of the produer
The main nanial results are summarized in Table D.4. It is important to notie
that, as ψ inreases, the improvement obtained using the optimal bid versus the
onditional mean and median drops from over 7% to about 2%. On the ontrary,
the improvement ompared to the zero day-ahead oer rises from 0% to around
2.5%. Finally, the average prie obtained dereases by e 3.5/MWh. This result
is also in line with the expetations, sine an inreasing penetration implies that
the total imbalane will tend to be in general of the same sign as the produer's
deviation, thus leading to less favorable pries.
D.5.4 Sensitivity Analysis: Correlation
For the study in this setion, we reorder the seond-stage senarios so as to
impose a rank orrelation level of -0.7, -0.3, 0, 0.3 and 0.7, using the method
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Table D.4: Finanial results with dierent levels of market penetration of the
produer
Produer Prot improvement w.r.t. Average prie
penetration (%) mean (%) median (%) zero (%) (e/MWh)
10 7.34 7.58 0.00 56.90
12.5 5.97 6.20 0.03 56.10
15 4.56 4.79 0.16 55.34
17.5 3.63 3.81 1.26 54.68
20 3.05 3.23 1.58 54.24
22.5 2.53 2.70 2.18 53.76
25 1.96 2.13 2.53 53.40
in [27℄, whih is skethed in Setion D.5.1.
The optimal oering urves are depited in Fig. D.5. As it appears, there is
a dereasing trend in the day-ahead oer, whih drops from roughly 170MWh
(ρ = −0.7) to about 40MWh (ρ = 0.7). Apparently, the produer takes bet-
ter advantage of the negative orrelation with the residual system deviation by
bidding loser to its median. Indeed, suh a bid implies that the produer's
deviation is more frequently of opposite sign ompared to the system imbal-
ane, and will therefore result in more favorable balaning market pries. With
inreasing orrelation, a low bid better hedges the produer from the highest
balaning pries, whih ours when the system is short of power.
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Figure D.5: Day-ahead oer urves with dierent levels of orrelation between
the wind power output of the produer and the residual system
deviation
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Table D.5 reports the main nanial results in this sensitivity study. The higher
the orrelation, the larger the improvement with respet to bidding the median.
Contrarily, the improvement with respet to the zero day-ahead bid drops. Fi-
nally, the average prie diminishes with inreasing orrelation, whih is an intu-
itive result, sine a high orrelation between own and system deviations implies
less favorable pries in the balaning market.
Table D.5: Finanial results with dierent levels of orrelation between the
wind power output of the produer and the residual system devi-
ation
Correlation
Improvement w.r.t. Average prie
mean (%) median (%) zero bid (%) (e/MWh)
-0.7 0.19 0.27 4.72 54.84
-0.3 0.69 0.95 3.57 54.47
0 1.89 2.59 2.33 54.36
0.3 3.08 3.25 1.58 54.26
0.7 7.43 8.05 0.13 52.93
D.5.5 Sensitivity Analysis: Distribution Shape
In this setion, we onsider dierent Beta distributions modeling the foreast
probability density funtion (pdf) of wind power prodution. To this end, we
onsider four dierent values ([1.89, 3.78, 5.67, 7.56]) for the parameter α of the
Beta distribution, and four dierent values ([1.62, 3.24, 4.86, 6.48]) for β. To
assess the eet of a hanging distribution on the performane of the proposed
strategy, we onsider the 16 possible ombinations of these parameter values.
The onsidered parameter spae overs a wide range of ases of wind power
prodution. Qualitatively speaking, the hosen parameters give rise to pdfs
with low mean and positive skewness when α < β, with mean around half the
installed wind power apaity and skewness lose to 0 when α ≈ β, and to
distributions with high mean and negative skewness when α > β. Fig. D.6
illustrates three examples of Beta distributions, one for eah group desribed
above, obtained with parameter values employed in the simulation.
To analyze the performane improvement brought by the proposed optimal
strategy, we test it against two usual benhmarks for day-ahead market oer:
the zero-oer and the onditional mean of wind power distribution.
D.5 Appliation Studies 183
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Fraction of nominal capacity
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 d
en
sit
y
α < β α ≈ β
α > β
Figure D.6: Examples of Beta distributions as parameters hange: α = 1.89
and β = 6.48 result in the low-mean distribution, α = 7.56 and
β = 6.48 in the mid-mean distribution, α = 7.56 and β = 1.62 in
the high-mean distribution
In Fig. D.7, the improvement in expeted prot with respet to the zero oer
is shown as a surfae for the 16 ombinations of the α and β parameters of the
Beta distribution onsidered. As one an notie, the improvement lies between
0 and 3%, whih is onsistent with the magnitude of the improvement observed
in the previous studies. Remarkably, the zero-oer is basially optimal for low
values of α and high values of β, whih result in low-mean Beta distributions.
Furthermore, there is a rather visible inreasing trend of the performane im-
provement toward the right-hand side of the gure, where we nd gradually
higher values of α and lower values of β. Indeed, the ombinations of param-
eters loated on the right orner of the gure result in distributions with the
highest mean and most negative skewness. Intuitively, it is reasonable that the
zero oer beomes less and less eient as the power distribution shifts loser
to the installed apaity.
Fig. D.8 illustrates the improvement with respet to oering the foreast on-
ditional mean of wind power prodution. One again, the magnitude of the
improvement is onsistent with the results obtained so far. Besides, there is a
trend speular to the one observed in Fig D.7. Indeed, the performane improve-
ment dereases as we move from the left to the right-hand side of the gure. This
trend highlights that, with ombinations of α and β yielding distributions with
high mean and negative skewness, the margin for improvement of the optimal
strategy ompared to oering the onditional mean dereases.
Finally, let us point out that the surfaes in Figs. D.7 and D.8 are obtained
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Figure D.7: Prot improvement with respet to oering zero as a funtion of
the parameters α and β of foreast wind power distribution
from a single simulation per set of parameter values. These surfaes orrespond
to one of the potential realizations from a stohasti proess, the stohastiity
oming from how representative these partiular sets of senarios may be. If one
wanted to have a full (though very ostly) piture of the potential variations in
these surfaes, one would have to repeat the simulations several times in a Monte
Carlo fashion, therefore obtaining their empirial probabilisti desription
D.6 Conlusion
This paper onsiders the optimization problem of a wind power produer be-
ing a prie-taker at the day-ahead market, but a prie-maker at the balaning
market. We model this problem as a Mathematial Program with Equilibrium
Constraints (MPEC) and ast it as a Mixed-Integer Linear Program (MILP).
Unertainty in day-ahead prie, wind power prodution, and system deviation
is modeled by employing senarios.
Through a ase study built from Nord Pool, the Sandinavian eletriity market,
and onsidering a one-prie settlement of imbalanes, we show that the optimal
day-ahead bid is dierent from the zero and the nominal apaity oer, as well
as from the foreast onditional mean and median of wind power distribution.
This result is non trivial, sine for a prie-taker produer the optimal bid is
either zero or the nominal apaity. The improvement in expeted revenues
with respet to these strategies amounts to between 1.5% and 3%.
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Figure D.8: Prot improvement with respet to oering the foreast mean
as a funtion of the parameters α and β of foreast wind power
distribution
Furthermore, we assess the impat of the produer's market penetration, or-
relation with the system imbalane and shape of foreast distribution of power
prodution. We nd that the optimal oer in the day-ahead market is inreasing
with market penetration and dereasing with orrelation. Besides, the average
market value of the energy traded by the wind power produer is a dereas-
ing funtion of both parameters. Finally, we show a onsistent performane
improvement up to 5% with respet to oering zero or the mean at the day-
ahead market, under a number of dierent distributions of foreast wind power
prodution.
This work opens up several diretions for future researh. First of all, it would be
interesting to assess the impat of market design on the optimal oering strategy
and on the market results for the wind power produer, by modeling e.g., the
two-prie imbalane settlement. This would shed light on the urrent debate
on the optimal design of balaning markets. Furthermore, the model ould be
extended so as to allow trading in the intraday market. Besides, onsidering the
oering problem of a wind power produer that is a prie-maker at all market
stages would be a relevant extension. Modeling the eletriity network ould be
another important upgrade of the model presented. Another topi of researh
onsists in devising a method to solve this problem by using deomposition
tehniques, apable of exploiting its struture. Finally, modeling ompetition
between wind power produers in the framework of Equilibrium Problems with
Equilibrium Constraints (EPECs) would be partiularly interesting.
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1
Abstrat
We model the retail market with dynami priing as a Stakelberg
game where both retailers (leaders) and exible onsumers (follow-
ers) solve an eonomi ost-minimization problem. The eletriity
retailer optimizes an eonomi objetive over a daily horizon by set-
ting an hourly prie-sequene, whih is then ommuniated to the
end-onsumers. In turn, on the basis of suh prie sequene, on-
sumers optimize a utility funtion that aounts both for energy
prourement osts and for the benet loss resulting from deferring
onsumption. The game is formulated as a Mathematial Problem
with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) and ast as a Mixed Integer
Linear Program (MILP), whih an be solved using o-the-shelf op-
timization software. In an illustrative example, we onsider a retailer
assoiated with both exible demand and wind power prodution.
Suh an example shows the eieny of dynami priing as a way to
ontrol the load for minimizing the imbalanes due to wind power,
assesses the overall eonomi results for the retailer and the on-
sumers as well as the dynami properties of onsumer exibility.
E.1 Introdution
The inreasing politial pressure to redue the environmental impat of ele-
triity generation is ausing a massive deployment of prodution apaity from
unpreditable and intermittent renewable energy soures, suh as wind and so-
lar. Failitating the integration of suh soures in eletriity markets is therefore
seen as of primary importane.
1
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Power markets nowadays are still designed aording to the priniple of demand-
following supply, whih ditates that the energy generation portfolio of the
system should be exible enough to always math the load. Given the non-
dispathable nature of wind and solar power, whih annot guarantee a ertain
prodution level in all meteorologial onditions, a reliable power system opera-
tion needs the bakup from dispathable, onventional soures. Obviously, this
fat limits the share of renewable generation apaity that an be integrated in
a power system.
One of the key fators for easing the large-sale integration of renewables is de-
mand response. Indeed, its eient deployment an bring about a shift in power
markets, by endowing them with a supply-following demand whose exibility an
be exploited to math the variable output of renewable soures. Several initia-
tives have been proposed in order to involve both large and small onsumers in
the provision of demand exibility, inluding most notably load shedding pro-
grammes, time-of-use and real-time taris for onsumers [1℄. Although large
onsumers are already allowed in many European ountries to provide demand
response, e.g. by partiipating at power exhanges or at load shedding pro-
grammes, the development of initiatives to involve small onsumers are still at
an experimental stage.
In order to involve small onsumers in demand response, many advoate the
use of dynami prie signals. Several questions, though, are still unanswered,
inluding quantifying the potential of dynami priing for peak-shaving, load-
shifting and redution of imbalane osts, its impat on the soial welfare and
the redistribution of the welfare surplus to the players involved.
In this work, we model the retail market with dynami priing as a Stakelberg
game [2℄ where both retailers (leaders) and exible onsumers (followers) solve
an eonomi ost-minimization problem. The eletriity retailer optimizes an
eonomi objetive over a daily horizon by setting an hourly prie-sequene,
whih is then ommuniated to the end-onsumers. In turn, on the basis of
suh a prie sequene, onsumers optimize a utility funtion that aounts both
for energy prourement osts and for the benet loss resulting from deferring
onsumption. We onsider that onsumers are exible in their onsumption for
heating, and model heating dynamis using state-spae models similar to [3℄.
This paper is strutured as follows. Setion E.2 illustrates the oneptual frame-
work from a high-level perspetive. The mathematial formulation of suh
framework is then presented in Setion E.3. An illustrative example enlight-
ening the main features of the model is introdued in Setion E.4. Finally,
Setion E.5 onludes the paper.
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E.2 Coneptual framework
This setion illustrates the general onept behind the model presented in this
paper, whih is a Stakelberg (or leader-follower) game. The struture of suh
a game is represented as a blok diagram in Figure E.1. A leader, in this ase
RETAILER
Minimize
f (pi, l1 , l2 , . . . , ln)
CONSUMER 1
Minimize
g1pi(l1)
CONSUMER 2
Minimize
g2pi(l2)
CONSUMER n
Minimize
gnpi(ln)
· · ·
pi l1
pi l2 pi
ln
Figure E.1: Coneptual framework for modeling demand response as a bilevel
program. Solid arrows indiate exhange of information, while
dashed arrows represent inferenes on the onsumer behavior
the retailer, minimizes its objetive funtion f(π, l1, l2, . . . , ln). For the sake of
generality of this setion we will leave the denition of the objetive funtion,
whih is most likely of eonomial nature, to Setion E.3.2. As the notation
tells expliitly, though, suh objetive funtion diretly depends on the prie π,
whih is a deision variable of the leader. Furthermore, the objetive funtion
f depends on the demand li, i = 1, 2, . . . , n from the n onsumers (followers)
assoiated to the leader.
Obviously, the onsumptions li are ultimately deisions of the onsumers. In a
demand response framework with variable prie, onsumers would have to solve
optimization problems where the minimization of the ost of eletriity proure-
ment is weighted against the loss of omfort implied by possible antiipations or
delays in energy onsumption. For example onsidering the eletriity onsump-
tion for heating, the objetive funtion giπ(li) for onsumer i would sum the ost
of eletriity to a penalty for the deviation of the indoor temperature from a
ertain referene [4℄. Suh an optimization problem inludes the onsumption li
as deision variable, and is parameterized in the prie π deided by the retailer.
This problem would then be solved diretly by the onsumer's smart applianes,
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one the prie signal π is broadast by the leader.
The solid lines in Figure E.1 indiate that there is a diret information ex-
hange when the prie shedule is sent from the leader to the follower. The
dashed lines indiate that the followers do not diretly ommuniate their on-
sumption shedule to the leader. Nevertheless, the leader an infer the followers'
onsumption shedule given the prie signal π on the basis of a model of the
onsumers.
As a nal remark in this setion, we point out that the leader of the Stakel-
berg game need not neessarily be a retailer, but any market entity setting the
dynami onsumer prie. In dierent demand response frameworks, the leader
ould be the Transmission System Operator (TSO), a Distribution System Op-
erator (DSO) or an aggregator of onsumers [5℄. Obviously, suh leaders would
have dierent objetive funtions, but the bilevel struture of the problem would
remain pratially unhanged.
E.3 Mathematial formulation
The Stakelberg game skethed in Setion E.2 an be formulated rigorously in
the framework ofMathematial Programs with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC)
[6℄. Suh games have a bilevel struture where one or more (lower-level) opti-
mization problems are nested in another (upper-level) one. This an be formu-
lated as
Min. f(π, l1, l2, . . . , ln) , (E.1a)
s.t. h(π, l1, l2, . . . , ln) ≤ 0 , (E.1b)
l1 ∈ argmin
{
g1π(l1) s.t. m
1
π(l1) ≤ 0
}
, (E.1)
l2 ∈ argmin
{
g2π(l2) s.t. m
2
π(l2) ≤ 0
}
, (E.1d)
.
.
.
ln ∈ argmin {g
n
π(ln) s.t. m
n
π(ln) ≤ 0} . (E.1e)
Notie that this formulation employs the same notation as Figure E.1. The
lower-level problems are represented by (E.1)(E.1e), whih inlude the fea-
sibility onstraints miπ(li) ≤ 0, besides the objetive funtions g
i
π(li). The
upper-level problem onsists in the minimization of the objetive funtion
f(π, l1, . . . , ln) in (E.1a) subjet to the feasibility onstraint (E.1b), and fur-
ther onstrained by the optimality of the lower-level problems.
Despite its larity, formulation (E.1) annot be translated diretly into a om-
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putationally manageable optimization problem, owing to the nested optimiza-
tion of the lower-level problems in (E.1)(E.1e). Fortunately though, suh
optimization problems an be replaed by their Karush-Kuhn-Tuker (KKT)
onditions under reasonably mild assumptions. Indeed, KKT onditions are
neessary and suient for optimality if the lower-level problems are onvex
and their onstraints satisfy some regularity onditions [7℄. If this holds, the
bilevel problem (E.1) an be reformulated as the following single-level program
Min. f(π, l1, l2, . . . , ln) , (E.2a)
s.t. h(π, l1, l2, . . . , ln) ≤ 0 , (E.2b)
KKT onditions of problem for Consumer 1 , (E.2)
KKT onditions of problem for Consumer 2 , (E.2d)
.
.
.
KKT onditions of problem for Consumer n . (E.2e)
In the remainder of this setion, we will formulate problem (E.2) expliitly and
deal with the nonlinearities in the KKT onditions.
E.3.1 Lower-level problem
As previously mentioned, we fous on the exibility of the load due to heating.
Therefore, the onsumer (lower-level) problem is the optimal sheduling of ele-
triity onsumption for heating. Similarly to [3℄, we model the heat dynamis
of buildings using state spae models [8℄. Furthermore, the objetive funtion
is dened as the sum over all the T time periods onsidered in the optimization
horizon of the ost of purhasing eletriity plus a quadrati penalty for devia-
tions of the temperature from a ertain referene xed a priori. This results in
the following problem
Min. gπ(l) =
T∑
t=1
c(x1,t − x¯1,t)
2 + πtlt , (E.3a)
s.t. x1,t = a11x1,t−1 + a12x2,t−1 : λ1,t t = 1, . . . , T , (E.3b)
x2,t = a22x2,t−1 + blt : λ2,t t = 1, . . . , T , (E.3)
lt ≥ 0 : µt t = 1, . . . , T . (E.3d)
The objetive funtion in (E.3a) omprises two terms: a quadrati penalty for
deviations of the indoor temperature (i.e. the rst state x1,t) from the referene
x¯1,t, multiplied by the parameter c, and the ost of purhasing eletriity πtlt.
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The objetive funtion is parameterized in the deision variable πt of the upper-
level problem. Constraints (E.3b) and (E.3) are the state updates of the model
for heat dynamis. The seond state x2,t is determined in (E.3) as a funtion of
its value at the previous step and the eletriity onsumption. In turn, the indoor
temperature x1,t depends in (E.3b) on the previous values of x1 and x2, but not
diretly on the onsumption. Finally (E.3d) enfores the nonnegativity of the
onsumption. In priniple, an upper bound ould be imposed as well, but this
is not neessary in this ase sine the tuning of the parameters disourages too
high onsumption levels. We nally point out that the symbols after the olons
in (E.3b)(E.3d) are the dual variables assoiated with the relative onstraints.
We remark that the optimization model (E.3) is akin to the one in [4℄. An
important dierene, though, is the quadrati penalty for deviations from a
point referene, rather than the penalty for deviations out of a referene band
in [4℄. The latter objetive funtion would indeed result in a degenerate lower-
level problem with multiple solutions. As a onsequene, there would be a
multipliity of Stakelberg solutions [9℄, while the optimization model (E.2)
would only determine (one of) the strong Stakelberg solution(s) [6℄.
Sine the optimization problem (E.3) is a onvex minimization problem with
linear onstraints, the KKT onditions are neessary and suient for optimal-
ity [7℄. Therefore, problem (E.3) is equivalent to the following set of onditions
2c(x1,t − x¯1,t) + λ1,t − a11λ1,t+1 = 0 t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1 , (E.4a)
2c(x1,T − x¯1,T ) + λ1,T = 0 , (E.4b)
λ2,t − a12λ1,t+1 − a22λ2,t+1 = 0 t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1 , (E.4)
λ2,T = 0 , (E.4d)
πt − bλ2,t − µt = 0 t = 1, . . . , T , (E.4e)
x1,t = a11x1,t−1 + a12x2,t−1 t = 1, . . . , T , (E.4f)
x2,t = a22x2,t−1 + blt t = 1, . . . , T , (E.4g)
0 ≤ µt ⊥ lt ≥ 0 t = 1, . . . , T . (E.4h)
Suh onditions inlude the stationarity onditions (E.4a)(E.4e) for the La-
grangian of problem (E.3) taken with respet to x1,t (t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1), x1,T ,
x2,t (t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1), x2,T and lt (t = 1, 2, . . . , T ), respetively. Further-
more, the set (E.4) inludes the onstraints of the primal and of the dual of
problem (E.3), as well as the omplementarity onditions (E.4h) relative to the
inequality onstraints (E.3d). The latter ondition implies that both lt and µt
are nonnegative and at least one of them is zero at any time.
Although (E.4h) is a nonlinear onstraint, it an be equivalently reast as the
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following set of mixed-integer linear onstraints [10℄
lt ≥ 0 t = 1, 2, . . . , T , (E.5a)
lt ≤ itMl t = 1, 2, . . . , T , (E.5b)
µt ≥ 0 t = 1, 2, . . . , T , (E.5)
µt ≤ (1− it)Mµ t = 1, 2, . . . , T , (E.5d)
it ∈ {0, 1} t = 1, 2, . . . , T , (E.5e)
where Ml and Mµ are large enough onstants, whih ensure that onstraints
(E.5b) and (E.5d) are never binding when the right-hand side is dierent from 0.
Notie that with this reformulation, the nonlinearity of (E.4h) has been traded
with the integrality of the onditions (E.5).
The values used for the parameters in problem (E.3) are listed in Table E.1.
Although suh values are arbitrary in this work, they are hosen so that they
Parameter Value Unit
c 0.003 e◦C−2
x¯1,t 22 + 2 cos
(
3
4π +
2πt
24
)
◦
C
a11 0.9 -
a12 0.07 -
a22 0.95 -
b 2 ◦C kW−1h−1
Table E.1: Values of the parameters in the onsumer problem (E.3)
produe realisti results. Our fous here is on the properties on the model,
therefore we refer the reader interested in a realisti estimation of models for
heat dynamis to [3℄. The temperature referene is hosen so that it has a daily
period with its peak during the afternoon. The c onstant is hosen so that
the results are sensible in a realisti range of eletriity pries. In priniple, one
ould imagine that the produers of heating systems would provide a number
of suh realisti onstants to be hosen by the onsumer.
An example of the interation between pries and onsumer behavior an be seen
in Figure E.2. This gure illustrates the evolution of the indoor temperature
x1,t during an entire day when the onsumer reeives a onstant prie shedule.
The results for three dierent prie levels are shown: πt =e 0.1/kWh, πt =e
0.2/kWh and πt =e 0.3/kWh. As one an notie, the heating system never
follows preisely the shedule, but there is always a negative dierene. This
is due to the fat that the ost of eletriity is positive, while the penalty for
deviations is quadrati, the ombination of whih makes it optimal to follow the
referene at a ertain distane from below. Furthermore, if the prie is inreased
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Figure E.2: Referene following for the onsumer problem at dierene prie
levels
the onsumer is less relutant to deviate from the referene and aepts a lower
temperature.
E.3.2 Upper-level problem
While the struture of the lower-level problem is well denedthe minimization
of a ost funtion for the onsumer based on the heat dynamis of buildings
dierent ongurations of the upper-level problem ould be thought of, depend-
ing on whom the leader of the Stakelberg game is.
In this work, we analyze the ase of a retailer equipped with a wind power
prodution faility and a exible load. To keep the analysis of the problem as
simple as possible, we onsider only one onsumer, although in priniple more
onsumers ould be inluded. It is assumed that the retailer partiipates at a
spot market, and that it has to provide the market operator with a shedule for
the hourly load onsumption during the following day with a ertain advane
in time. This is urrently the ase in NordPool, the Sandinavian eletriity
market, where retailers have to purhase every day at noon their expeted on-
sumption for eah hour of the following day.
For the sake of simpliity, we fous on the use of demand response for reduing
the imbalane osts due to the deviations of wind power prodution from its day-
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ahead foreast. We assume that the day-ahead shedule st for power delivery at
hour t of the following day is given by the dierene of the day-ahead prognoses
of wind out-turn ŵt and of onsumption l̂t
st = ŵt − l̂t . (E.6)
We remark that st ould be both positive or negative, indiating a power delivery
to or withdrawal from the grid, respetively. As far as the prognosis for wind
power prodution is onerned, we assume without loss of generality that the
retailer uses point foreasts issued before the time of bidding on the spot market.
This bidding strategy is still rather ommon among wind power produers [11℄.
Besides, the onsumption foreast an be determined by solving the onsumer
problem (E.3) with a onstant prie signal. In this work, we onsider the range
of pries between e 0.1/kWh and e 0.3/kWh. Therefore, a reasonable hoie
when determining the day-ahead load prognosis is a onstant prie signal of
π̂t =e 0.2/kWh, ∀t. This gives the retailer room for adjusting the onsumer
prie later in both diretions.
At the real-time stage, the net power withdrawal or delivery will dier from the
shedule st, owing to the unpreditability of wind power prodution. Sine the
level of unertainty dereases with shorter lead times, we an expet that the
foreasts available one hour ahead are less unertain than the day-ahead ones.
Therefore, the retailer has the possibility of smoothing out the foreast errors
by sending the onsumers a prie signal that enourages them to absorb suh
deviations.
In stohasti programming, it is ustomary to represent unertainty with a dis-
rete number of senarios. We will index the senarios using the subsript ω.
Eah senario is assoiated with its probability pω and with a spei realiza-
tion of wind power prodution wtω, whih is the only stohasti variable we
onsider here. Figure E.3 shows 10 senarios for wind power out-turn with a
36-hour horizon, along with the orresponding day-ahead point foreast. Both
point foreasts and senarios are generated using time series models following
the method proposed in [12℄. As one an see in the plot, the hour-ahead infor-
mation is in the form of a senario fan, i.e. the rst preditions oinide for all
the senarios and represents the urrent (known) wind power prodution. This
implies that there is perfet information on the urrent wind power out-turn. In
pratial situations where deisions are not made exatly in real-time, though
very lose, the senarios would dier also at the rst time period.
For every senario ω and time-period t, the net deviation from the shedule is
given by
dtω = wtω − lt − st , (E.7)
where lt is the atual onsumption from the onsumers assoiated with the
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retailer. In many eletriity markets, deviations from the day-ahead shedule are
penalized and in general unwanted, as they require the system operators to take
ostly orretive measures (e.g. the ativation of power reserves). Resembling
the operation of a virtual power plant, we aim at minimizing the absolute value
of the deviation from the day-ahead shedule (or power imbalane). In order to
inlude the absolute value in a linear optimization model, we split the imbalane
into its positive and negative parts, d+t and d
−
t respetively, whih are dened
as follows
d+t =
{
dt, dt ≥ 0 ,
0, dt < 0 ,
d−t =
{
0, dt ≥ 0 ,
dt, dt < 0 .
(E.8)
Notie that if the objetive funtion is the minimization of the absolute value
of the deviations, it is not neessary to enfore the pieewise denition (E.8).
Indeed, it is easy to verify that, for any optimization problem inluding the
following
Min. d+tω − d
−
tω , (E.9a)
s.t. d+tω ≥ wtω − lt − st , (E.9b)
d−tω ≤ wtω − lt − st , (E.9)
d+tω ≥ 0, d
−
tω ≤ 0 (E.9d)
the optimum is unhanged if (E.9b), (E.9) and (E.9d) are replaed by the
pieewise denitions (E.8).
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The nal formulation of the problem is then readily given by
Min.
Nω∑
ω=1
pω
(
T∑
t=1
d+tω − d
−
tω
)
(E.10a)
s.t. d+tω ≥ wtω − lt − st ∀t, ω (E.10b)
d−tω ≤ wtω − lt − st ∀t, ω (E.10)
d+tω ≥ 0, d
−
tω ≤ 0 ∀t, ω (E.10d)
0.1 ≤ πt ≤ 0.3 ∀t (E.10e)
{(E.4a)(E.4g), (E.5a)(E.5e)} for every onsumer
The objetive funtion (E.10a) is the expetation of the sum over all the T time
periods in the horizon of the absolute value of power imbalane. Compared to
the onstraints of model (E.9), the optimization problem (E.10) inludes (E.10e),
whih enfores that the prie is never higher than e 0.3/kWh nor lower than
e 0.1/kWh. This ensures that the onsumer will not be asked to give up too
muh omfort for balaning the operation of the virtual power plant. Finally,
the KKT onditions guaranteeing optimality of the lower-level problem are also
inluded. We remark that problem (E.10) is a MILP, whih an be solved by
employing o-the-shelf optimization software.
After the optimization problem (E.10) is solved, the retailer sends the optimal
prie signal πt to the onsumers for all the time periods inluded in the horizon.
The proess is then repeated iteratively rolling the optimization horizon forward.
As a result, only the rst prie in the signal is atually harged to the onsumer
at any iteration of this rolling proess.
E.4 Illustrative example
This setion illustrates an example where the model presented in Setion E.3 is
simulated over one day. In total 24 optimizations are run, one for every hour
of the day, employing a rolling horizon. At eah hour the wind power senarios
are updated for the entire horizon, and the initial onditions are set to the
orresponding output values at the previous step of the proedure.
Figure E.4 illustrates the dynamis of relevant variables during the simulation.
The reader should keep in mind that only realized values are used to produe
these plots, i.e. the evolutions are obtained by onatenating the rst value of
eah variable at eah step of the rolling proedure. The indoor temperature
for the onsumer is shown in Figure E.4(a). As one an see, the temperature
dynamis with variable prie is similar to the one with xed prie. In general
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Figure E.4: Dynamis of relevant quantities during hourly simulations span-
ning one day with rolling horizon
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the dierene between the two dynamis is rather small, and appears to onsist
in a small time lag. Figures E.4(b) and E.4(d) deserve to be analyzed jointly.
The former one illustrates the dynamis of the onsumption in the variable prie
and the xed prie ases, while the latter shows the power imbalane at eah
time step. It should be notied that the power imbalane in the xed prie ase
is entirely aused by the deviation of wind power prodution with respet to the
day-ahead foreast. By omparing Figures E.4(b) and E.4(d), we notie that the
dierenes in onsumption are driven by the wind power imbalanes. Indeed,
suh imbalanes are absorbed when possible by deviations in the load indued
by the variable prie. The only period when the wind power imbalanes annot
be absorbed is between 12:00 and 19:00, when the onsumption is already null
(and therefore annot be redued any further) and the wind power deviation is
negative (underprodution). Finally, we remark that the wind power imbalane
(equivalent to the deviation in the xed prie ase in Figure E.4(d)) is mostly
negative during the onsidered day, i.e. the wind plants are underproduing. To
redue suh imbalanes, there is a need to ut the onsumption. This is ahieved
by sending a dynami prie signal higher than the xed prie, see Figure E.4().
Overall results are inluded in Table E.2. As one an see, the use of dynami
Unit Fixed prie Variable prie
Expeted total imbalane kWh 6.79 2.98
Consumer ost e 3.57 4.77
Consumer disomfort (e) 0.11 0.13
Table E.2: Overall results of hourly simulations spanning one day with rolling
horizon
priing allows the retailer to ut over half of the power imbalanes it would
inur using a xed prie. These ost savings, though, are not passed on to the
onsumers. Indeed, owing to the higher pries, they are harged a total ost
larger by roughly one third in the ase of dynami priing. In general, one
would expet that the wind power foreasts are unbiased, i.e. that the error
in the long run has zero mean. As a result, the hours where the onsumers
are harged higher pries should be equally likely than hours where the prie
is lower. Nevertheless, there is a need to further reward onsumer exibility in
order to enourage their partiipation in demand response programs. Finally,
the third row in Table E.2 shows the onsumer disomfort, i.e. the sum of the
quadrati penalties in the objetive funtion (E.3a). As one ould expet, there
is a slight inrease when dynami priing is used, indiating that the onsumer
is giving up a marginal fration of her/his omfort for ensuring the balane of
the system.
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s of a similar simulation are shown in Figure E.5. In this exam-
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Figure E.5: Dynamis of relevant quantities during hourly simulations span-
ning one day. The wind power foreasts are biased and overesti-
mate the atual prodution
ple, a biased day-ahead foreast of wind power prodution is used. Suh bias
is introdued by adding 0.4 kWh to the point foreast, whih onstantly over-
estimates the wind out-turn as a result. This an be seen in the red line in
Figure E.5(d), whih is negative exept for the 22nd hour of the day. Owing to
the onstant negative imbalane of wind power prodution, the dynami prie
rapidly shoots up to the upper limit (e0.3 /kWh). The system is working under
onsiderable stress: for example, the indoor temperature with dynami pri-
ing in Figure E.5(a) is roughly 2◦C lower ompared to the temperature with
xed prie. The quadrati penalty in the objetive funtion makes it diult to
deviate further from the referene temperature. In other words, the storage
apaity of the heating system is fully used. As a onsequene, as one an see
in Figure E.5(d), the system an hardly absorb imbalanes after the 8th hour
in the simulation.
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E.5 Conlusion
In this work, we introdued a bilevel framework for modeling demand response.
We onsider onsumer exibility for heating, and set up a lower-level problem
where onsumers solve an eonomi ost minimization problem, one they are
given a prie shedule as input. Then, suh a problem is inorporated as a
set of Karush-Kuhn-Tuker equilibrium onditions in an upper-level problem.
The framework is general, and dierent upper-level problems an be thought of
onsidering dierent market players.
We desribe an illustrative example where the upper-level problem is the one
of a retailer equipped with a wind power prodution faility, whose objetive
is the minimization of the trading imbalanes owing to the wind unertainties.
This an be thought of as a virtual power plant operational problem.
The results of the example show that dynami priing provides an eetive
signal for smoothing out the retailer's trading imbalanes. The benets for the
onsumers, though, are not always lear. Indeed, overestimation of wind power
prodution at the day-ahead stage results in higher onsumer pries, whih result
in both inreased osts and redued omfort. Furthermore, the heating exibility
has dynami properties that makes it akin to an energy storage. When wind
power foreasts are onstantly biased, the apaity of the onsumers to absorb
deviations is rapidly exhausted.
Further results, where the retailer's partiipation at the day-ahead and real-time
markets are optimized simultaneously are available in [13℄.
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Abstrat
Demand response programmes are seen as one of the ontributing
solutions to the hallenges posed to power systems by the large-
sale integration of renewable power soures, mostly due to their
intermittent and stohasti nature. Among demand response pro-
grammes, real-time priing shemes for small onsumers are believed
to have signiant potential for peak-shaving and load-shifting, thus
relieving the power system while reduing osts and risk for energy
retailers. This paper proposes a game theoretial model aounting
for the Stakelberg relationship between retailers (leaders) and on-
sumers (followers) in a dynami prie environment. Both players in
the game solve an eonomi optimisation problem subjet to stohas-
tiity in pries, weather-related variables and must-serve load. The
model allows the determination of the dynami prie-signal deliver-
ing maximum retailer prot, and the optimal load pattern for on-
sumers under this priing. The bilevel program is reformulated as
a single-level MILP, whih an be solved using ommerial o-the-
shelf optimisation software. In an illustrative example, we simulate
and ompare the dynami priing sheme with xed and time-of-use
priing. We nd that the dynami priing sheme is the most ee-
tive in ahieving load-shifting, thus reduing retailer osts for energy
prourement and regulation in the wholesale market. Additionally,
the redistribution of the saved osts between retailers and onsumers
is investigated, showing that real-time priing is less onvenient than
xed and time-of-use prie for onsumers. This implies that areful
design of the retail market is needed. Finally, we arry out a sen-
sitivity analysis to analyse the eet of dierent levels of onsumer
exibility.
1
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Nomenlature
Sets
T Time periods in the optimisation horizon
Ω2 Spae of seond-stage stohasti variables
Ω3 Spae of third-stage stohasti variables
Indies
t Index of Program Time Unit (PTU) t ∈ {1, 2, . . .NT }
ω2 Senario index for seond-stage stohasti variable ω2 ∈ {1, 2, . . .NΩ2}
ω3 Senario index for third-stage stohasti variable ω3 ∈ {1, 2, . . .NΩ3}
Random variables
T at,ω2 Ambient temperature
πst,ω2 Energy prie at the spot market
π↑t,ω2 Up-regulation prie at the real-time market
π↓t,ω2 Down-regulation prie at the real-time market
lit,ω3 Consumption from inexible (must-serve) load
ψ↑t,ω2 Up-regulation penalty at the real-time market
ψ↓t,ω2 Down-regulation penalty at the real-time market
Deision variables
Est Energy ontrated at the spot market
π˜t,ω2 Dynami real-time prie harged to the end-onsumer
lt,ω2 Energy purhased by the onsumer
∆E↑t,ω2,ω3 Up-regulation energy purhased at the real-time market
∆E↓t,ω2,ω3 Down-regulation energy sold at the real-time market
T rt,ω2 Indoor temperature in the onsumer building model
T ft,ω2 Floor temperature in the onsumer building model
Twt,ω2 Water temperature in the onsumer building model
vt,ω2 Deviation from the omfort band for indoor temperature
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Parameters
π Minimum dynami prie harged to the end-onsumer
π Maximum dynami prie harged to the end-onsumer
πAV G Average daily dynami prie harged to the end-onsumer
ρ Penalty for deviation from the omfort band for indoor temperature
l Minimum exible onsumption for the end-onsumer
l Maximum exible onsumption for the end-onsumer
T rt Lower bound of the omfort band for indoor temperature
T rt Upper bound of the omfort band for indoor temperature
F.1 Introdution
Favoured by ambitious international agreements and national plans, integration
of renewable power soures is expeted to onstantly rise in the years to ome
in most industrialised ountries. Several among the urrently or potentially
deployable renewable soures, namely wind, solar, tidal and wave, are hara-
terised by an intermittent and stohasti nature. This will pose problems to
the operation and management of future power systems, as supply must math
demand at all times. Furthermore seurity of supply will beome an issue as
the apaity margin is lower during peak-demand hours with low intermittent
generation. Finally prie volatility is also destined to inrease, sine it is known
that intermittent renewables have an impat on market pries under the urrent
demand onditions [1, 2℄.
As a way to ope with these issues, many propose a revolution of power systems
from a struture where supply follows demand to one where demand follows sup-
ply. This an be ahieved in pratie by adopting measures failitating demand
response, suh as load shedding programmes, time-of-use or real-time based on-
sumer taris. While large industrial onsumers an partiipate in spot markets
and are already involved in load shedding programmes in many ountries, little
has been done yet to allow the partiipation of small end-onsumers in demand
response programmes, at least within a European ontext [3℄. Nevertheless,
demand response is reeiving inreasing attention from governments and poliy
makers.
In line with this inreasing governmental onsideration, demand response is
being studied intensively by researhers. Several setups have been proposed
involving dierent stakeholders, namely transmission system operators (TSOs),
distributing ompanies (DISCOs) and retailers. In parallel dierent advantages
of demand response have been stressed, in partiular the ability to enhane
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power system seurity, and the possibility of reduing eletriity prourement
osts and, at the same time, market risk.
The TSO's perspetive on the demand-response problem attrated a fair share
of interest sine entralising the management of demand response may have
a number of advantages. On the one hand, spei stohasti unit ommit-
ments approahes were introdued, permitting to aount for demand-side re-
serve bids submitted by an aggregator on the day-ahead market [4℄, or jointly
aounting for wind power generation and demand response based on a linear
inverse demand funtion [5℄. On the other hand, dierent eonomi dispath
models aiming at integrating demand response and wind power were reviewed
and ompared in [6℄ and [7℄, respetively. These are based on a model using
multi-diretional information exhange where the TSO hooses a prie sequene
based on ommuniated prodution shedules and orresponding load response
to that prie sequene.
In parallel in view of their potential leading role in the optimal management
of demand response, the DISCOs point of view was extensively studied with
a blend of load shedding and ontrol-based proposals. Indeed, it may be that
DISCOs operating distributed generation and with the apability of interrupting
load onsider the possibility of optimising their overall operating osts, as in [8℄.
They may alternatively design optimal bidding strategies with the additional
exibility suh that a ertain number of load interruptions is allowed by ontrat
as agreed on with the onsumers [9℄. In a dierent paradigm foused on the
onsumption dynamis, the idea of using prie signals for ontrolling a part of
the load has reently appeared, based e.g.on statistial models for the foreasting
of the onditional load response to varying pries [10℄, or onversely on the
optimisation problem of a load exposed to dynami market pries [11℄. Finally
as a more global approah involving DISCOs, retailers (whih are purhasers of
demand response) as well as aggregations of onsumers (sellers), spei market
designs may be proposed as in [12℄, the onguration of whih should arguably
allow maximising soial welfare.
In ontrast to these proposals mainly foused on TSOs and DISCOs point of
views, we take an original path foused on the joint onsideration of the eonomi
optimisation problems of a set of onsumers and of their eletriity-supplying
retailer. In this setup, the retailer naturally ats as a buer between already
existing eletriity markets and newly-enabled exible end-onsumers. We as-
sume that onsumers respond to a dynami prie signal sent by the retailer by
shifting part of their onsumption to low-prie periods, thus minimising the ost
of eletriity prourement. The fat that the onsumption shedule is deided
after the ommuniation of the prie signal by the retailer implies that there is
a leader-follower struture typial of Stakelberg games, whih were introdued
in the original version of the work later translated in [13℄. For simpliity only
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the load used for heating purposes is onsidered as exible, i.e.it an be shifted
in time, although this assumption is not binding. In pratie onsumer exibil-
ity in time is modelled by using a disrete-time state-spae model; the reader
not familiar with state spae models is referred to [14℄. In turn the retailer
is also subjet to an eonomi problem, in that it ats as an intermediary by
purhasing at wholesale (day-ahead and real-time) markets and selling bak to
the onsumers.
The novelty of this approah is fourfold. First of all, it jointly onsiders the opti-
misation problem of onsumers, onsisting of the maximisation of a utility fun-
tion minus the eletriity prourement osts, integrating it into the retailer prob-
lem, whih is purely eonomi. Using a game theoreti approah, ompletely
novel ompared to the state-of-the-art reviewed above, we are able to apture
the oniting eonomi interests of the retailer and their end-onsumers. Under
the assumption that the introdution of real-time pries makes the onsumers
rational, we quantify the ost/benet improvement for both the stakeholders
involved. Seondly, by inorporating the onsumer optimisation problem in the
model, our analysis is based on a realisti ost funtion rather than resorting to
models that arbitrarily hoose demand elastiities or onsumer benet funtions,
as in [4℄, [5℄ [8℄ and [12℄. Thirdly, by using a state-spae model for onsumer
preferenes within a game-theoreti approah, we rigorously aount for the dy-
namis of demand response, whih are often either heuristially approahed, see
[6℄ and [7℄, or simply disarded by making use of stati elasti demand as in [4℄,
[5℄, [8℄ and [12℄. Last but not least, we onsider a two-market settlement rather
than a single one [6, 7, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12℄. This allows us to quantify the advan-
tages of demand response both with respet to peak-shaving(-shifting) and to
the redution of osts due to imbalanes (deviations) of real-time onsumption
from the day-ahead prognosis.
The paper is strutured as follows. Setion F.2 introdues the mathematial
formulation of the retailer and the onsumer problems separately. Then, the
bilevel problem is linearised and formulated as a single-level optimisation pro-
gram in Setion F.3. Setion F.4 disusses the results of an illustrative example.
Finally, onlusions are drawn in Setion F.5.
F.2 Formulation of retailer and onsumer opti-
misation problems
We onsider the eonomi optimisation problem of an energy retailer, whih ats
as an intermediary between energy wholesalers and end-onsumers. Energy is
purhased at the wholesale market and, in turn, it is sold to the onsumers, who
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fae an eonomi optimisation problem aimed at minimising the ost of their
onsumption.
Needless to say, the retailer business an only be protable if the eletriity
prie harged to the onsumers π˜ is greater than the purhase (spot) prie πs.
This prie surharge is justied by the risk that retailers take when entering into
a ontrat with onsumers. Indeed retailers must purhase energy in advane
on the wholesale market, at a stohasti prie πs, and sell it to the onsumers
at a prie π˜ that is often regulated and/or xed. Furthermore they might
inur penalties when the aggregate onsumption from their ustomers, whih
is stohasti, deviates from the shedule resulting from the wholesale market
learing proess. The most striking example of the risk faed by retailers is
undoubtedly the Californian energy risis in 2000-2001, where several utilities
went bankrupt as a result of soaring wholesale pries and regulated retail rates,
see [15℄.
In this model we speially fous on the interation between the retailer and
a partially exible onsumer, who an deide on the alloation of its heating
onsumption based on an hourly prie shedule ommuniated by the retailer
as well as on weather foreasts (e.g.of the outdoor temperature). The problem
exhibits a bilevel struture, where the retailer determines the prie shedule de-
livering the optimal prots (upper-level problem), while the onsumer, based on
this prie shedule, optimises its exible onsumption (lower-level problem). In
game theory, hierarhial optimisation problems of this type are usually referred
to as Stakelberg games and an be formulated mathematially in the frame-
work of bilevel programs, whih are speial instanes of Mathematial Programs
with Equilibrium Constraints (MPECs). The interested reader is referred to [16℄
for a omplete treatment of the subjet.
In the following, we adopt the general formulation of a bilevel program
Maximize φ(x,y)
s.t. (x,y) ∈ Z (F.1)
y ∈ S(x) = argmin
y
{θ(x,y) : y ∈ C(x)}
where x ∈ Rn is the vetor of deision variables of the upper-level problem,
y ∈ Rm the one of the lower-level problem, φ(x,y) : Rn+m → R and θ(x,y) :
R
n+m → R the objetive funtions of the upper- and the lower-level problems
respetively, Z is the joint feasible region of the upper-level problem and C(x)
the feasible region of the lower-level problem indued by x.
From the disussion above, it is lear that the nanial risk of the retailer stems
from multiple stohasti variables: spot and regulation market pries, weather-
F.2 Formulation of retailer and onsumer optimisation problems 219
related variables that inuene heating onsumption, utuations of the inex-
ible (must-serve) part of the load as well as inauraies in modelling onsumer
behaviour. The spei market design allows the players (retailers and on-
sumers) to make deisions both day-ahead and real-time. Furthermore energy
imbalanes are settled ex-post, i.e.after their realisation and the alulation of
market pries. Deisions made at the later stages benet from updated infor-
mation on the stohasti proesses that inuene the system, either in the form
of more aurate foreasts thanks to a shorter look-ahead time or of realised
values of random variables. Speially, we onsider the following situation for
the three aforementioned stages:
day-ahead The retailer deides on the amount Est of energy purhased at the
spot market for every Program Time Unit (PTU) t in the optimisation
horizon, based on foreast senarios of the spot market prie πst,ω2 , of the
up- and down-regulation pries, π↑t,ω2 and π
↓
t,ω2 respetively, of the ambient
temperature T at,ω2 , of the inexible load l
i
t,ω3 and on its model of onsumer
behaviour.
real-time The retailer deides on the prie shedule π˜t,ω2 to be sent out to
the onsumers for every PTU in the optimisation horizon, given the er-
tain realisation of the spot prie πst and the ontrated purhase at the
spot market Est . At the same time the onsumer optimises its heating on-
sumption shedule lt,ω2 based on the prie signal reeived from the retailer
and on the realisation of the ambient temperature T at,ω2, whih is assumed
to be known at this point. This is a simpliation of the more realisti,
yet intratable, situation where more aurate foreasts are available in
real-time than day-ahead, whih would result in an exponentially growing
senario-tree.
ex-post The realisation of the inexible part of the load lit,ω3 beomes known,
allowing the alulation of the up- and down-regulation imbalanes
∆E↑t,ω2,ω3 and ∆E
↓
t,ω2,ω3 , respetively. These imbalanes are purhased
and sold at the up- and down- regulation prie, π↑t,ω2 and π
↓
t,ω2 respe-
tively, determining the net prot for the retailer.
The proposed model is therefore a stohasti bilevel optimisation model with
seond- and third-stage reourse. The two levels of the model apture the hier-
arhial relationship between the retailer and the onsumer. The three stages
allow us to disriminate between unertain fators being revealed before real-
time operation and those dislosed on an ex-post basis. The remainder of the
setion is dediated to the introdution of the upper-level (retailer) and the
lower-level (onsumer) problems.
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F.2.1 Retailer problem
The objetive funtion of the retailer is the maximisation of the expeted market
prots, with respet to both the seond- and third-stage stohasti variables,
given by
φ(x,y) = EΩ2,Ω3
{
NT∑
t=1
π˜t,ω2(lt,ω2 + l
i
t,ω3)− π
s
t,ω2E
s
t
− π↑t,ω2∆E
↑
t,ω2,ω3 + π
↓
t,ω2∆E
↓
t,ω2,ω3
} (F.2)
where x =
{
π˜t,ω2 , E
s
t ,∆E
↑
t,ω2,ω3 ,∆E
↓
t,ω2,ω3
}
is the retailer's set of deision vari-
ables and y ⊇ {lt,ω2} is the onsumer's one.
The objetive funtion above is the sum of four terms. The rst one represents
the revenues from harging the prie π˜t,ω2 to both the exible and the inexible
load of the onsumer, lt,ω2 and l
i
t,ω3 respetively. The seond term is the ost of
purhasing the energy Est at the spot market prie π
s
t,ω2 . Finally the last two
terms represent the ost (prot) of purhasing (selling) up(down)-regulation
power ∆E↑t,ω2,ω3 (∆E
↓
t,ω2,ω3) at the regulation prie π
↑
t,ω2 (π
↓
t,ω2), where up- and
down-regulation are dened as
∆E↑t,ω2,ω3 =
{
lt,ω2 + l
i
t,ω3 − E
s
t , lt,ω2 + l
i
t,ω3 − E
s
t ≥ 0
0, otherwise
(F.3)
∆E↓t,ω2,ω3 =
{
Est − lt,ω2 − l
i
t,ω3 , lt,ω2 + l
i
t,ω3 − E
s ≤ 0
0, otherwise
(F.4)
The pieewise denitions (F.3) and (F.4) of the up- and down-regulations are
neessary only in a two-prie market, i.e.if π↑ 6= π↓. On the ontrary the problem
formulation for a single-prie real-time market (i.e.a market where π↑ = π↓)
requires only one variable denition for the imbalane, without pieewise splits.
Although we onsider here a two-prie market for regulation, the model an be
easily adapted to the single-prie market ase, whih is simpler to treat owing
to the linearity of the denition of the imbalanes.
Due to the fat that the model provides no possibility for onsumers to swith
to a dierent retailer, i.e.market ompetition is not modelled, the retailer ould
inrease the end-onsumer prie possibly up to innity in order to maximise
its prots. On the other hand the proess of retailer-swithing is rather slow
as ompared to the optimisation horizon onsidered here, whih makes it hard
to onsider ompetition diretly in the model. Still, in order to enfore market
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ompetitiveness of retailer pries, we hoose to introdue onstraints that model
possible future ontrats between retailers and prie-responsive onsumers. We
make the assumption that the two parties will agree on ertain harateristis
of a variable eletriity prie, i.e.minimum, maximum and average value during
the day, just as today they agree on a xed rate. In mathematial terms, this
assumption implies the following onstraints on the onsumer-prie
π˜t,ω2 ≥ π, ∀t ∈ T, ∀ω2 ∈ Ω2 (F.5)
π˜t,ω2 ≤ π, ∀t ∈ T, ∀ω2 ∈ Ω2 (F.6)
1
24
(1+i)24∑
t=1+24i
π˜t,ω2 = π
AV G, i = 0, 1, . . . ,
|T |
24
− 1, ∀ω2 ∈ Ω2 (F.7)
Constraints (F.5) and (F.6) ensure that the prie harged to the demand is
always ontained within the range [π, π]. Constraint (F.7) enfores that by
ontrat the dynami prie signal must have a xed daily average. Notie that
the latter onstraint is neessary in order to ensure a suient number of low-
prie periods. In absene of this onstraint, the retailer would in priniple be
allowed to always harge the maximum prie to the onsumer when not faed by
high regulation pries. Finally, we underline that onstraints (F.5)(F.7) onsent
a straightforward omparison between retailers in a ompetitive market, based
on few meaningful parameters suh as the average hourly prie and its maximum
and minimum values, i.e. the prie level and its volatility.
Following the general formulation of a bilevel program (F.1), we write the retailer
problem as
Maximize
x,yω2
φ(x,yω2 )
s.t. (F.3)(F.7)
yω2 ∈ Sω2(x), ∀ω2 ∈ Ω2 (F.8a)
Equation (F.8a) enfores that the shedule for exible load onsumption is part
of (one of) the solution(s) Sω2(x) of the lower-level optimisation problem for any
realisation of the seond stage variables ω2 ∈ Ω2. In pratie eah onsumption
shedule lt,ω2 solves a dierent optimisation problem parameterised in ω2.
Furthermore, it should be notied that the objetive funtion in (F.2) has two
nonlinearities. The rst one is introdued by the pieewise linear denition of the
imbalanes (F.3) and (F.4); the seond one by the bilinear produts π˜t,ω2 lt,ω2 in
(F.2). The former nonlinearity an be worked around through a reformulation
of the problem, the latter by enforing the strong duality theorem, see [17℄,
on the lower-level (onsumer) problem. The desription of the linearisation is
left to Setion F.3, while the next setion introdues the onsumer (lower-level)
problem.
222 Paper F
F.2.2 Consumer problem
We onsider a exible demand response environment, where the onsumer an
optimise its future onsumption based on a dynami prie shedule ommuni-
ated by the retailer. We assume here that only the load lt,ω2 neessary for
heating is exible, and treat the remaining, inexible part of the load lit,ω3 as a
third-stage stohasti variable. We remark that this limitation to heating load
is not ritial and other soures of onsumer exibility ould be onsidered. In
a similar fashion one ould onsider more general models akin to the one in [11℄.
Just like the retailer, the end-onsumer faes an eonomi problem, too. With a
exible prie, he/she will minimise the ost of the eletriity needed for heating
by shifting as muh onsumption as possible to low-prie periods, without giving
up too muh on the omfort, i.e.on the indoor temperature of the building. We
therefore model the objetive of the onsumer as a utility funtion trading-o
the ost of eletriity prourement and the disomfort for deviating from the
referene temperature band.
Two dierent formulations of the eonomi optimisation problem of the heating
system of a building are introdued in this setion. First, a linear program-
ming (LP) formulation is introdued. Then, its equivalent Karush-Kuhn-Tuker
(KKT) system is presented.
F.2.2.1 LP formulation of the onsumer problem
Based on the work in [18℄ we onsider a three-state, disrete-time state spae
model for the heating dynamis of a building. The three states of the system
are the indoor temperature T rt,ω2 , the oor T
f
t,ω2 temperature and the temper-
ature Twt,ω2 inside a water tank diretly onneted to a heat pump. The only
input is the eletriity onsumption lt,ω2 , while the outdoor temperature T
a
t,ω2
is a stohasti disturbane. We stress that solar irradiation, an additional dis-
turbane in [18℄ is disarded here for the sake of simpliity. Using a matrix
formulation, the state spae model writesT rt,ω2T ft,ω2
Twt,ω2
 = A
T rt−1,ω2T ft−1,ω2
Twt−1,ω2
+Blt−1,ω2 +ET at−1,ω2 (F.9)
where all the matries are onstants. The output of interest is learly the indoor
temperature T rt,ω2 , as this is the only variable inuening the onsumer omfort.
In the following optimisation model, adapted from [18℄, the deviation of the
output from a referene band [T rt T
r
t ] is linearly penalised in the objetive
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funtion, where it is summed to the ost of eletriity onsumption.
Minimize
y
θω2(x,y) =
NT∑
t=1
π˜t,ω2 lt,ω2 + ρvt,ω2 (F.10a)
s.t.
T rt,ω2 = a11T
r
t−1,ω2 + a12T
f
t−1,ω2
+ a13T
w
t−1,ω2
+ b1lt−1,ω2 + e1T
a
t−1,ω2 (µ
r
t,ω2)
(F.10b)
T ft,ω2 = a21T
r
t−1,ω2 + a22T
f
t−1,ω2
+ a23T
w
t−1,ω2
+ b2lt−1,ω2 + e2T
a
t−1,ω2 (µ
f
t,ω2)
(F.10)
Twt,ω2 = a31T
r
t−1,ω2 + a32T
f
t−1,ω2
+ a33T
w
t−1,ω2
+ b3lt−1,ω2 + e3T
a
t−1,ω2 (µ
w
t,ω2)
(F.10d)
lt,ω2 ≥ l (λt,ω2) (F.10e)
lt,ω2 ≤ l (λt,ω2) (F.10f)
T rt,ω2 + vt,ω2 ≥ T
r
t (ǫt,ω2) (F.10g)
T rt,ω2 − vt,ω2 ≤ T
r
t (ǫt,ω2) (F.10h)
vt,ω2 ≥ 0 (F.10i)
The onsumer's set of deision variables is y =
{
lt,ω2 , vt,ω2 , T
r
t,ω2, T
f
t,ω2 , T
w
t,ω2
}
,
while µrt,ω2 , µ
f
t,ω2 , µ
w
t,ω2 , λt,ω2 , λt,ω2 , ǫt,ω2 , ǫt,ω2 are the dual variables assoiated
with onstraints (F.10b)(F.10h). The state spae model (F.9) translates into
onstraints (F.10b), (F.10) and (F.10d). Inequalities (F.10e) and (F.10f) set
the lower and upper limit for eletriity onsumption, respetively. Variable
vt,ω2 represents the absolute value of deviations of the indoor temperature out
of the referene band
[
T rt T
r
t
]
through (F.10g)(F.10i). Positive values of this
variable are penalised in the objetive funtion, where they are summed with
weight ρ to the ost of eletriity over the time horizon NT .
It is stressed that sine the dynami eletriity prie π˜t,ω2 enters the onsumer
problem as a onstant vetor (it is only a variable in the retailer problem),
model (F.10) is a linear program. Inidentally, we remark that in this model
the retailer must provide the onsumer with a prie foreast for a ertain time-
horizon, whih resembles the assumption in [6℄.
Finally, we point out that the objetive funtion (F.10a) with a linear penalisa-
tion of the temperature deviations from a referene band is only one of the pos-
sible utility funtions for the onsumer. However, it has ertain harateristis
that make it appealing, e.g. its simpliity, and the fat that, as we show in what
follows, it leads to a reformulation of the bilevel model as a Mixed-Integer Linear
Program (MILP). More sophistiated onsumer problems ould involve varying
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upper and lower bounds for the indoor temperature in (F.10g) and (F.10h), de-
ned as linear funtions of the onsumer prie π˜t,ω2 , or quadrati penalties for
deviations from a referene, whih losely relates to Linear Quadrati Regulator
(LQR) problems in ontrol theory, see [19℄. Suh extensions of the model are
left for future researh.
F.2.2.2 KKT formulation of the onsumer problem
In this setion we present the formulation of the onsumer problem given by its
Karush-Kuhn-Tuker onditions. The equivalene of the KKT formulation and
the one in Setion F.2.2.1 is guaranteed by the linearity of the latter one, whih
implies that solutions of the optimisation problem are also solution of the KKT
system of equations and vie versa, see [20℄.
We begin by stating the stationarity onditions with respet to the deision
variables y =
{
lt,ω2 , vt,ω2 , T
r
t,ω2, T
f
t,ω2 , T
w
t,ω2
}
{
π˜t,ω2 − b1µ
r
t+1,ω2 − b2µ
f
t+1,ω2
− b3µ
w
t+1,ω2 + λt,ω2 + λt,ω2 = 0, t < NT
π˜t,ω2 + λt,ω2 + λt,ω2 = 0, t = NT
(F.11)
0 ≤ vt,ω2 ⊥ ρ+ ǫt,ω2 − ǫt,ω2 ≥ 0 (F.12){
µrt,ω2 − a11µ
r
t+1,ω2 − a21µ
f
t+1,ω2
− a31µ
w
t+1,ω2 + ǫt,ω2 + ǫt,ω2 = 0, t < NT
µrt,ω2 + ǫt,ω2 + ǫt,ω2 = 0, t = NT
(F.13){
−a12µ
r
t+1,ω2 + µ
f
t,ω2 − a22µ
f
t+1,ω2
− a32µ
w
t+1,ω2 = 0, t < NT
µft,ω2 = 0, t = NT
(F.14){
−a13µ
r
t+1,ω2 − a23µ
f
t+1,ω2
+ µwt,ω2 − a33µ
w
t+1,ω2 = 0, t < NT
µwt,ω2 = 0, t = NT
(F.15)
It should be notied that the stationarity onditions with respet to the vari-
ables appearing in the state-update equations (F.10b)(F.10d) have a dierent
formulation at the nal step NT of the optimisation horizon. This is beause
only one state-update equation inludes them, rather than two in the general
ase, as there is no equation imposing the evolution of the state from NT to
NT+1.
The KKT system is ompleted by the (equality and inequality) onstraints al-
ready inluded in Model (F.10), along with the omplementary slakness ondi-
F.3 Linearisation and bilevel formulation of the problem 225
tions assoiated with the inequality onstraints, i.e.
T rt,ω2 = a11T
r
t−1,ω2 + a12T
f
t−1,ω2
+ a13T
w
t−1,ω2 + b1lt−1,ω2 + e1T
a
t−1,ω2 (F.16)
T ft,ω2 = a21T
r
t−1,ω2 + a22T
f
t−1,ω2
+ a23T
w
t−1,ω2 + b2lt−1,ω2 + e2T
a
t−1,ω2 (F.17)
Twt,ω2 = a31T
r
t−1,ω2 + a32T
f
t−1,ω2
+ a33T
w
t−1,ω2 + b3lt−1,ω2 + e3T
a
t−1,ω2 (F.18)
0 ≥ λt,ω2 ⊥ lt,ω2 − l ≥ 0 (F.19)
0 ≤ λt,ω2 ⊥ lt,ω2 − l ≤ 0 (F.20)
0 ≥ ǫt,ω2 ⊥ T
r
t,ω2 + vt,ω2 − T
r
t ≥ 0 (F.21)
0 ≤ ǫt,ω2 ⊥ T
r
t,ω2 − vt,ω2 − T
r
t ≤ 0 (F.22)
We underline that the system of KKT onditions is linear, with the exeption of
the omplementarity onditions (F.12) and (F.19)(F.22). In order to linearise
these onditions we make use of the Fortuny-Amat linearisation [21℄; for example
(F.12) an be substituted by the following onstraints
ρ+ ǫt,ω2 − ǫt,ω2 ≥ 0 (F.23)
vt,ω2 ≥ 0 (F.24)
ρ+ ǫt,ω2 − ǫt,ω2 ≤ zt,ω2M
1
(F.25)
vt,ω2 ≤ (1 − zt,ω2)M
1
(F.26)
zt,ω2 ∈ {0, 1} (F.27)
where M1 is a suiently large onstant. The omplementary slakness ondi-
tions (F.19)(F.22) an be linearised using the same strategy. Therefore we end
up with a (integer linear) system of KKT onditions equivalent to model (F.10).
As a trade-o for introduing additional omplexity (i.e.integer variables), we
an simply onatenate the KKT system as additional onstraints of the upper-
level problem. This puts the bilevel problem in a tratable formulation. One is
nally left with the neessary linearisation of the objetive funtion (F.2) of the
retailer.
F.3 Linearisation and bilevel formulation of the
problem
As pointed out in Setion F.2.1 there are two nonlinearities in the objetive
funtion (F.2) of the upper-level problem. The rst one stems from the pieewise
denition of negative and positive energy imbalanes in (F.3) and (F.4), and an
be linearised through a reformulation of the problem. The seond nonlinearity
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an be overome by exploiting the strong duality theorem on the lower-level
problem. The remainder of this setion deals with the linearisation of these
terms, and with the presentation of the nal formulation of the bilevel problem
as a single-level optimisation program.
F.3.1 Reformulation of the energy imbalane
In order to reformulate the problem, let us rst dene the market penalties for
up- and down-regulation
ψ↑t,ω2 = π
↑
t,ω2 − π
s
t,ω2 ≥ 0 (F.28)
ψ↓t,ω2 = π
s
t,ω2 − π
↓
t,ω2 ≥ 0 (F.29)
These values represent the additional ost (or missed revenue) per MWh in-
urred by the retailer in omparison to the ase where it has perfet informa-
tion on its stohasti onsumption. In the latter ase, the retailer is harged
the spot prie for all its onsumption. In the former, more realisti, ase
the retailer will need to adjust its bid on the real-time market, where it is
harged π↑t,ω2 = π
s
t,ω2 + ψ
↑
t,ω2 for any additional onsumed MWh, and paid
π↓t,ω2 = π
s
t,ω2 − ψ
↓
t,ω2 for any MWh onsumed less than the shedule leared
at the spot market. Clearly ψ↑t,ω2 and ψ
↓
t,ω2 an be interpreted as the per-unit
penalty for imperfet information on future onsumption.
Using the market penalties dened above, the objetive funtion (F.2) an be
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reformulated as follows
φ(x,y) = EΩ2,Ω3
{
NT∑
t=1
π˜t,ω2(lt,ω2 + l
i
t,ω3)− π
s
t,ω2E
s
t
− (πst,ω2 + ψ
↑
t,ω2)∆E
↑
t,ω2,ω3 + (π
s
t,ω2 − ψ
↓
t,ω2)∆E
↓
t,ω2,ω3
}
=
= EΩ2,Ω3
{
NT∑
t=1
π˜t,ω2(lt,ω2 + l
i
t,ω3)− π
s
t,ω2
(
Est +∆E
↑
t,ω2,ω3 −∆E
↓
t,ω2,ω3
)
− ψ↑t,ω2∆E
↑
t,ω2,ω3 − ψ
↓
t,ω2∆E
↓
t,ω2,ω3
}
= EΩ2,Ω3
{
NT∑
t=1
π˜t,ω2(lt,ω2 + l
i
t,ω3)− π
s
t,ω2(lt,ω2 + l
i
t,ω3)
− ψ↑t,ω2∆E
↑
t,ω2,ω3 − ψ
↓
t,ω2∆E
↓
t,ω2,ω3
}
(F.30)
where the last line is obtained by notiing that lt,ω2 + l
i
t,ω3 = E
s
t +∆E
↑
t,ω2,ω3 −
∆E↓t,ω2,ω3 holds at any time, whih is a result of the denitions in (F.3) and
(F.4).
We an now formulate the retailer optimisation problem exploiting the objetive
funtion reformulation (F.30)
Maximize
x
φ(x,y) in (F.30)
s.t. ∆E↑t,ω2,ω3 ≥ lt,ω2 + l
i
t,ω3 − E
s
t (F.31a)
∆E↓t,ω2,ω3 ≥ E
s
t − lt,ω2 − l
i
t,ω3 (F.31b)
∆E↑t,ω2,ω3 ,∆E
↓
t,ω2,ω3 ≥ 0 (F.31)
(F.5)(F.7), (F.8a)
First, it should be emphasised that the maximisation of (F.2) with the im-
balane denitions in (F.3)(F.4) is equivalent to the maximisation of (F.30)
subjet to onstraints (F.31a)(F.31). The latter is a relaxed, yet linear, for-
mulation of the former optimisation problem with a larger feasible spae, where
the variables ∆E↑t,ω2,ω3 and ∆E
↓
t,ω2,ω3 are allowed to assume greater values than
the atual up- and down-regulations. The equivalene of the two optimisation
problems is readily proved by notiing that, as long as ψ↑t,ω2 , ψ
↓
t,ω2 > 0, all
the additional feasible points of (F.31a)(F.31) have a stritly worse objetive
than at least one feasible point of (F.3)(F.4), i.e.the one with the minimal
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absolute imbalane allowed. In other words, there is no interest for the retailer
in artiially pushing up the values of ∆E↑t,ω2,ω3 and ∆E
↓
t,ω2,ω3 , as this would
ontribute negatively to the objetive funtion without any advantages. With
similar arguments, it an be shown that ∆E↑t,ω2,ω3 and ∆E
↓
t,ω2,ω3 ould assume
greater values than the atual up- and down-regulation, but without inuening
the other variables, in the ase where at least one between ψ↑t,ω2 and ψ
↓
t,ω2 is
zero. The atual imbalanes an still be alulated by applying (F.3) and (F.4)
to the optimal solution of (F.31).
It is also remarked that the reformulation presented in this setion is only needed
in a two-prie real-time market. Under the single-prie market struture, there
is no need for a pieewise denition of the imbalanes (F.3) and (F.4).
F.3.2 Linearisation of bilinear terms
The only nonlinearity still present in objetive funtion (F.30) onsists in the
bilinear terms π˜t,ω2 lt,ω2 . Optimisation problems inluding bilinear terms are
often solved by approximation tehniques. For example, [22℄ makes use of binary
expansion on one of the variables involved in the bilinear term, while a pieewise
linear approximation is employed in [23℄. Using the same approah as in [24℄,
we show that this problem allows for an exat linearisation of these terms. By
employing the strong duality theorem, see [17℄, on the lower-level model (F.10)
we enfore that primal and dual objetives are equal at optimality. This implies
that
NT∑
t=1
π˜t,ω2 lt,ω2 + ρvt,ω2 = −µ
r
1,ω2
(
a11T
r
0,ω2 + a12T
f
0,ω2
+ a13T
w
0,ω2 + b1l0,ω2
)
− µf1,ω2
(
a21T
r
0,ω2 + a22T
f
0,ω2
+ a23T
w
0,ω2 + b2l0,ω2
)
− µw1,ω2
(
a31T
r
0,ω2 + a32T
f
0,ω2
+ a33T
w
0,ω2 + b3l0,ω2
)
−
NT∑
t=1
{
µrt,ω2e1T
a
t−1,ω2 + µ
w
t,ω2e3T
a
t−1,ω2 + µ
f
t,ω2e2T
a
t−1,ω2
+ λt,ω2 l + λt,ω2 l + ǫt,ω2T
r
t + ǫt,ω2T
r
t
}
(F.32)
From the equality between primal and dual objetive of the lower-level problem,
it follows that the sum of terms π˜t,ω2 lt,ω2 is equal to the sum of produts be-
tween dual variables and parameters of the primal onstraints of the lower-level
problem, minus ρvt,ω2 , whih are all linear in the bilevel formulation.
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By solving (F.32) on
∑NT
t=1 π˜t,ω2 lt,ω2 and taking the expetation with respet to
Ω2 and Ω3 on both sides of the equation, we are able to replae all the bilinear
terms in (F.30), thus obtaining the linear reformulation of the objetive funtion
that follows
φ(x,y) = EΩ2,Ω3
{
− µr1,ω2
(
a11T
r
0,ω2 + a12T
f
0,ω2
+ a13T
w
0,ω2 + b1l0,ω2
)
− µf1,ω2
(
a21T
r
0,ω2 + a22T
f
0,ω2
+ a23T
w
0,ω2 + b2l0,ω2
)
− µw1,ω2
(
a31T
r
0,ω2 + a32T
f
0,ω2
+ a33T
w
0,ω2 + b3l0,ω2
)
−
NT∑
t=1
{
µrt,ω2e1T
a
t−1,ω2 + µ
w
t,ω2e3T
a
t−1,ω2 + µ
f
t,ω2e2T
a
t−1,ω2
+ λt,ω2 l + λt,ω2 l + ǫt,ω2T
r
t + ǫt,ω2T
r
t − ρvt,ω2
+ π˜t,ω2 l
i
t,ω3 − π
s
t,ω2(lt,ω2 + l
i
t,ω3)− ψ
↑
t,ω2∆E
↑
t,ω2,ω3 − ψ
↓
t,ω2∆E
↓
t,ω2,ω3
}}
(F.33)
F.3.3 Final problem formulation
As a result of the reformulations above, the bilevel program an be expressed
as the following equivalent single-level MILP
Maximize
x,y
φ(x,y) in (F.33)
s.t. (F.31a)(F.31), (F.5)(F.7)
(F.11), (F.23)(F.26), (F.13)(F.15)
(F.16)(F.18)
lt,ω2 − l ≥ 0
λt,ω2 ≤ 0
lt,ω2 − l ≤ z
2
t,ω2M
2
λt,ω2 ≥ −(1− z
2
t,ω2)M
2
 linearisation of (F.19)
(F.34a)
lt,ω2 − l ≤ 0
λt,ω2 ≥ 0
lt,ω2 − l ≥ −z
3
t,ω2M
3
λt,ω2 ≤ (1− z
3
t,ω2)M
3
 linearisation of (F.20)
(F.34b)
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T rt,ω2 + vt,ω2 − T
r
t ≥ 0
ǫt,ω2 ≤ 0
T rt,ω2 + vt,ω2 − T
r
t ≤ z
4
t,ω2M
4
ǫt,ω2 ≥ −(1− z
4
t,ω2)M
4
 linearisation of (F.21)
(F.34)
T rt,ω2 − vt,ω2 − T
r
t ≤ 0
ǫt,ω2 ≥ 0
T rt,ω2 − vt,ω2 − T
r
t ≥ z
5
t,ω2M
5
ǫt,ω2 ≤ (1 − z
5
t,ω2)M
5
 linearisation of (F.22)
(F.34d)
z1t,ω2 , z
2
t,ω2 , z
3
t,ω2, z
4
t,ω2 , z
5
t,ω2 ∈ {0, 1} (F.34e)
The bilevel problem an be solved as a single-level one having the same obje-
tive funtion as the upper-level problem (F.33), and onstraints given by the
onatenation of
• the onstraints of the upper-level problem (F.31a)(F.31), (F.5)(F.7)
• the stationarity onditions in the KKT system of the lower-level problem
(F.11), (F.13)(F.15) and the linearisation of the stationarity ondition
(F.12) i.e.the system (F.23)(F.26)
• the equality onstraints of the lower-level problem (F.16)(F.18)
• the linearisation of the omplementarity onditions (F.19)(F.22), i.e.the
systems (F.34a)(F.34d)
• the integrality onditions (F.34e) for the binary variables introdued by
the Fortuny-Amat linearisations of the omplementarity onstraints.
The resulting problem an be solved as a single-level MILP due to the linearity
of both the objetive funtion and the onstraints, while integer variables are in-
trodued by the Fortuny-Amat linearisation of the omplementarity onditions.
Problems of this type an be solved using ommerial o-the-shelf optimisation
software. In this work the problem is formulated in the GAMS environment and
solved by employing the CPLEX solver.
F.4 Numerial results and disussion 231
F.4 Numerial results and disussion
We desribe here the numerial results obtained by running model (F.34) on a
small test-ase based on real-world data.
The example simulates a single bidding round at the spot market for the re-
tailer, whih optimises its bid and real-time market operation using a 48-hour
horizon. Unertainties on the future realisation of spot and real-time market
pries, outdoor temperature and inexible load are modelled through senarios.
For the sake of simpliity, we limit the number of onsumers to three. Indeed,
this number is suient to draw quantitative onlusions on the behaviour of
the model, at the same time allowing the visualisation of relevant variables for
eah onsumer. Inidentally, we stress that although there is no theoretial limit
on the number of onsumers that an be onsidered in the model  adding one
onsumer translates into adding one set of lower-level KKT onditions to the
onstraints of the upper-level program  there is a ertain omputational burden
implied by the inreasing number of integer variables.
Aggregation of onsumers into lasses haraterised by similar building dynam-
is, behaviour and therefore onsumption is paramount for obtaining a tratable,
yet realisti, model for the retailer problem. In general, lustering of onsumers
is widely applied in deision making problems. For instane, lustering teh-
niques for modelling eletriity onsumption have been proposed in [25℄, where
their importane for eletriity providers is also underlined. Clustering the
driving behaviour of eletri ar owners is proposed in [26℄ for optimising their
harging and disharging. Similarly, the three onsumers inluded in this ex-
ample an be regarded as three lasses eah grouping a number of onsumers
with similar behaviour, i.e.building dynamis, heating preferenes, et. Indeed
we will treat the three onsumers as groups by assigning them dierent proba-
bilities, i.e.by varying the distribution (or proportion) of onsumers belonging
to a ertain lass.
In the following setion, we present the parameters hosen to model onsumer
heating dynamis. Then, we desribe how senarios have been generated in
order to model unertainties. Finally, the results of the example are disussed.
F.4.1 Parameters in the model of building dynamis
The onsumer optimisation problem desribed in Setion F.2.2 inludes among
its onstraints a state spae model of onsumer building dynamis.
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Parameter Value Unit
a11 0.4103 -
a12 0.5586 -
a13 0.0028 -
a21 0.1092 -
a22 0.8801 -
a23 0.0078 -
a31 0.0022 -
a32 0.0310 -
a33 0.9668 -
b1 0.0044
◦
C/kWh
b2 0.0173
◦
C/kWh
b3 4.2332
◦
C/kWh
e1 0.0284 -
e2 0.0029 -
e3 0 -
l 0 kWh
l 0.33 kWh
ρ 30 e/◦C
Table F.1: Parameter values onsidered for the LP model representing the
onsumer's heating dynamis
Table F.1 summarises the values used for the parameters as well as their units.
The hosen parameter values are the ones used in [18℄, exeption made for a
lower hourly onsumption limit l for eletriity and lowered b1, b2 and b3 values,
due to the hoie of a smaller gain for the heat pump, whih is dereased by a
fator of 3. These hanges aim at better spreading the eletriity onsumption
over the day, rather than having few daily onsumption spikes as in [18℄. We
do not disuss here the physial meaning of the parameters, and just refer the
interested reader to [18℄ and [27℄ for disussion on the physial interpretation of
the parameters and on how they an be estimated.
Besides, we onsider time-varying omfort bands [T rt T
r
t ], so that there is a
higher referene for indoor temperature during the day and a lower one during
the night. In order to model dierent onsumer preferenes, we assume that
the three onsumer groups have dierent omfort bands. As one an see in
Figure F.1, the rst onsumer is the most exible, as it aepts temperatures in
a range of 5
◦C, while the range is narrowed down to 2◦C for the third onsumer.
It is worth mentioning that these temperature ranges need not be onstant as in
this example, but ould e.g. be wider during working hours and narrower when
onsumers are expeted to be at home.
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Figure F.1: Comfort bands [T rt T
r
t ] for the three onsumer groups. The on-
sumer exibility dereases from top to bottom
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F.4.2 Senario generation
This setion desribes the methodology employed for generating senarios for
the market quantities (spot and regulation pries), inexible load and tem-
perature required as inputs to the model. All the employed methodologies are
rather simplisti answers to ompliated problems, i.e.modelling of weather- and
market-related stohasti proesses, whih are out of the sope of this paper.
The interested reader is referred to [28℄ and [29℄ and to [30℄ and [31℄, respetively
for an introdution to modelling of stohasti proesses related to weather and
eletriity markets.
As far as the spot market prie πst,ω2 is onerned, we use the observed spot
market pries in the DK-2 (Eastern Denmark) market area of NordPool, the
Sandinavian power exhange, as mean value for the senarios. We hoose
arbitrarily to onsider pries pertaining to the 15-16th Marh 2011, whih are
available at [32℄ along with other market data for NordPool. In order to generate
senarios, we simulate a multivariate Gaussian proess with an exponentially
dereasing ovariane struture, i.e.the (i, j)-th element of the ovariane matrix
is given by
C(i, j) = σ2e−|i−j|/τ (F.35)
The parameter σ is the standard deviation of the proess. We onsider a on-
stant standard deviation σ = e 6.67, whih is the approximate RMSE value
for the spot market prie foreasting model in the work in [33℄
3
. Furthermore
we point out that the time-lags onsidered for these senarios are at least 13
hours, whih is the look-ahead time of the senarios for the rst hour of the rst
day onsidered. The parameter τ sets the exponential deay of orrelation with
respet to the time lag. We hoose the value τ = 7 hours in the example. The
hoie of model (F.35) is justied by the fat that, despite being relatively sim-
ple, it allows us to onsider the dynamis of market pries and to easily enfore
a realisti value for the standard deviation of the foreast error.
Finally, senarios are generated by adding the oloured Gaussian noise to the
observed spot market prie. Figure F.2 shows both the observed spot market
prie and the obtained senarios.
Senarios for the real-time market pries π↑t,ω2 and π
↓
t,ω2 are generated from the
spot prie senarios using a model based on the average values of the ratios
α↑t =
π↑t
πst
α↓t =
π↓t
πst
(F.36)
3
This work onsiders the DK-1 (i.e.Western Denmark) prie area of NordPool. Generally
the prie dierene between DK-1 and DK-2 is negligible
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Figure F.2: Observed spot market prie in the DK-2 prie area of NordPool
and generated senarios for the period 15-16th Marh 2011
These averages are alulated for the three winter months in the DK-2 prie
area of NordPool using data from [32℄, resulting in the values α˜↑ = 1.19 and
α˜↓ = 0.95. Senarios an then be generated from the model as funtions of the
spot prie senarios
π↑t,ω2 = α˜
↑πst,ω2 π
↓
t,ω2 = α˜
↓πst,ω2 (F.37)
As a onsequene of the use of this model, there is a single regulation prie
senario assoiated to eah spot prie realisation. This is learly a simplied
model for the regulation pries. We point out, though, that there is no obstale
in using third-stage senarios in the proposed model, besides that of modelling
the stohasti regulation pries. Furthermore, this simpliation does not in-
trodue signiant distortions in the results of the model, sine both regulation
penalties ψ↑t,ω2 and ψ
↓
t,ω2 are dierent from 0 at any time and for all senarios.
In other words, the senarios π↑t,ω2 and π
↓
t,ω2 represent the expeted real-time
market pries onditioned on the realisation of the spot market prie πst,ω2 . Fur-
thermore, it should be notied that model (F.36) is not a very good preditor
of the balaning market pries, espeially as far as the up-regulation prie is
onerned (the standard deviations of the ratios in (F.36) are 0.76 and 0.12,
respetively). While developing a state-of-the-art foreasting tool for the regu-
lation pries is out of the sope of this paper, one should keep in mind that more
sophistiated foreasting models should be used in realisti appliations. The
reader should notie that the hoie of model (F.36) implies no loss of general-
ity, as the senarios for the regulation pries are exogenous to the optimisation
model.
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Senarios for T a are formed by gathering temperature observations available at
the [34℄
4
. Measurements are piked from a single loation during dierent days
of Marh 2011 with similar temperature patterns. The obtained senarios are
shown in Figure F.3. In total NΩ2 = 14 seond stage senarios are onsidered in
this example, for reasons of data availability. In a more realisti setup one would
want to make use of more advaned modelling of weather-related variables. We
refer the reader interested in the subjet to [28℄ for a presentation of senario-
generation tehniques applied to weather-related variables.
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Figure F.3: Senarios for temperature T at,ω2 obtained from measurements dur-
ing Marh 2011 available at ??
Finally the third-stage senarios for the inexible load lit,ω3 are generated with
a model similar to the one used for the spot prie πst,ω2 . The observed load in
DK-2, available at [32℄, is saled and used as mean value of the proess. The
saling is done so that the inexible load is approximately about 85% of the
total load, whih is the share of the residual household load after subtrating
the onsumption due to heating in Denmark [35℄. We emphasise, though, that
the share of total onsumption represented by heating varies from ountry to
ountry. Coloured Gaussian noise with a ovariane struture of the same form
of (F.35) is then added to the load pattern. The standard deviation is here
set to σ = 0.0075kWh. As Figure F.4 highlights, the variane of the inexible
load is relatively smaller than the variane of the spot prie, reeting the easier
preditability of the load ompared to market quantities. Ideally the standard
4
The geographial displaement between the loations of the temperature and market
datasets is justied by reasons of data aessibility. This displaement is equivalent to on-
sidering that temperature and market prie senarios are independent from eah other. We
assume that the results obtained in this paper would hold, at least qualitatively, using onsis-
tent datasets.
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deviation of the inexible load would be a funtion of the size of the onsidered
ustomer group, dereasing in relative terms with respet to the size owing to
smoothing of the errors. In total a number of third-stage senarios NΩ3 = 10 is
seleted. Note that the number of senarios should be large enough to guarantee
a faithful representation of the unertainties involved in the problem. One more
we stress that developing rened models for the unertainty is outside the sope
of this paper.
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Figure F.4: Senarios for the inexible part of the load lit,ω3 for the period
15-16th Marh 2011
F.4.3 Numerial results
The results of the illustrative example are disussed in this setion. First, we
assess the dierenes in onsumer behaviour and market performane of the
retailer between the ases of xed-prie, Time-Of-Use (TOU) prie and dynami-
prie ontrats between retailer and onsumers. Then, dierent distributions of
onsumer groups are onsidered in order to disuss how dynami pries imposed
by the retailer impat the market players, and how this impat is inuened by
onsumer behaviour.
F.4.3.1 Advantages of dynami priing
In order to ompare the xed-, TOU- and the dynami-prie ase, the model is
run three times on the same dataset. In the rst run the prie harged by the
238 Paper F
Day time 17 810 1114 1516 1720 2123 24
Type valley at peak at peak at valley
Prie 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1
Table F.2: Details of the Time-Of-Use (TOU) priing sheme employed. Pries
are in e/kWh
retailer is set to be onstant over time to the value e 0.2/kWh, whih amounts
to replaing (F.5)(F.7) with the equation π˜t,ω2 = e 0.2/kWh.
In the seond run, the Time-Of-Use (TOU) priing sheme illustrated in Ta-
ble F.2 is employed. In this sheme, onsumption is harged e 0.3/kWh during
peak hours, e 0.2/kWh during at hours, and e 0.1/kWh during valley hours.
Notie that, sine there are 8 hours for eah group, the average TOU prie is
equal to the prie in the xed-prie sheme, i.e.e 0.2/kWh.
In the third run, the original model (F.34) is simulated. We remind the
reader that the prie in model (F.34) is dynami, but must have a daily mean
πAV G = e 0.2/kWh, whih is equal to the xed prie and to the average
of the TOU prie. Furthermore the prie must always fall within the range
[0.1, 0.3]e/kWh. In all the ases onsidered the distribution of the onsumer
groups is set to [0.3, 0.4, 0.3], whih means that 30% of the onsumers have
highly exible behaviour, 40% are balaned and 30% have low exibility.
The dynamis of π˜t,ω2 and of the exible load lt,ω2 are shown in Figures F.5,
F.6 and F.7 for eah onsumer type, in the xed-, TOU- and dynami-prie
ase, respetively. Mean, median and range (i.e.maximum and minimum value)
aross senarios are shown for these variables, whih, exept for π˜t,ω2 in the
xed- and TOU-prie ase, are senario-dependent.
In the xed-prie ase, there is no eonomi inentive for the onsumer to modify
his/her onsumption shedule aording to the prie signal sent by the retailer.
In pratie the optimisation onsists of a trade-o between onsumption (and
therefore ost) minimisation and aversion to deviations from the omfort band.
In this example, the onsumer hooses to alloate all of its onsumption during
the rst hours of the simulation horizon, as shown in Figure F.5.
The situation hanges in the TOU-prie ase, where the onsumers prefer to
alloate their exible onsumption during valley hours, whih are haraterised
by low pries. Clearly, onsumption takes plae during peak hours only when
neessary, i.e.during few hours for onsumer type 2 and for the least exible
onsumer type 3.
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Figure F.5: Flexible onsumption (l) patterns for the onsumer types with
xed prie π˜
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Figure F.6: Flexible onsumption (l) patterns for the onsumer types with
Time-Of-Use (TOU) based prie π˜
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In the dynami prie ase, the onsumer adapts to the prie signal submitted
by the retailer. Remarkably, the prie plotted in Figure F.7 is on average lower
during night time, i.e.hours 08 and 2132. The onsumer response follows the
prie signal: indeed, exible onsumption takes plae more likely in time periods
where the prie tends to be low. This appears to hold rather generally aross
all the onsumer groups onsidered.
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Figure F.7: Flexible onsumption (l) patterns for the onsumer types with
dynami prie π˜
Analysing the results further, one noties senarios where the prie hosen by the
retailer implies multiple solutions for the onsumer. In this ase, the onsumer
is indierent with respet to hoosing any of these solutions, and might therefore
pik randomly or deide aording to a seondary riterion (e.g.hoosing, among
the solutions delivering the minimum ost, the one minimising the onsumption).
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The results presented here refer to the ase where the onsumer selets, among
the optimal solutions, the one that yields the best prot for the retailer. In
mathematial terms, this is the optimisti or strong Stakelberg solution [36℄.
Notie that by denition every solution to the MPEC in the general form (F.1)
is a strong Stakelberg solution. In pratie this means that the results of the
bilevel model ould be too optimisti, unless there is a reason why the onsumer
would hoose the strong Stakelberg solution instead of any other element in
his/her optimal set y ∈ S(x). For example, the retailer ould ommuniate,
along with the prie signal, a suggested onsumption level to hoose in ase
multiple solutions are found. As an alternative, one ould modify the setup
of the lower level problem so that it always has a unique solution. In other
words, one must dene a lower level problem as a variational inequality where
the funtional is strongly monotone on the feasible set, see [16℄. Future researh
in this diretion is needed.
Let us now onsider the relationship between the total onsumption lt,ω2 + l
i
t,ω3
and the prie πst,ω2 paid by the retailer at the spot market under the dynami-
priing sheme. As one an see in Figure F.8, total onsumption peaks when
the spot prie is at the lowest point, i.e.during the night in both the rst and
the seond day inluded in the horizon. Furthermore, another peak of smaller
intensity and shorter duration is observed around the 13th hour of the sim-
ulation, where the spot prie appears on average to have a loal valley. An
intuitive explanation for this is that part of the load annot be postponed to
the following night (or shifted to the previous one) without violating the om-
fort band; therefore aepting a loally minimum prie is a good ompromise.
Observing this type of behaviour was one of the reasons behind the hoie of a
model apturing the dynamis in the onsumer exibility. Finally, the energy
Es purhased by the retailer at the spot market resembles the pattern of the
average onsumption, though shifted somewhat up due to the lower expeted
osts for down-regulation ompared to up-regulation.
Finally, it is of interest to analyse the impat of the introdution of dynami
pries on the retailer's energy imbalane. Indeed demand response, if managed
with orret poliies, has the potential to redue both the magnitude and the
total ost of regulation. Deviations from the day-ahead shedule and imbalane
penalties are shown in Figure F.9, F.10 and F.11, in the ases of xed, TOU and
dynami prie, respetively. It is worth pointing out that generally the retailer
prefers being long, i.e.ontrating more energy at the spot market than needed
on average. This is onrmed by the prevalene of down-regulation in the three
gures. Furthermore, we remark that in the TOU-prie ase in Figure F.10,
the largest imbalanes are moved to the valley hours. In a similar fashion,
the retailer manages to move the largest imbalanes away from periods where
regulation pries peak under dynami priing. This is illustrated in Figure F.11.
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Figure F.8: Total onsumption (aggregating exible and inexible load l+ li)
and spot market oer Es versus spot market prie πs
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Figure F.9: Retailer energy imbalane ∆E↑t,ω2,ω3 (up-regulation), ∆E
↓
t,ω2,ω3
(down-regulation) and imbalane penalties ψ↑t,ω2 (up-regulation),
ψ↓t,ω2 (down-regulation) with xed onsumer prie π˜
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Figure F.10: Retailer energy imbalane ∆E↑t,ω2,ω3 (up-regulation), ∆E
↓
t,ω2,ω3
(down-regulation) and imbalane penalties ψ↑t,ω2 (up-regulation),
ψ↓t,ω2 (down-regulation) with Time-Of-Use (TOU) based on-
sumer prie π˜
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Figure F.11: Retailer energy imbalane ∆E↑t,ω2,ω3 (up-regulation), ∆E
↓
t,ω2,ω3
(down-regulation) and imbalane penalties ψ↑t,ω2 (up-regulation),
ψ↓t,ω2 (down-regulation) with dynami onsumer prie π˜
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The main results for the retailer in the simulations with xed, TOU and dynami
prie are summarised in Table F.3. It emerges from these results that the retailer
improves its performane when it is allowed to send a dynami prie signal to
its exible onsumers. The expeted prot φ(x,y) rises by approximately 5%
ompared to the xed-prie ase, both due to an inrease in revenues and a ost
redution. On the ontrary, the TOU-priing sheme yields the lowest prots
among the three ases onsidered.
The retailer revenues onsist of returns of the sale of energy for exible and
inexible onsumption at the prie imposed by the retailer, that is
NT∑
t=1
π˜t,ω2 lt,ω2 + π˜t,ω2 l
i
t,ω3 (F.38)
The two omponents, averaged over the senarios used in this example, are
presented separately in the table. In the ase with TOU-prie, revenues from the
exible part of the load are dramatially lower if ompared to the orresponding
quantities with xed- and dynami-prie. This learly indiates that this priing
sheme is the most favourable to the onsumers. With dynami priing, the total
revenues are maximised, indiating that the retailer is fully exploiting its market
power over the onsumers.
The osts for the retailer are presented in two dierent formulations. In the
rst formulation they are alulated by summing the payment for purhasing
power at the spot market and the ost (revenue) of buying (selling) energy at
the real-time market
NT∑
t=1
πst,ω2E
s
t + π
↑
t,ω2∆E
↑
t,ω2,ω3 − π
↓
t,ω2∆E
↓
t,ω2,ω3 (F.39)
The payment at the spot market is lowest with dynami-priing, i.e.when the
retailer an indiretly shift the load by ommuniating a prie signal to the
onsumer, while the TOU priing sheme ranks seond. The results in the real-
time market seem, at a superial analysis, ounterintuitive, sine the revenues
are lower in the dynami-prie ase than in the xed-prie one. However, it
is not straightforward from this formulation to understand whether dynami
pries an help to ahieve better results in terms of imbalane osts. For this
reason we onsider reformulation (F.30) and break down the retailer osts in
the following way
NT∑
t=1
πst,ω2(lt,ω2 + l
i
t,ω3) + ψ
↑
t,ω2∆E
↑
t,ω2,ω3 + ψ
↓
t,ω2∆E
↓
t,ω2,ω3 (F.40)
where the rst term an be onsidered as the spot market osts if the retailer
had perfet information on future onsumption, and the last two terms are
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Retailer performane index
Priing
Fixed TOU Dynami
Prots 2.3139 2.2296 2.4286
Revenues exible load 0.7050 0.4300 0.7180
inexible load 2.7155 2.8865 2.7868
total 3.4205 3.3164 3.5049
Costs spot market 1.2146 1.1676 1.1578
regulation market -0.1080 -0.0808 -0.0814
total 1.1067 1.0868 1.0763
Costs (reform.) perfet information 1.0970 1.0781 1.0680
real-time penalties 0.0096 0.0088 0.0083
total 1.1067 1.0868 1.0763
Table F.3: Market performane of the retailer in the simulations with xed
and dynami prie. All the values are averages for the onsidered
senarios expressed in e
the imbalane penalties, i.e.the ost of imperfet information. As shown in
Table F.3, not only the spot market virtual payment under perfet information,
but also the imbalane osts behave aording to intuition. Indeed, the dynami
priing sheme (whih is optimal) performs best, followed by the ase with TOU
prie (whih is suboptimal, but designed to redue osts on average), while
the xed prie ase ranks last. This onrms that demand response an be
employed both for reduing the ost of energy prourement (i.e.peak-shifting)
and for utting the regulation ost.
The results of the simulations for the onsumers are summarised in Table F.4.
Note that the onsumer osts in this table are equal to the retailer revenues in
Table F.3. As already mentioned in the disussion above, the eletriity pro-
urement payments for the onsumers are maximised under the dynami priing
sheme, and lowest with TOU prie. Espeially the fat that the onsumer pay-
ments for the exible part of the load are highest with dynami priing tells
us that dynami pries alone do not neessarily result in higher benet for the
exible onsumers. In this example, the onsumer is better o with TOU- or
xed-prie ontrats than with a dynami-prie one with equal average pries
over the day. Redutions in the average real-time onsumer prie ould be
onsidered as an inentive for onsumers to swith to dynami-prie ontrats.
Therefore, determining an average value making dynami real-time pries bene-
ial also for onsumers is an interesting problem for whih models of this type
ould be employed. Finally we point out that, despite the eletriity proure-
ment osts for the onsumers are higher in the dynami-prie ase ompare to
the xed priing sheme, the average prie paid by the exible part of the load
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Consumer result index Unit
Priing
Fixed TOU Dynami
Costs exible load e 0.7050 0.4300 0.7180
inexible load e 2.7155 2.8865 2.7868
total e 3.4205 3.3164 3.5049
Prie exible load e/kWh 0.2000 0.1136 0.1885
inexible load e/kWh 0.2000 0.2126 0.2053
Table F.4: Consumer results in the simulations with xed and dynami prie.
All the values are averages for the onsidered senarios
dereases quite sensibly. This implies that the total eletriity onsumption is
higher in the dynami-prie ase.
To onlude, we an interpret the redution of the market osts for the retailer
in the dynami-prie ase as an inrease of soial welfare. This is beause the
transfer of money from onsumers to retailer anels out in a soial welfare
alulation. Sine there were no deviations from the omfort band in any of
the ases and senarios onsidered in the example, we an onlude that the
onsumer benet is onstant. As a result, the soial welfare is given by the
generation osts hanged in sign. These annot be diretly alulated, sine
this model does not inlude the supply side. Nevertheless, we an onsider the
redution in retailer market osts as a proxy for the redution of generation ost.
On the other hand, the inrease in onsumer payments to the retailer implies
that the redistribution of this additional welfare between the players might not
be fair under this retailer-onsumer onguration. One again, though, we point
out that these onsiderations hold for the onsidered example and with the
onsidered setup. Dierent dynami prie ontrats, i.e.dierent parameters in
the onstraints (F.5)(F.7), ould yield a fairer redistribution of the welfare.
F.4.3.2 Impat of onsumer exibility
We now onsider how dierent levels of demand exibility impat the results
for both the retailer and the onsumer. This is done by arrying out two ad-
ditional simulations with dierent distributions into the onsumer groups de-
sribed in Setion F.4.1. In the rst run of the model, aimed at simulating a
situation of high demand exibility, we onsider the onsumer group distribu-
tion [0.6, 0.3, 0.1]. The situation is reversed to the distribution [0.1, 0.3, 0.6] in
the last run of the model, simulating low demand exibility. Both ases are
ompared to the referene ase in the previous setion, where demand exibility
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Retailer performane index Unit
Flexibility
High Medium Low
Prots e 2.3199 2.4286 2.5311
Revenues exible load e 0.5517 0.7180 0.8757
inexible load e 2.7969 2.7868 2.7767
total e 3.3486 3.5049 3.6524
Costs spot market e 1.1058 1.1578 1.2057
regulation market e -0.0771 -0.0814 -0.0845
total e 1.0287 1.0763 1.1212
Costs (reform.) perfet information e 1.0211 1.0680 1.1114
real-time penalties e 0.0076 0.0083 0.0099
total e 1.0287 1.0763 1.1212
Table F.5: Market performane of the retailer in simulations with dierent
demand exibility. All the values are averages for the onsidered
senarios
is medium due to the hoie of the distribution [0.3, 0.4, 0.3].
Table F.5 illustrates the retailer market performane in the three ases of de-
mand exibility, this time only with dynami prie. Observe that higher demand
exibility results in lower average prots for the retailer. This is the result of
two ontrasting trends. On the one side, total revenues for eletriity sale di-
minish as demand exibility inreases. This is in line with the expetations that
retailers have lower market power, i.e.ability to impose pries to the demand, as
onsumers get more exible. On the other side, total market osts drop as well
with higher onsumer exibility. This drop is due to uts both in spot market
osts for eletriity prourement (perfet information row in Table F.5) and in
regulation penalty osts. Nevertheless the overall eet is still of dereasing
retailer prots with inreasing exibility, beause the uts in market osts are
not large enough to oset the redution in revenues.
The results for the onsumer are shown in Table F.6. As already pointed out,
demand experienes a ut in the eletriity osts as it gets more and more
exible. This is due to a quite dramati drop in the ost of exible load and
only a slight inrease in the ost of must-serve load. Therefore, there is a lear
eonomi signal suggesting the demand to adopt more exible onsumption
preferenes, and to inrease the share of exible demand. The derease in the
average prie per kWh paid for exible load onrms that a more ost-eetive
load pattern is adopted by the onsumer.
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Consumer result index Unit
Flexibility
High Medium Low
Costs total e 3.3486 3.5049 3.6524
exible load e 0.5517 0.7180 0.8757
inexible load e 2.7969 2.7868 2.7767
Prie exible load e/kWh 0.1870 0.1885 0.1921
inexible load e/kWh 0.2060 0.2053 0.2045
Table F.6: Consumer results in simulations with dierent demand exibility.
All the values are averages for the onsidered senarios
F.5 Conlusions
This paper presents a game theoretial model for the partiipation of energy re-
tailers in eletriity markets with exible demand and real-time onsumer pries.
The hierarhial struture in the relation between retailers and onsumers, per-
taining to the so-alled Stakelberg (or leader-follower) games, is imposed by the
formulation as a bilevel optimisation problem. The model has three-stages to
reet the fat that deisions are made day-ahead, real-time and ex-post with
dierent information struture on the stohasti variables involved. Further-
more a dynami model for the demand exibility based on realisti onsumer
preferenes is employed.
In an illustrative example, the model is simulated in a realisti setup, whih
allows the omparison of the results obtained using the optimal dynami prie
with the ones under xed and time-of-use priing shemes. We show that, in the
dynami-prie ase, the retailer, while maximising its prots, sends the onsumer
a prie-inentive to shift his/her demand to periods of the day haraterised by
low spot market pries. Similarly, a drop in the imbalane osts borne by the
retailer, due to deviations of the atual onsumption from the energy ontrated
day-ahead, is experiened when swithing from a xed or a time-of-use to a
real-time onsumer prie regime. It turns out that the dynami priing sheme
minimises the retailer net payments in the day-ahead and real-time markets. On
the ontrary, the xed prie yields the highest osts among the priing shemes
onsidered, while the time-of-use prie has a middle performane.
We link the redution of prourement and regulation osts, obtained by shifting
the load, to an inrease in soial welfare. As simulations show, though, the
redistribution of the additional welfare is not fair in the dynami-prie sheme
onsidered, as the retailer absorbs entirely the added welfare. Indeed, the on-
sumer payments to the retailer are highest under the dynami-priing sheme
252 Paper F
in the onsidered example. On the ontrary, the time-of-use setup yields the
lowest osts for the onsumers among the priing shemes onsidered. These
results, however, do not aount for the eet of ompetition among retailers.
In any ase, partiular are should be taken in designing priing shemes that
an eetively motivate onsumers partiipation in real-time prie programmes.
Finally, through a sensitivity analysis it is shown that, one real-time ontrats
are in plae, there is an eonomi inentive for the onsumers to inrease their
exibility.
Future extensions of this researh ould move in several diretions. Dierent
utility funtions to model the trade-o for the onsumer between eletriity
prie and omfort ould be dened and simulated. For example, the lower and
upper bounds of the omfort band ould be linear funtions of the prie, or
a quadrati penalty for deviations of the temperature from a referene ould
be used. Furthermore, dierent forms of onsumer exibility ould be onsid-
ered, for example by modelling the onsumption of intelligent applianes suh
as prie-responsive washing mahines and eletri vehiles. Besides, a dier-
ent setup ensuring a unique solution to the lower-level optimisation problem
ould be proposed so as to improve the ontrollability of the load from the
retailer perspetive, i.e.to ensure that the strong Stakelberg solution is also
unique. Furthermore, the eet of renewable power on market pries ould be
introdued in the model, thus paving the way for an assessment of the value of
demand response programmes in the integration of renewable generation in the
system. Additionally, the optimisation model for the retailer ould be rened
by onsidering a diversied portfolio inluding e.g.futures and options, and by
inluding risk management. Finally, ompetition among retailers ould be mod-
elled in the framework of Equilibrium Programs with Equilibrium Constraints
(EPECs)
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Abstrat
In this paper, we onsider an eletriity market that onsists of a
day-ahead and a balaning settlement, and inludes a number of
stohasti produers. We rst introdue two referene proedures for
sheduling and priing energy in the day-ahead market: on the one
hand, a onventional network-onstrained aution purely based on
the least-ost merit order, where stohasti generation enters with
its expeted prodution and a low marginal ost; on the other, a
ounterfatual aution that also aounts for the projeted balan-
ing osts using stohasti programming. Although the stohasti
learing proedure attains higher market eieny in expetation
than the onventional day-ahead aution, it suers from fundamen-
tal drawbaks with a view to its pratial implementation. In parti-
ular, it requires exible produers (those that make up for the lak
or surplus of stohasti generation) to aept losses in some senar-
ios. Using a bilevel programming framework, we then show that the
onventional aution, if ombined with a suitable day-ahead dispath
of stohasti produers (generally dierent from their expeted pro-
dution), an substantially inrease market eieny and emulate
the advantageous features of the stohasti optimization ideal, while
avoiding its major pitfalls.
A two-node power system serves as both an illustrative example and
a proof of onept. Finally, a more realisti ase study highlights
the main advantages of a smart day-ahead dispath of stohasti
produers.
1
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G.1 Introdution
The penetration of stohasti prodution in eletri energy systems is notably
inreasing worldwide, primarily owing to a booming wind power industry. There
is a broad onsensus in the researh ommunity that today's eletriity market
designs are to be revisited so that stohasti produers an enter the ompetition
in a fair and eient manner.
In its most basi form, an eletriity market onsists of a forward (typially
day-ahead) market and a balaning market. On the one hand, the day-ahead
market is required to aommodate the generation from the inexible power
plants, i.e. from those generating units that need advane planning in order to
eiently and reliably set their prodution levels. On the other, the balaning
market lears the energy deployed to maintain the onstant balane of supply
and demand over periods of time with ner resolution, ommonly spanning from
minutes to one hour. Being leared shortly before real time, balaning markets
allow the trade of energy between exible rms, whih an adjust their output
quikly, and stohasti produers, whose generation is preditable only with
limited auray at the day-ahead stage.
Conventionally the day-ahead and the balaning markets are settled indepen-
dently. Furthermore, with respet to the partiipation of stohasti produers,
the day-ahead market is typially leared onsidering their expeted produ-
tion at a very low marginal ost (e.g., zero). The eventual energy adjustments
needed to ope with the assoiated foreast errors are left then to the exible
units partiipating in the balaning market. Consequently, if this market is not
provided with enough exible apaity, balaning osts may esalate dramati-
ally. It is expeted that this problem beomes exaerbated as the penetration
of stohasti prodution inreases [1, 2, 3℄.
To fae this hallenge, two main solution strategies have been onsidered,
namely:
1. To establish reserve markets, where exible apaity is proured su-
iently in advane of energy delivery and then made available to the bal-
aning market, where it is dispathed if needed. The reserve demand in
these markets is exogenously speied by the Transmission System Oper-
ator, whih opens up a number of dierent ad-ho riteria, see e.g. [4℄.
2. To lear the forward market using stohasti programming [5℄, whih al-
lows modeling future balaning needs and osts in a probabilisti frame-
work, thus yielding the day-ahead energy dispath that minimizes the
expeted system operating osts. One of the major advantages of this
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approah is that it endogenously solves for the optimal amount of reserve
apaity to be left to the balaning market, weighing the expeted osts
and benets of suh apaity [6, 7, 8, 9℄.
Ideally, the stohasti solution method attains maximum market eieny (as
it minimizes the expeted system operating ost) and therefore, it is used here
as a referene in this respet. For its pratial appliation within a market
environment, though, it must be rst omplemented with a set of pries and
payments that make market partiipants satised with the resulting day-ahead
dispath. In this vein, [6℄ and [10℄ dene pries for both energy and reserve
apaity. However, determining who should pay for suh reserve and to whih
extent is still a major soure of onit and debate [11℄.
In this paper, we follow the approah of [12℄ and [13℄, where the stohasti
dispath is supported by energy pries only. However, this approah is not
without its problems either. Indeed, [13℄ illustrate that the energy-only market
settlement assoiated with the stohasti dispath requires exible produers to
aept losses for some realizations of the stohasti prodution, whih also raises
onerns on its pratial appliability.
Starting from this point, the objetive of this paper is to show that, if leared
with an appropriate value of stohasti prodution, generally dierent from the
expeted value, the onventional settlement of the day-ahead market an notably
approah the behavior of the ideal stohasti dispath, while sidestepping its
theoretial drawbaks. For this purpose, we onstrut a bilevel programming
formulation that determines the optimal value of stohasti prodution that
should be used to lear the day-ahead market under the onventional settlement.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Setion G.2 presents the onven-
tional and stohasti dispath models that we use as referenes in our work, and
provides the mathematial insight to alulate the optimal day-ahead shedule
of stohasti prodution under the onventional market settlement. Setion G.3
disusses results from a small example and a ase study. More speially,
the example serves to illustrate the dierent dispath models, whih are sub-
sequently ompared and tested using a more realisti setup in the ase study.
Lastly, Setion G.4 onludes the paper.
G.2 Dispath Models
Consider the sequene of a day-ahead and a balaning market. The day-ahead
market is leared on day d−1 (e.g., by 10 am) and overs energy transations for
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delivery on day d, typially on an hourly basis. The balaning market settles the
energy imbalanes with respet to the day-ahead prodution and onsumption
shedule. These imbalanes are omputed throughout day d, usually over time
intervals ranging from minutes to 1 hour.
Let us begin by outlining a standard model for the dispath of energy. This will
serve to present the notation and provide a starting point for the developments
of the rest of the paper. The setting will be an eletri power system omprising
a olletion N of nodes.
G.2.1 Conventional Dispath (ConvD)
Let pG and pW denote the vetors of deisions on the day-ahead dispath of
onventional and stohasti produers, respetively. For simpliity and without
loss of generality, the demand at eah node n of the system, ln, is onsidered to
be known with ertainty. We also assume that power ows in the transmission
network are determined by the vetor δ0 of nodal voltage angles.
The onventional eonomi dispath model (ConvDM) identies the optimal
shedule (p∗G, p
∗
W ) that minimizes day-ahead generating osts, C
D(pG, pW ), as
follows:
Minimize
pG,pW ,δ0
CD (pG, pW ) (G.1a)
s.t. hD
(
pG, pW , δ
0
)
− l = 0 : λD , (G.1b)
gD
(
pG, δ
0
)
≤ 0 , (G.1)
pW ≤ Ŵ , (G.1d)
where Ŵ is the foreast vetor of stohasti prodution. The equality on-
straints (G.1b) enfore the day-ahead balaning onditions, stating that the
dispath plus net power ow equals the demand at eah node. The inequal-
ities (G.1) inlude upper and lower bounds to the dispath of onventional
produers and sheduled power ows, as well as delarations of non-negative
variables. Constraints (G.1d) limit the day-ahead shedule of stohasti pro-
duers to their expeted generation.
The dispath model (G.1) an be understood as a network-onstrained aution
that follows a least-ost merit-order priniple, i.e., the heapest generators are
dispathed rst. Consequently, beause stohasti produers enter the market
with very low or zero marginal ost, their dispath up to the foreast mean Ŵ
is prioritized.
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Notie that the vetor of dual variables assoiated with onstraint (G.1b), whih
is indiated in (G.1) by λD, onstitutes the vetor of day-ahead loational
marginal pries.
One the optimal day-ahead shedule (p∗G, p
∗
W ) has been obtained from (G.1),
the balaning market must deal with the energy imbalane aused by the
stohasti prodution. Consider a spei realization vetor of this produ-
tion, denoted by Wω′ . The energy imbalane is then given by Wω′ − p
∗
W , whih
represents a surplus of generation, if positive, or a shortage, if negative. To
aommodate an exess of prodution, several ations may be taken, namely:
• To derease the power prodution of exible generating units. In market
terms, this is equivalent to say that exible produers repurhase a ertain
amount r−ω′ of energy in the balaning market.
• To spill a part W spillω′ of the stohasti prodution.
Similarly, to balane a deit of generation, the following ations may be taken:
• To inrease the power output of exible units, whih is equivalent to say
that exible produers sell an additional amount r+ω′ of energy in the bal-
aning market.
• To shed a portion lshedω′ of the demand. This ation is, in general, very
ostly, as the so-alled value of lost load is normally very high.
It should be notied that the previous deision vetors r−ω′ , r
+
ω′ , W
spill
ω′ , and
lshedω′ have been intentionally augmented with the subsript ω
′
to underline their
impliit dependene on the spei realization Wω′ of stohasti prodution.
For ease of presentation, we group all these deision variables into one single
vetor yω′ (the notation introdued here will beome relevant later on in the
illustrative example of Setion G.3). Thus, the vetor y∗ω′ that minimizes the
ost of balaning the energy deviation Wω′ − p
∗
W is solution to the following
optimization problem:
Minimize
yω′ ,δω′
CB (yω′) (G.2a)
s.t. hB
(
yω′ , δω′ , δ
0∗
)
+Wω′ − p
∗
W = 0 : λ
B
ω′ , (G.2b)
gB (yω′ , δω′ , p
∗
G;Wω′) ≤ 0 , (G.2)
where δω′ is the vetor of nodal voltage angles at the balaning stage. The
equality onstraints (G.2b) ensure that generating units and loads are redis-
pathed so that the system remains in balane. The vetor λBω′ of dual variables
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assoiated with these onstraints dene the loational marginal pries at the
balaning market. Similarly to (G.1), the inequalities (G.2) omprise upper
and lower bounds on the re-dispath of generating units, load shedding, wind
spillage, atual power ows, and delarations of nonnegative variables.
If we now denote the optimal vetor of balaning ations by y∗ω′ , the overall ost
of operating the power system under the realizationWω′ of stohasti prodution
is given by CD (p∗G, p
∗
W ) + C
B (y∗ω′).
It is important to stress that both onstraints (G.2b) and (G.2), and hene also
the balaning osts CB (yω′), are dependent on the optimal day-ahead shedule(
p∗G, p
∗
W , δ
0∗
)
. Sine the onventional dispath model (G.1) is blind to suh
dependeny, the market beomes more and more ineient as the penetration
of stohasti prodution inreases. In this vein, the stohasti dispath model
presented next intends to apture preisely the interation between day-ahead
and balaning deisions.
G.2.2 Stohasti Dispath (StohD)
Consider that the eletriity prodution from stohasti produers an be e-
iently modeled by a nite set Ω of senarios, eah haraterized by a vetor of
power values Wω and a probability of ourrene πω . It must hold that πω ≥ 0,
for all ω ∈ Ω, and
∑
ω∈Ω πω = 1. The senario set Ω is assumed to be available
to the Transmission System Operator.
The stohasti dispath model writes as follows:
Minimize
pG,pW ,δ0;yω,δω,∀ω
CD (pG, pW ) + Eω
[
CB (yω)
]
(G.3a)
s.t. hD
(
pG, pW , δ
0
)
− l = 0 : λD , (G.3b)
gD
(
pG, δ
0
)
≤ 0 , (G.3)
pW ≤W , (G.3d)
hB
(
yω, δω, δ
0
)
+Wω − pW = 0 , ∀ω ∈ Ω , (G.3e)
gB (yω, δω, pG;Wω) ≤ 0 , ∀ω ∈ Ω , (G.3f)
where W is the vetor of apaities of stohasti produers and Eω[·] is the
expetation operator over the senario set Ω. Notie that, based on this set,
the dispath problem (G.3) expliitly models and thus antiipates the balaning
operation of the power system by means of onstraints (G.3e) and (G.3f) and the
expetation of the balaning osts in the objetive funtion (G.3a). This way, the
stohasti programming problem (G.3) yields the day-ahead dispath (p∗G, p
∗
W )
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that maximizes market eieny, provided that the senario set Ω is properly
onstruted. As we shall see later, aording to (G.3), exible produers may
be dispathed out of merit order in the day-ahead market to provide the power
system with suient exible apability to ope with the energy imbalanes
aused by stohasti produers in real time.
G.2.3 Improved Dispath of Stohasti Produers (ImpD)
In an attempt to inrease the performane of the onventional dispath
model (G.1), we address now the following question: Whih value pmaxW should
the foreast vetor Ŵ in (G.1d) be replaed with to maximize market eieny?
The answer to this question is naturally given by the following bilevel program-
ming problem:
Minimize
pG,pW ,δ0,pmaxW ;yω,δω ,∀ω
CD (pG, pW ) + Eω
[
CB (yω)
]
(G.4a)
s.t. hB
(
yω, δω, δ
0
)
+Wω − pW = 0 , ∀ω ∈ Ω , (G.4b)
gB (yω, δω, pG;Wω) ≤ 0 , ∀ω ∈ Ω , (G.4)
0 ≤ pmaxW ≤W , (G.4d)(
pG, pW , δ
0
)
∈ arg
{
Minimize
xG,xW ,θ
CD (xG, xW ) (G.4e)
s.t. hD (xG, xW , θ)− l = 0 : λ
D , (G.4f)
gD (xG, θ) ≤ 0 , (G.4g)
xW ≤ p
max
W
}
. (G.4h)
The lower-level problem (G.4e)(G.4h) is equivalent to the onventional dis-
path (G.1), exept for the upper bound of the day-ahead shedule of stohasti
produers in (G.4h), whih is, in this ase, endogenously omputed by the upper-
level problem (G.4a)(G.4d) to minimize the sum of day-ahead dispath osts
and the expeted balaning osts. Consequently, the bilevel model (G.4) man-
ages to dispath stohasti produers not only based on their marginal osts
(whih are often very low or zero), but also on the ost of their unertainty
(whih is estimated by (G.4a)(G.4d)).
If the onventional dispath model (G.1) is linearnote that this inludes the
family of dispath models that onsider pieewise linear supply osts funtions,
a DC power-ow network model, a pieewise linear approximation of the trans-
mission losses, ramping onstraints, et. (see e.g. [14℄)the lower-level prob-
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lem (G.4e)(G.4h) an be replaed by its KKT onditions. In turn, the asso-
iated omplementarity onditions an be reast using the equivalent mixed-
integer formulation proposed by [15℄. The steps required to transform a bilevel
programming problem of the type of (G.4), with a linear lower level, into a
manageable single-level optimization problem are well known in the tehnial
literature (see e.g. [16℄) and are omitted here for oniseness. However, this
transformation is illustrated later, in Setion G.3, using a small example.
For ease of omparison, the short form ImpD is used to refer to the onven-
tional dispath model (G.1) where Ŵ in (G.1d) is replaed with the optimal
value of pmaxW that results from (G.4).
G.2.4 Energy-only Market Settlement
We now introdue a standard settlement sheme whereby market partiipants
are paid for energy only.
Consider a ertain market partiipant k and dene EDk as the amount of energy
sold (if positive) or purhased (if negative) in the day-ahead market, and EBkω′
as the amount of energy sold (if positive) or purhased (if negative) in the
balaning market in senario ω′. These quantities are diretly derived from
the power shedule that is solution to the dispath model under onsideration.
The payment to (if positive) or from (if negative) market partiipant k under
senario ω′ is then given by
λDs(k)E
D
k + λ
B
s(k)ω′E
B
kω′ , (G.5)
where s(k) indiates the node where market partiipant k is loated. The loa-
tional day-ahead market prie λDs(k) is obtained from either ConvD, StohD,
or ImpD, while the loational balaning market prie λBs(k)ω′ is omputed
from (G.2) after the day-ahead market is leared and the atual realization
ω′ of the stohasti prodution beomes known.
[13℄ shows that, if generating units are fully dispathable from zero to their max-
imum apaities (the problem of priing in markets with non-onvexities is not
treated here; see e.g. [17℄ for further information on this topi), the energy-only
settlement sheme (G.5) under the stohasti dispath model (G.3) guarantees
ost reovery for exible produers only in expetation. This expetation is,
besides, ontingent on the probabilisti haraterization of the stohasti pro-
dution at a market-wide level, whih is in possession of the TSO and out of the
ontrol of the individual produers. Furthermore, we show in the illustrative
example of Setion G.3 that StohD may atually dispath exible units in the
day-ahead market in a loss-making position.
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Bus 1
Bus 2
L1 (80 MW)
L2 (90 MW)
G1 G2
WP
100 MW
G3
High: (50 MW, 0.6)
Low: (10 MW, 0.4)
Figure G.1: Two-bus power system.
On the ontrary, the onventional dispath model, either in the traditional form
of ConvD or in the variant ImpD proposed in this paper, ensures ost reovery
for exible produers for any possible realization of the stohasti prodution.
G.3 Results and Disussion
In this setion, we rst make use of a small two-node system to intuitively
illustrate the main features of the previously disussed dispath models. Then,
we provide meaningful results from a more realisti ase study.
G.3.1 Illustrative Example
The dierent dispath models are illustrated next using the two-node system
depited in Fig. G.1. This small system onsists of one line, two loads (L1
and L2), three onventional generators (G1, G2, and G3), and one wind power
plant (WP). The apaity and reatane of the line are 100 MW and 0.13 pu,
respetively. Loads L1 and L2 are assumed to be inelasti and equal to 80
and 90 MW, respetively. The demand that is involuntarily shed is valued at
$200/MWh. The stohasti power output of the wind farm is modeled by two
plausible senarios, whih are referred to as high (50 MW) and low (10 MW),
with probabilities of ourrene equal to 0.6 and 0.4.
Data for the onventional units are ollated in Table G.1, where P is the unit
apaity; C is the prie oer for energy sale in the day-ahead market; C+ and C−
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Table G.1: Unit data Two-bus system
Unit G1 G2 G3
P (MW) 100 110 50
C ($/MWh) 35 30 10
C+ ($/MWh) 40  
C− ($/MWh) 34  
R+ (MW) 20 0 0
R− (MW) 40 0 0
are, respetively, the prie oers for energy sale and purhase in the balaning
market; and R+ and R− are, in that order, the upper bounds of the energy sale
and purhase oers in the balaning market. Note that, in omparative terms,
unit G1 is expensive, but exible; unit G2 is a little bit heaper, but inexible;
and unit G3 is very heap, but inexible. Therefore, G1 is the only unit in the
system that an be re-dispathed to provide balaning energy. Besides, observe
that, for this unit, C+ > C and C− < C, meaning that produer G1 is willing
to be exible in return for a prie premium on the energy traded during the
balaning operation [12℄.
The marginal ost of the energy produed by the wind farm is onsidered to be
zero. The expeted wind power prodution is 50× 0.6 + 10× 0.4 = 34 MW.
G.3.1.1 Dispath Models
Firstly, we onsider the onventional dispath model (G.1), whih writes for this
partiular example as follows:
Min. 35pG1 + 30pG2 + 10pG3 (G.6a)
s.t. pG1 + pG2 + pW − 80 = −
δ02
0.13
, (G.6b)
pG3 − 90 =
δ02
0.13
, (G.6)
pG1 ≤ 100 , pG2 ≤ 110 , pG3 ≤ 50 , (G.6d)
− 100 ≤
δ02
0.13
≤ 100 , (G.6e)
pW ≤ 34 , (G.6f)
pG1 , pG2 , pG3 , pW ≥ 0 , (G.6g)
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where bus 1 is onsidered as the referene node, i.e. δ01 = 0. Optimization
problem (G.6) aims at minimizing the day-ahead prodution osts (G.6a). The
dispath problem is built upon a DC modeling of the transmission network,
whih leads to the set of nodal power balane equations (G.6b) and (G.6),
and inludes generation and transmission apaity limits, (G.6d) and (G.6e),
respetively. As it is ustomary, onstraint (G.6f) limits the dispath of the
wind power plant to its expeted prodution. Constraints (G.6g) enfore the
nonnegative harater of prodution quantities.
Observe that, aording to the dispath model (G.6), the day-ahead market is
settled irrespetive of the potential impat that the resulting day-ahead program
{p∗G1 , p
∗
G2
, p∗G3 , p
∗
W } may have on the subsequent balaning operation. The day-
ahead market is thus leared purely based on a least-ost merit-order priniple.
This way, the wind farm is rst dispathed to 34 MW (its expeted prodution),
followed by generating unitsG3 andG2, in that order, whih are dispathed to 50
and 86 MW, respetively, to over the total system load of 170MW. UnitG1 (the
exible produer) is onsequently left out of the day-ahead shedule. Afterwards,
during the balaning operation of the power system, energy adjustments to
the day-ahead shedule are required to ope with the unertain wind power
prodution. Speially, if the power output of the wind farm turns out to be
high (50 MW), the wind power produer seeks to sell the leftover 50 − 34 =
16MW in this market. However, the only exible unit in the system, unit
G1, annot purhase the extra wind, as it annot derease its prodution below
zero. As a result, these 16 MW of free wind power have to be spilled. On
the other hand, if the eventual wind generation is low (10 MW), there is a
wind generation deit of 34 − 10 = 24MW. This deit has to be overed in
the balaning market, but generating unit G1 an only inrease its prodution
20 MW at most. Consequently, the remaining 24 − 20 = 4 MW are obtained
from ostly load urtailment.
We an alternatively ompute the day-ahead generation shedule using the
stohasti dispath model (G.3), whih writes as follows:
Min. 35pG1 + 30pG2 + 10pG3 + 0.6
(
40r+G1h − 34r
−
G1h
+ 200
(
lshed1h + l
shed
2h
) )
+ 0.4
(
40r+G1l − 34r
−
G1l
+ 200
(
lshed1l + l
shed
2l
) )
(G.7a)
s.t. (G.6b)− (G.6e) , (G.6g) , (G.7b)
pW ≤ 50 , (G.7)
r+G1h − r
−
G1h
+ lshed1h + 50− pW −W
spill
h =
(δ02 − δ2h)
0.13
, (G.7d)
r+G1l − r
−
G1l
+ lshed1l + 10− pW −W
spill
l =
(δ02 − δ2l)
0.13
, (G.7e)
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lshed2h = −
(δ02 − δ2h)
0.13
, (G.7f)
lshed2l = −
(δ02 − δ2l)
0.13
, (G.7g)
pG1 + r
+
G1h
≤ 100 , pG1 + r
+
G1l
≤ 100 , (G.7h)
pG1 − r
−
G1h
≥ 0 , pG1 − r
−
G1l
≥ 0 , (G.7i)
− 100 ≤
δ2h
0.13
≤ 100 , −100 ≤
δ2l
0.13
≤ 100 , (G.7j)
r+G1h ≤ 20 , r
+
G1l
≤ 20 , (G.7k)
r−G1h ≤ 40 , r
−
G1l
≤ 40 , (G.7l)
W spillh ≤ 50 , W
spill
l ≤ 10 , (G.7m)
lshed1h ≤ 80 , l
shed
1l ≤ 80 , l
shed
2h ≤ 90 , l
shed
2l ≤ 90 , (G.7n)
r+G1h , r
+
G1l
, r−G1h , r
−
G1l
,W spillh ,W
spill
l , l
shed
1h , l
shed
1l , l
shed
2h , l
shed
2l ≥ 0 ,
(G.7o)
where subsripts h and l index the orresponding augmented variable with
senario high and low, respetively. Note that the leared amount of wind
prodution in the day-ahead market, pW , is limited to its apaity (50 MW)
through onstraint (G.7).
Optimization problem (G.7) inludes the senario-based modeling of the balan-
ing operation through the set of onstraints (G.7d)(G.7o). Balaning ations
omprise the prodution inrease/derease of exible unit G1 (r
+
G1
/r−G1), wind
spillage (W spill), and load shedding (lshed1 , l
shed
2 ). The stohasti dispath model
seeks to minimize the overall expeted system osts (G.7a), whih onsists of
the day-ahead dispath osts plus the expetation of the balaning operation
osts. Constraints (G.7d)(G.7g) enfore the power balanes per node and se-
nario. Inequalities (G.7h)(G.7j) impose generation and transmission apaity
limits at the balaning stage. Constraints (G.7k) and (G.7l) limit the balaning
energy provided by unit G1 to its exible apaity, whih is speied through
R+ and R− in Table G.1 for prodution inreases and dereases, respetively.
Inequalities (G.7m) and (G.7n) ap, in that order, the amount of wind power
that is spilled and the amount of load that is shed to the atual wind power pro-
dution and the atual load onsumption. Finally, the set of onstraints (G.7o)
onstitute positive variable delarations.
The essential feature of the stohasti dispath model (G.7) is that the day-ahead
generation shedule {pG1 , pG2 , pG3 , pW } is determined onsidering its projeted
impliations for the subsequent balaning operation of the power system. Fol-
lowing this rationale, only 10 MW of wind power prodution are leared in the
day-ahead market. Furthermore, the exible, but expensive, generating unit G1
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is dispathed to 40 MW in order to exploit its apability of reduing its power
output during the balaning operation. Thus, if senario high materializes, the
40-MW wind prodution surplus an be sold to unit G1 instead of being ur-
tailed. Besides, sine the share of unit G1 in the day-ahead shedule is inreased
up to 40 MW, unit G2 is only dispathed to 70 MW, even though this unit is
$5/MWh heaper than unit G1. Therefore, the least-ost merit-order priniple
that drives the onventional dispath model is here violated.
We ompute next the amount of wind power prodution that should lear the
day-ahead market to maximize power system eieny under the onventional
dispath model. For this purpose, we solve the following bilevel programming
problem:
Min. 35pG1 + 30pG2 + 10pG3 + 0.6
(
40r+G1h − 34r
−
G1h
+ 200
(
lshed1h + l
shed
2h
) )
+ 0.4
(
40r+G1l − 34r
−
G1l
+ 200
(
lshed1l + l
shed
2l
) )
(G.8a)
s.t. r+G1h − r
−
G1h
+ lshed1h + 50− pW −W
spill
h =
(δ02 − δ2h)
0.13
, (G.8b)
r+G1l − r
−
G1l
+ lshed1l + 10− pW −W
spill
l =
(δ02 − δ2l)
0.13
, (G.8)
lshed2h = −
(δ02 − δ2h)
0.13
, (G.8d)
lshed2l = −
(δ02 − δ2l)
0.13
, (G.8e)
pG1 + r
+
G1h
≤ 100 , pG1 + r
+
G1l
≤ 100 , (G.8f)
pG1 − r
−
G1h
≥ 0 , pG1 − r
−
G1l
≥ 0 , (G.8g)
− 100 ≤
δ2h
0.13
≤ 100 , −100 ≤
δ2l
0.13
≤ 100 , (G.8h)
r+G1h ≤ 20 , r
+
G1l
≤ 20 , (G.8i)
r−G1h ≤ 40 , r
−
G1l
≤ 40 , (G.8j)
W spillh ≤ 50 , W
spill
l ≤ 10 , (G.8k)
lshed1h ≤ 80 , l
shed
1l ≤ 80 , l
shed
2h ≤ 90 , l
shed
2l ≤ 90 , (G.8l)
r+G1h , r
+
G1l
, r−G1h , r
−
G1l
,W spillh ,W
spill
l , l
shed
1h , l
shed
1l , l
shed
2h , l
shed
2l ≥ 0 ,
(G.8m)
0 ≤ pmaxW ≤ 50 , (G.8n)(
pG1 , pG2 , pG3 , pW , δ
0
2
)
∈ arg
{
Minimize
xG1 ,xG2 ,xG3 ,xW ,θ
35xG1 + 30xG2 + 10xG3
(G.8o)
s.t. xG1 + xG2 + xW − 80 = −
θ
0.13
: λD1 , (G.8p)
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xG3 − 90 =
θ
0.13
: λD2 , (G.8q)
xG1 ≤ 100 : µG1 , xG2 ≤ 110 : µG2 , xG3 ≤ 50 : µG3 , (G.8r)
− 100 ≤
θ
0.13
≤ 100 : (µ
δ
, µδ) , (G.8s)
xW ≤ p
max
W : ρ , (G.8t)
xG1 , xG2 , xG3 , xW ≥ 0 : (µG1
, µ
G2
, µ
G3
, ρ)
}
, (G.8u)
where the dual variables of the lower-level problem (G.8o)(G.8u) have been
made expliit after the orresponding onstraint, separated by a olon.
Notie that pmaxW is a deision variable of the upper-level problem that enters the
lower-level problem as a onstant. This variable is limited to the apaity of the
wind farm through onstraint (G.8n). The remaining equations are the same as
those in the onventional and stohasti dispath models (G.6) and (G.7).
For the bilevel programming problem (G.8) to be proessed by optimization
solvers, it has to be rst transformed into an equivalent single-level optimiza-
tion problem. To this end, we an replae the lower-level minimization prob-
lem (G.8o)(G.8u) with its KKT onditions, whih are as follows:
35 + λD1 + µG1 − µG1
= 0 , (G.9a)
30 + λD1 + µG2 − µG2
= 0 , (G.9b)
10 + λD2 + µG3 − µG3
= 0 , (G.9)
λD1 + ρ− ρ = 0 , (G.9d)
λD1 − λ
D
2 + µδ − µδ
0.13
= 0 , (G.9e)
(G.6b)− (G.6e) , (G.6g) , (G.9f)
pW ≤ p
max
W , (G.9g)
µG1(pG1 − 100) = 0 , µG2(pG2 − 110) = 0 , µG3(pG3 − 50) = 0 , (G.9h)
µ
δ
(
δ02
0.13
+ 100
)
= 0 , µδ
(
δ02
0.13
− 100
)
= 0 , (G.9i)
ρ(pW − p
max
W ) = 0 , (G.9j)
µ
G1
pG1 = 0 , µG2
pG2 = 0 , µG3
pG3 = 0 , ρ pW = 0 (G.9k)
µ
G1
, µG1 , µG2
, µG2 , µG3
, µG3 , ρ , ρ , µδ , µδ ≥ 0 . (G.9l)
Besides, the omplementarity onditions (G.9h)(G.9k) an be reast using the
mixed-integer linear formulation introdued by [15℄. For example, onsider a
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Table G.2: Comparison of expeted system operation osts ($) Two-bus sys-
tem
Total Day ahead Balaning
Load
urtailment
ConvD 3720 3080 320 320
StohD 3184 4000 −816 0
ImpD 3520 3200 320 0
large enough onstant M . The omplementarity ondition (G.9j) an be equiv-
alently formulated as
ρ ≤ Mu ,
pmaxW − pW ≤ W (1− u) ,
where u is a binary variable, i.e. u ∈ {0, 1}, and W is the apaity of the wind
farm, equal to 50 MW. Notie that both quantities in the left-hand side of the
inequalities above must be nonnegative as a result of (G.9g) and (G.9l).
After all these transformations, the bilevel program (G.8) leads to a single-level
mixed-integer linear programming problem that an be readily proessed by o-
the-shelf optimization software and results in pmax∗W = 30 MW. Consequently,
under ImpD (the onventional settlement with a smart day-ahead dispath of
the wind farm), only 30 MW of wind power prodution are leared in the day-
ahead market, whih avoids expensive load urtailment if senario low eventually
realizes. The onventional units are leared following a least-ost merit order.
In partiular, generating units G1, G2, and G3 are dispathed to 0, 90, and
50 MW, respetively. As a onsequene, 20 MW of wind power have to be
spilled if senario high realizes.
Table G.2 provides the breakdown of the expeted system operation ost under
eah dispath model. Logially, both StohD and ImpD outperform ConvD.
Observe, moreover, that both StohD and ImpD result in a more ostly day-
ahead dispath, whih leads, however, to savings in the balaning operation stage
without load shedding. In fat, the stohasti dispath model is able to redue
osts at the balaning operation phase through a more eient integration of
the wind prodution. However, the energy-only market settlement assoiated
with this dispath model requires the exible produer G1 to aept eonomi
losses if senario low omes true, as we show in the following setion.
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Table G.3: Day-ahead and balaning energy pries ($/MWh)Two-bus system
λDn ,∀n ∈ N
λBnω,∀n ∈ N
High Low
ConvD 30 0 200
StohD 30 25.67 36.50
ImpD 30 0 75
G.3.1.2 Pries and Revenues
Energy pries resulting from eah of the dispath models are shown in Table G.3.
Note that these pries do not dier between buses, beause no network onges-
tion ours in any of the two wind power senarios onsidered. Observe that, for
the three dispath models, the resulting day-ahead eletriity prie is $30/MWh,
whih is the marginal ost of unit G2. In the ase of ConvD, the value of lost
load ($200/MWh) determines the balaning energy prie in senario low, where
load shedding ations need to be undertaken if the day-ahead generation shed-
ule given by this dispath model is implemented. In both ConvD and ImpD,
the balaning eletriity prie is set to $0/MWh in senario high due to the
ourrene of wind urtailment.
Given the energy pries in Table G.3 and the dispath results previously dis-
ussed, we an determine the prot made by eah market partiipant in expe-
tation and per senario aording to eah dispath model (see Table G.4). For
example, the payment to the exible generator G1 in senario low under StohD
is given by 40× 30 = $1200. Sine its marginal ost is equal to $35/MWh, the
prot that generatorG1 makes in this senario is equal to 1200−40×35 = −$200.
Here we bump into one of the most ontroversial features of StohD, namely,
the likelihood that exible units inur eonomi losses in some senarios, even
though the reovery of osts is guaranteed in expetation. Atually, notie that
unit G1 enters the day-ahead dispath in a loss-making position, beause its
marginal ost, $35/MWh, is higher than the resulting day-ahead market prie,
$30/MWh. Therefore, under StohD, being exible may involve higher risk
than being inexible, whih may potentially disourage power produers from
providing balaning servie. In ontrast, ConvD and the proposed ImpD ensure
revenue adequay in the day-ahead market and per senario, and therefore they
do not suer from this problem.
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Table G.4: Prot ($) of market partiipantsTwo-bus system
Agent Expeted
Per senario
High Low
ConvD
G1 1320 0 3300
G2 0 0 0
G3 1000 1000 1000
WP −900 1020 −3780
L1 −2400 −2400 −2400
L2 −2380 −2700 −1900
StohD
G1 24 173.33 −200
G2 0 0 0
G3 1000 1000 1000
WP 916 1326.66 300
L1 −2400 −2400 −2400
L2 −2700 −2700 −2700
ImpD
G1 320 0 800
G2 0 0 0
G3 1000 1000 1000
WP 300 900 −600
L1 −2400 −2400 −2400
L2 −2700 −2700 −2700
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Table G.5: Generator data (* = {+, −}). Powers in MW
Unit Type Bus # P R∗
1 U76 1 152 40
2 U76 2 152 40
3 U100 7 300 70
4 U197 13 591 180
5 U12 15 60 60
6 U155 15 155 30
7 U155 16 155 30
8 U400 18 400 0
9 U400 21 400 0
10 U50 22 300 0
11 U155 23 310 60
12 U350 23 350 40
G.3.2 Case Study
We now onsider a 24-bus power system that is based on the single-area version
of the IEEE Reliability Test System [18℄. It inludes 34 lines, 17 loads, and 12
generating units. The nodal loation, type, apaity, and exibility parameters
of these units are ollated in Table G.5. Energy oers submitted by power
produers in the day-ahead market onsist of the four inremental ost/power
bloks listed in Table 9 of [18℄, assuming the fuel osts used by [19℄. We onsider
that nulear and hydro power produers oer their prodution at zero prie.
Prie premiums of 5% and 4% are assumed for the energy sold and purhased,
respetively, in the balaning market. This means that exible produers are
willing to sell (purhase) energy in the balaning market at a prie 5% higher
(4% lower) than their energy oer prie in the day-ahead market. Nulear and
hydro units are assumed to be inexible and therefore, they do not provide
balaning energy.
Two wind farms are loated at nodes 5 and 7. The per-unit power prodution of
these wind farms is modeled using Beta distributions, as in [20℄. The shape pa-
rameters of these Beta distributions, denoted by (α, β), are equal to (0.71, 0.08)
and (3.78, 1.62), respetively. Thus, the per-unit foreast power outputs of the
wind farms at nodes 5 and 7 are 0.9 and 0.7, in that order. Furthermore, the
power outputs of both wind farms are assumed to be orrelated with a orrela-
tion oeient ρ. Correlated samples from the previous Beta distributions are
obtained using the sampling proedure desribed by [21℄. An original senario
set omprising 10 000 wind power samples is rst generated and then redued to
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100 using the fast forward seletion algorithm presented by [22℄. The marginal
osts of the wind farms are assumed to be zero.
Loads are onsidered to be inelasti with a value of lost load equal to
$1000/MWh. These loads are geographially distributed among buses as indi-
ated in Table 5 of [18℄. The total system demand is 2000 MW. The apaities
of lines 15, 510, and 78 are doubled (up to 350 MW) so that higher amounts
of wind power prodution an be injeted at buses 5 and 7.
The single-level mixed-integer linear programming problem that results from
the bilevel program (G.4) has been solved using CPLEX 12.3.0 under GAMS on
a Windows-based personal omputer Intel(R) Core(TM) i5 with four proessors
loking at 2.4 GHz and 6 GB of RAM. Solution time is kept below 30 seonds
in all instanes.
The stohasti dispath model (G.3) has, among others, two properties that
make it partiularly useful to failitate the large-sale integration of stohasti
prodution in eletriity markets, namely, its ability to avoid the uneonomi
sheduling of stohasti prodution apaity and its ability to eiently aom-
modate generation from stohasti produers that are spatially orrelated. We
show below that these two properties are onferred, to a large extent, on the
onventional dispath model (G.1), if solved for an appropriate value of stohas-
ti prodution, generally dierent from the mean. This is atually what we refer
to as ImpD.
Figure G.2 shows the expeted ost of the power system operation as a fun-
tion of the wind power penetration level, for the three dispath models. The
wind power penetration level is dened as the ratio of the foreast wind power
prodution to the total system demand and is inreased by augmenting the a-
paity installed at both wind farms by the same amount. The gure is arranged
in two illustrations, eah orresponding to a dierent orrelation oeient be-
tween wind farms. Observe that from a ertain penetration level, the expeted
ost resulting from the implementation of the onventional dispath begins to
signiantly diverge from the expeted ost yielded by the other two dispath
models. Furthermore, note that this breaking point, roughly identied on the
graphs using a vertial dashed line, ours for lower penetration levels if the
orrelation oeient between wind sites inreases. Indeed, the breaking point
moves approximately from 38% to 33% if the orrelation oeient goes from
0.35 to 0.75. In ontrast, StohD and ImpD are signiantly less aeted by
orrelated winds, as they both aount for the wind prodution variability to
deide the wind generation shedule. Furthermore, notie that, in the ase of
ConvD, the expeted ost exhibits an inreasing trend after a high enough wind
power penetration level, whereas both StohD and ImpD guarantee that an
inrease in wind power apaity never leads to an inrease in the expeted ost.
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Figure G.2: Impat of the wind power penetration level and spatial orrela-
tion on the expeted ost of the system operation. Total system
demand = 2000MW.
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Table G.6: Highlights of prots. Wind penetration 38% (ρ = 0.35)
Unit
1 6 11 12
ConvD
Expeted
prot ($)
379.8 359.7 724.9 389.1
StohD
Expeted
prot ($)
45.6 48.4 99.7 64.9
Average
losses ($)
−17.4 −10.9 −17.6 −11.5
Probability
prot < 0
0.81 0.71 0.71 0.75
ImpD
Expeted
prot ($)
170.2 263.7 531.6 178.7
We now show that, unlike ConvD or ImpD, the stohasti dispath leads to
a oniting energy-only settlement of the market, beause it requires exible
produers to inur losses in some senarios. Let us onsider a wind power
penetration level of 38%. In this instane, generators 1, 2, 6, 7, 11 and 12 are
mostly the units providing balaning energy. Table G.6 inludes the expeted
prot made by some of these units in these onditions under the three dispath
models. For the ase of StohD, the average losses inurred by the seleted units
and the probability of their prot being eventually negative are also shown. Note
that this probability is remarkably high.
Lastly, observe that the expeted prot made by the seleted units is signi-
antly higher under ConvD than under ImpD. This is so beause, under the
onventional dispath where the expeted wind power prodution is leared,
there is a onsiderable transfer of money from the wind power produers to the
exible produers, as the wind power produers have to bear the ost of a very
ineient balaning operation. ImpD manages to substantially mitigate this
eet by learing an amount of wind power produtionnot neessarily equal
to the meanthat avoids high balaning osts.
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G.4 Conlusions
This paper deals with the learing of a day-ahead eletriity market that in-
ludes a signiant number of stohasti produers. Our study uses two ref-
erene models for generation sheduling: on the one hand, a onventional
network-onstrained aution based on a least-ost merit order for dispath,
where stohasti generation enters with its expeted prodution and a very low
marginal ost; on the other, a full stohasti dispath method that maximizes
market eieny by antiipating balaning osts. The onventional dispath
may turn out to be very uneonomial, while the stohasti one leads to an
energy-only market settlement that does not guarantee ost reovery for exible
produers is some senarios.
We show that the onventional aution, if leared with an appropriate value
of stohasti prodution, generally dierent from the mean, an signiantly
approah the stohasti dispath ideal. We onstrut a bilevel program that
optimally omputes this value. Our analysis prompts two fundamental onlu-
sions, namely:
1. Current day-ahead markets should not lear the expeted stohasti pro-
dution by default. There is indeed room for substantial improvement
in market eieny by abandoning this pratie, in partiular in those
markets with a high share of stohasti generation.
2. The amount of stohasti prodution to be leared in the day-aheadmarket
should be driven not only by the marginal ost of stohasti generation,
whih is usually very low or zero, but also by the ost of its unertainty,
understood as its eonomi impat due to system balaning.
As future researh, it is neessary to develop omputationally eient methods
that allow us to determine a day-ahead shedule for stohasti produers better
in terms of market eieny than their expeted power outputs without having
to diretly solve a omputationally ostly bilevel program. Likewise, the idea in-
trodued in this paper is ompatible with the implementation of reserve apaity
markets or the exible ramping produts that are urrently under development
in CAISO [23℄ and Midwest ISO [24℄. The ombination of these strategies may
bring urrent market eieny loser to the full stohasti optimization ideal.
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Abstrat
To a large extent, eletriity markets worldwide still rely on deter-
ministi proedures for learing energy and reserve autions. How-
ever, larger and larger shares of the prodution mix onsist of re-
newable soures whose nature is stohasti and non-dispathable, as
their output is not known with ertainty and annot be ontrolled
by the operators of the prodution units. Stohasti programming
models for the joint determination of the day-ahead energy and re-
serve dispath, neessary for oping with the real-time output de-
viations from these soures, have been proposed in the literature.
In this work, we take an alternative approah and ast the problem
as an adaptive robust optimization problem. The day-ahead and
reserve shedules determined in this fashion yield the minimum sys-
tem ost, aounting for the ost of the redispathing deisions at
the balaning stage, in the worst-ase realization of the stohasti
prodution within a speied unertainty set. In a ase-study based
on a 24-node system, we assess the degree of suboptimality of the
robust solution with respet to the optimal dispath obtained with
a stohasti programming approah, and ompare their worst-ase
ost. Furthermore, we disuss the robustness of these two alterna-
tive approahes with respet to hanges in the distribution of the
unertainty, as well as their omputational properties.
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Nomenlature
Deision Variables
x Vetor of deision variables at the dispathing stage, inluding energy dis-
path, upward and downward reserve, and network state variables at the
nodes of the system;
∆w Foreast error for stohasti power prodution;
y Vetor of deision variables at the balaning stage, inluding energy redis-
path, load shedding, stohasti power spillage and atual state variables
at the nodes of the system.
Parameters
cx Coeients in the ost funtion assoiated with the day-ahead dispathing
(energy and reserve);
cy Coeients in the ost funtion assoiated with the redispathing at the
balaning stage;
d Demand at eah node of the system (onsidered known with ertainty);
ŵ Conditional expetation of stohasti power prodution.
H.1 Introdution
In reent years, renewable eletriity prodution soures have experiened an
unpreedented growth in installed apaity worldwide. Suh a development
is explained both by tehnologial advane, whih has made prodution from
soures like wind and solar heaper, and by governmental support aimed at
promoting sustainability. Soures of this type are fundamentally dierent from
onventional means of eletriity generation. Indeed, they are stohasti, i.e.,
their prodution is not known with ertainty in advane, and non-dispathable,
i.e., the power plant operators have partial or no ontrol on the output level.
Owing to the features desribed above, an inreasing penetration of renewables
hallenges the traditional way eletriity markets are operated. In partiular,
deterministi shemes have been employed for years to assess the amount of
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reserve apaity, the availability of whih is needed in order to ope with un-
foreseen events in the system. Typially, mehanisms for reserve determination
are based on deterministi N−1 or N−k riteria, whih guarantee the funtion-
ing of the system in the event of loss of the largest unit, or of the k largest units
in the system, respetively. As the penetration of stohasti generation soures
in power system grows, reserves are inreasingly used to over the utuations
of the power output from renewables, thus alling for stohasti deision-making
tools.
In parallel, market-learing proedures for energy markets are also hallenged
by the growth of stohasti prodution apaity. For example, the day-ahead
market is leared aording to a deterministi least-ost dispath priniple based
on the oers and bids submitted by suppliers and onsumers. Stohasti pro-
dution is normally dispathed at a point foreast of its output distribution.
However, this proedure does not aount for the projeted ost of the dispath
at the balaning stage, and is therefore suboptimal, see [1℄.
The existing literature on the subjet shows that system ost an be signi-
antly redued in expetation by jointly optimizing the day-ahead dispath and
the reserve in a stohasti programming framework, see [2℄. However, models of
this type require that the market operator has an aurate probabilisti desrip-
tion of the joint distribution of unertain prodution at dierent loations in the
grid, whih is far from trivial. Furthermore, suh models may require unreason-
able solution time as the disrete number of senarios used to approximate the
distribution of the unertainty inreases.
An alternative framework to stohasti programming for dealing with problems
under unertainty is robust optimization. In this framework, stohasti variables
are assumed to take values within an unertainty set. Then, a robust deision
is determined as the solution to an optimization problem that must be feasible
for any realization of the unertainty, and optimal in the worst-ase hoie of
the stohasti parameters in the aforementioned set. The modeling eort is
redued in robust optimization to a desription of a meaningful set over whih
the unertain parameters may take values in, i.e., the support of the density
funtion rather than the full probability distribution required by the stohasti
programming approah.
The equivalent of stohasti programming with reourse in robust optimization
is adaptive robust optimization. This framework aims at minimizing the total
ost in the worst-ase realization of the unertainty, assuming that reourse
ations an be taken as a response to the realization of the unertainty. For an
introdution to robust optimization, and to its adaptive version, we refer the
interested reader to [3℄.
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Reent appliations of adaptive robust optimization fousing on eletriity mar-
kets are presented in [4℄, [5℄ and [6℄, whih study the unit ommitment problem
under unertain load or prodution from stohasti soures. In all these works, a
utting-plane approah is employed to exploit the onvex dependene of the ob-
jetive funtion on the rst-stage deision, see [7℄. Then, the resulting max-min
problem resulting from the sequential enforement of the worst-ase (maximum-
ost) parameter realization and deision on the optimal reourse ation is ast as
a single-level bilinear program. This problem is then solved either with an outer-
approximation tehnique [4℄, or as a Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP) after
linearization through binary expansion [5, 6℄.
The main features of the model presented in this paper are threefold:
1. We apply adaptive robust optimization to the problem of determining the
optimal day-ahead energy and reserve dispath in a single time-period,
rather than to unit ommitment. The problem we onsider is partiu-
larly interesting as it resembles the urrent design of eletriity markets
in Europe, where deisions on unit ommitment are left to the power pro-
duers, and the market operator determines sequentially the amount of
reserves needed and the optimal day-ahead energy dispath. Note that
the extension of the proposed model to a multi-period setting does not en-
tail any oneptual ompliation. We propose the joint determination of
day-ahead dispath and reserve akin to the one in [2℄, though in a robust
optimization framework.
2. We propose a reformulation of the inner max-min problem for the deter-
mination of the unertainty and reourse deision that an aommodate
general polyhedral sets for the unertainty and onverges to an exat so-
lution. Our approah is more exible than the binary reformulation in [5℄
and [6℄ in that it allows to model any polyhedral unertainty set, still using
a omparable number of binary variables. In omparison to the approah
in [4℄, whih is more exible with respet to the hoie of the unertainty
set, our reformulation guarantees onvergene to an exat solution.
3. We ompare the results obtained from the robust optimization approah
with the ones from the orresponding stohasti programming version of
the model.
The struture of the paper is the following. In Setion H.2, we introdue the for-
mulation of the problem. Algorithms for solving this problem are then desribed
in Setion H.3. Then, Setion H.4 presents results from a simple illustrative ex-
ample and from a larger ase study based on the 24-node IEEE Reliability
Test-System in [8℄. Finally, onlusions are presented in Setion H.5.
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H.2 Problem Formulation
When an eletri energy system inludes stohasti prodution soures, the joint
determination of the optimal day-ahead energy and reserve dispath an be
formulated as the following problem of optimization under unertainty:
min
x
cx
Tx+QW(x) (H.1a)
s.t. Fx = d− ŵ , (H.1b)
Gx ≥ g . (H.1)
The vetor x of deision variables inludes energy dispath, upward and down-
ward reserve as well as state variables at eah node of the transmission network.
For the sake of larity, we split the set of onstraints into two groups. Group
(H.1b) only inludes equalities, whih represent the balaning onditions. Suh
onstraints guarantee that for eah node of the transmission network, the day-
ahead energy dispath for prodution and the net power inow, whih are either
a subset or linearly dependent on a subset of the variables x, are equal to the net
demand, i.e., onsumption, d, minus the foreast stohasti power prodution,
ŵ. The seond set of onstraints (H.1) inludes upper and lower bounds to the
energy and reserve dispath, to the sheduled power ows, as well as delarations
of nonnegative variables.
The objetive funtion (H.1a) is equal to the sum of the ost assoiated with
the day-ahead deision cx
Tx and a measure of the stohasti optimal reourse
ost, QW(x). Suh a measure is a funtion of the rst-stage deision only, and is
parameterized on the distribution W of the unertainty, in this ase stohasti
power generation. In stohasti programming, typial hoies of QW(x) are the
expetation or the onditional value at risk (or a ombination of these) over a
disrete set of senarios approximating the atual distribution of the unertainty.
In a robust optimization framework, instead, we seek to minimize the reourse
ost in the worst-ase realization of the stohasti parameters within an un-
ertainty set. The determination of the worst-ase reourse ost, or redispath
ost, writes as the following max-min programming problem, parameterized on
the rst-stage deision x:
QW(x) = max
∆w
min
y
cy
Ty (H.2a)
s.t. Py = −∆w−Qx , : λ , (H.2b)
Ly ≥ l−Mx−N∆w , : µ , (H.2)
s.t. H∆w ≤ h . (H.2d)
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Model (H.2) has a max-min struture that allows the determination of the min-
imum reourse ost in the worst-ase realization of the unertainty. Indeed,
the maximization problem hooses the worst-ase realization of the stohasti
deviation ∆w of stohasti power prodution from the onditional mean fore-
ast within the polyhedral unertainty set dened by the set (H.2d) of linear
inequalities. After the worst-ase realization of the unertainty is hosen, the
reourse ost is minimized in the min problem in (H.2a). The vetor y of op-
timization variables of this problem onsists of the energy redispath for eah
produer, load shedding, spillage of stohasti prodution and the network state
variable at eah node in the balaning stage. The set of equations (H.2b) ensure
that redispath plus additional net ow equals the error of stohasti power
predition at eah node. Notie that (H.2b) depends on the rst-stage network
state variables inluded in the day-ahead deision vetor x. Furthermore, the
problem is onstrained by the set (H.2) of linear inequalities, whih inlude
upper and lower bounds on energy redispath, load shedding, stohasti power
spillage, atual power ows and delarations of nonnegative variables. Notie
that reserve, whih is inluded in the day-ahead deision vetor x, limits the
provision of bakup power at the reourse stage. Furthermore, stohasti power
spillage is limited above by the atual stohasti power prodution ŵ +∆w.
H.2.1 Reformulation as a Min-Max Bilinear Problem
The formulation in the above setion annot be immediately employed in pra-
tie. Indeed, the diret substitution of QW(x) as dened in (H.2) results in a
min-max-min problem, for whih a general-purpose solution algorithm is not
available. However, following the derivations in [4℄, [5℄ and [6℄, it is possible to
reformulate it as a min-max problem by substituting the right-hand side max
problem with its dual. This results in the following formulation:
min
x
cx
Tx+max
∆w
max
λ,µ
(−∆w−Qx)
T
λ+ (l−Mx−N∆w)
T
µ (H.3a)
s.t. PTλ+ LTµ = cy , (H.3b)
µ ≥ 0 , (H.3)
s.t. H∆w ≤ h , (H.3d)
s.t. Fx = d− ŵ , (H.3e)
Gx ≥ g . (H.3f)
It should be notied that model (H.3) is in fat a min-max programming
problem. Indeed, the mid- and right-hand-side maximization problems an be
merged into a single maximization problem in the optimization variables ∆w,
λ and µ. Furthermore, we remark that the optimization problem resulting from
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this merging is a bilinear one, as it involves ross-produts between ∆w and
the lower-level deision variables λ and µ in the objetive funtion (H.3a).
We onlude the setion with the following two observations, whih will turn
out useful in Setion H.3.
1. The problem resulting from the merging of the mid and the right-hand-
side maximization problems (H.3a)(H.3) is bilinear and dened over a
polyhedral set. As a onsequene, its optimal solution is one of the verties
of this set.
2. Sine the vetor x of day-ahead deision variables only appears in the
objetive funtion and not in the onstraints, the feasible polyhedron is
independent of the day-ahead deision, and hene it has a nite number
of verties.
H.2.2 Reformulation as a Linear Min-Max Problem with
Equilibrium Constraints
Let us onsider again formulation (H.3). We notie that it is possible to swap
the order of the mid and right-hand-side maximization problems, thus rst op-
timizing over the variables λ,µ, and then over ∆w. Furthermore, not all the
terms of the objetive funtion depend on ∆w, and the onstraints are separa-
ble for the two sets of variables. As a result, we an reformulate (H.3) as follows:
min
x
cx
Tx+max
λ,µ
− (Qx)Tλ+ (l−Mx)
T
µ+max
∆w
−
(
λT + µTN
)
∆w (H.4a)
s.t. H∆w ≤ h , ξ ,
(H.4b)
s.t. PTλ+ LTµ = cy , (H.4)
µ ≥ 0 , (H.4d)
s.t. Fx = d− ŵ , (H.4e)
Gx ≥ g , (H.4f)
where we indiate with ξ the set of dual variables relative to onstraints (H.4b)
for the right-hand-side maximization problem.
The max-max programming problem omprising the mid and the right-hand-
side optimization problems in (H.4) an be ast as a Mathematial Program
with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC), see [GCF
+
12℄. However, before doing
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so, we point out that sine the right-hand-side maximization problem is linear,
the strong duality theorem holds. Therefore, the following relationship holds at
optimality:
−
(
λT + µTN
)
∆w = hT ξ . (H.5)
Dierently from the term on the left-hand side of (H.5), the one on the right-
hand side is linear, as it does not involve ross-produts between optimization
variables. Therefore, onsidering (H.4) and (H.5) renders the problem below
whose objetive funtion is linear in the optimization variables:
min
x
cx
Tx+ max
λ,µ,∆w,ξ
− (Qx)
T
λ+ (l−Mx)
T
µ+ hT ξ (H.6a)
s.t. 0 ≤ ξ ⊥ h−H∆w ≥ 0 , (H.6b)
HT ξ = −λ−NTµ , (H.6)
PTλ+ LTµ = cy , (H.6d)
µ ≥ 0 , (H.6e)
s.t. Fx = d− ŵ , (H.6f)
Gx ≥ g . (H.6g)
Notie that formulations (H.1)(H.2), (H.3) and (H.6) are equivalent.
H.3 Solution Algorithm
In this setion, we present two iterative shemes to solve the min-max-min
problem (H.1)(H.2), both of whih are based on the utting-plane algorithm
in [9℄ within a Benders' deomposition sheme [10℄.
H.3.1 Benders-Dual Cutting-Plane Algorithm
Let us onsider reformulation (H.3). Beause of the observations in the last
paragraph of Setion H.2.1, the solution to the inner level bilinear maximization
problem belongs to a set of nite ardinality K, whih does not depend on the
rst-stage deisions. Indiating the elements of this set as (∆wk,λk,µk), with
k = 1, . . . ,K, we an alternatively reformulate problem (H.1)(H.2) as follows:
min
x,β
cx
Tx+ β (H.7a)
s.t. β ≥ −∆wTk λk + (l−N∆wk)
T
µk − (λkQ+ µkM)x , ∀k , (H.7b)
Fx = d− ŵ , (H.7)
Gx ≥ g . (H.7d)
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As one an see, the term β in the objetive funtion is bounded from below
by the pointwise maximum of a nite set of linear funtions in the rst-stage
deision variables x. This implies that the optimal objetive funtion value of
(H.7) is a onvex, pieewise linear funtion in x. The following utting-plane
algorithm, proposed for robust optimization problems with reourse by [7℄, is
guaranteed to onverge to the optimal solution in a nite number of steps.
1. Set upper and lower bounds UB = +∞ and LB = −∞, and initialize the
iteration index i← 1.
2. Dene the relaxed master problem (MP) as the minimization of (H.7a),
subjet to (H.7) and (H.7d), and x a reasonable lower bound for β,
i.e., lower than the expeted objetive value of the inner problem. Fix a
feasible solution (x∗1, β
∗
1) to the relaxed MP.
3. Solve either the following subproblem
SP1 : max
∆w,λ,µ
(−∆w−Qx∗i )
T
λ + (l−Mx∗i −N∆w)
T
µ (H.8a)
s.t. PTλ+ LTµ = cy , (H.8b)
µ ≥ 0 , (H.8)
H∆w ≤ h , (H.8d)
or
SP2 : max
λ,µ,∆w,ξ
− (Qx∗i )
T
λ+ (l−Mx∗i )
T
µ+ hT ξ (H.9a)
s.t. 0 ≤ ξ ⊥ h−H∆w ≥ 0 , (H.9b)
HT ξ = −λ−NTµ , (H.9)
PTλ+ LTµ = cy , (H.9d)
µ ≥ 0 . (H.9e)
Notie that (H.8) and (H.9) orrespond to the merging of the mid and
right-hand-side optimization problems in (H.3), and to the right-hand-side
problem in (H.6), respetively, where the rst-stage variables are xed.
Let us indiate the optimal SP objetive funtion value as zSPi
∗
. Update
the upper bound UB = min{UB, cxx
∗
i + z
SP
i
∗
}. Add to the relaxed MP
the Benders ut (H.7b) orresponding to the SP solution (∆w∗i ,λ
∗
i ,µ
∗
i )
determined at this stage.
4. Solve the relaxed MP, x x∗i+1 at the solution and z
MP
i+1
∗
at the objetive
funtion value. Update LB = zMPi+1
∗
.
5. If UB−LB < τ , where τ is a small tolerane value, then stop. Otherwise,
update i← i+ 1 and go bak to 3.
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The above approah is named Benders-dual utting plane algorithm in [11℄, sine
the uts generated in step 3 of the algorithm above are based on the optimal
dual solution of the lower-level problem in (H.2).
H.3.2 Primal Cut Algorithm
Similarly to the previous approah, the primal ut algorithm [11℄ is based on
the fat that the solution to the lower-level optimization problem in (H.3) is at
one of the verties of the feasibility set. Beause the feasibility set for ∆w is
ompletely deoupled from the feasibility set of the variables (λ,µ), the worst-
ase realization of the unertainty∆w is at a vertex of its feasibility set dened
by H∆w ≤ h.
We indiate with∆wk the verties of the feasibility set for the unertain stohas-
ti power prodution∆w, and assign a opy yk of the vetor of reourse deision
variables to eah of these verties. Hene, one an reformulate problem (H.1)
(H.2) in the following way:
min
x,yk,β
cx
Tx+ β (H.10a)
s.t. β ≥ cy
Tyk , ∀k , (H.10b)
Pyk = −∆wk −Qx , ∀k , (H.10)
Lyk ≥ l−Mx−N∆wk , ∀k , (H.10d)
Fx = d− ŵ , (H.10e)
Gx ≥ g . (H.10f)
Notie that uts (H.10b) are ane in the primal reourse variables yk, as
opposed to uts (H.7b), whih depend on the dual variables. Besides, we remark
that there is a opy yk of the reourse variables and of onstraints (H.10b),
(H.10) and (H.10d) for eah vertex ∆wk.
The following omments are in order:
• Dierently from (H.7), model (H.10) inludes energy redispath, load shed-
ding, stohasti power spillage, and network state variables at the balan-
ing stage as deision variables. Furthermore, there is one suh set of
deisions for eah vertex of the unertainty set.
• The number of verties, and therefore of Benders uts, in (H.10) is smaller
than that in (H.7). This is beause in (H.10) there is one Benders ut per
vertex of the unertainty set, and not per vertex of the joint feasibility set
of (∆w,λ,µ), whih has higher dimensionality.
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• On the other hand, the inrease in size of the relaxed MP in a Benders
sheme is muh larger every time a vertex is added to the MP. Indeed, this
entails adding a set of balaning market variables (reourse for a spei
realization of the unertainty), as well as a Benders ut (H.10b) and a set
of feasibility onstraints (H.10)(H.10d) for the balaning stage.
The primal ut algorithm is akin to the one desribed in Setion H.3.1, with the
following dierenes: the master problem used in step 2 is (H.10); at the end of
step 3, we add a set yk of reourse variables and a set of onstraints (H.10b)
(H.10d), where we x ∆w at the urrent solution ∆w∗i of the subproblem.
As doumented in [11℄ and [6℄, the primal ut algorithm, whih is the one used
in this work, generally guarantees a faster onvergene to the optimal solution
than the Benders-dual utting plane one.
H.3.3 Choie of the Subproblem and of its Solution
Method
In the desription of the utting-plane algorithm in Setion H.3.1, we left open
the hoie of the subproblem and of relative solution method in step 3.
To our knowledge, the existing literature on the topi exlusively onsiders sub-
problem (H.8). The solution of this optimization problem is far from being triv-
ial, sine the presene of bilinear terms in the objetive funtion (H.3a) renders
the problem non-onvex. In [4℄, an outer-approximation algorithm is proposed
to solve this problem with general unertainty sets. However, sine the subprob-
lem is non-onvex, only loal onvergene is guaranteed for this method. As an
alternative, exat linearization methods based on the use of integer variables
are proposed in [5℄ and [6℄. However, the unertainty set is restrited to the
partiular ase of polyhedral budgeted sets.
In this work, we propose the use of subproblem (H.9). The only nonlinearity
in this problem is the presene of omplementarity onditions (H.9b), where
the ⊥ operator implies that ξ(h − H∆w) = 0. Notie that omplementarity
onditions an be linearized by making use of binary variables as proposed by
[12℄. Alternatively, one ould employ the approah of [13℄, whih is based on
SOS-1 variables. In this work, the former implementation is hosen.
In omparison to the models in [5℄, [6℄ and [4℄, the proposed model has the
following harateristis:
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1. As ompared to the method in [4℄, our approah onverges to the global
optimal solution. However, the model in [4℄ onsiders general onvex un-
ertainty set, while our model is valid for any type of polyhedral set.
2. In omparison to the approah in [5℄ and [6℄, our approah retains the
onvergene to the global optimum while allowing us to onsider any type
of polyhedral sets. The number of binary variables employed in the lin-
earization of the omplementarity onditions (H.6b) grows linearly with
the number of inequality onstraints used to dene the unertainty set.
Hene, in the ase where the unertainty set is a multidimensional inter-
val with a total budget for deviations, the number of binary variables is
omparable to the one in the binary expansions in [5℄ and in [6℄
H.4 Results and Disussion
In this setion, we present results obtained by employing the proposed model
on dierent appliation studies. Setion H.4.1 desribes an example based on
a simple two-node system, to illustrate the funtioning of the model. A larger
study based on the 24-node IEEE Reliability Test-System, the speiations of
whih an be found in [8℄, is onsidered in Setion H.4.2.
H.4.1 Illustrative Example
Let us onsider the two-node system depited in Figure H.1. The line between
the two nodes of the system has a apaity of 60MW and a reatane of 0.13 pu.
The load at eah node is known with ertainty and equal to 110MWh and
30MWh at node 1 and 2, respetively, during the market period onsidered.
Furthermore, two wind farms are loated at eah node. The day-ahead pro-
dution foreast is equal to 20MWh and 25MWh for wind farms 1 and 2,
respetively. Notie that we make the assumption that the length of a market
period is one hour. Hene, a foreast prodution equal to 20MWh orresponds
to an average output of 20MW during the onsidered period. However, for the
sake of larity we will hereinafter employ the unit MWh for energy prodution
and dispath, and MW for reserve and apaity.
The harateristis of the units in the system are listed in Table H.1. The
apaity of eah unit is indiated with Pmax, the per unit ost of prodution
with C, while C+ and C− represent the osts for eah MW of available upward
and downward reserve, respetively. Prodution from unit 1 is ostly, but the
unit is highly exible, whih is reeted in its low osts for reserve. On the
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Node 1
Load 1
(110 MWh)Unit 1 Unit 2
Wind
farm 1
Node 2
Wind
farm 2Unit 3
Load 2
(30 MWh)
60 MW
Figure H.1: Two-node system
ontrary, unit 3 has a low marginal ost of prodution but is inexible. Unit 2
has balaned harateristis.
Table H.1: Charateristis of the units in the two-node system
Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3
Pmax (MW) 120 80 70
C ($/MWh) 32 20 12
C+ ($/MW) 7 11 15
C− ($/MW) 5 6 14
Model (H.1) for this example writes as follows:
min
p,r+,r−,δ0
32p1 + 20p2 + 12p3 + 7r
+
1 + 11r
+
2 + 15r
+
3
+ 5r−1 + 6r
−
2 + 14r
−
3 +QW(p, r
+, r−, δ0)
(H.11a)
s.t. p1 + p2 + 20 = 110−
δ02
0.13
, (H.11b)
p3 + 25 = 30 +
δ02
0.13
, (H.11)
p1 + r
+
1 ≤ 120 , p2 + r
+
2 ≤ 80 , p3 + r
+
3 ≤ 70 , (H.11d)
p1 − r
−
1 ≥ 0 , p2 − r
−
2 ≥ 0 , p3 − r
−
3 ≥ 0 , (H.11e)
− 60 ≤
δ02
0.13
≤ 60 , (H.11f)
p1, p2, p3, r
+
1 , r
+
2 , r
+
3 , r
−
1 , r
−
2 , r
−
3 ≥ 0 . (H.11g)
Constraints (H.11b) and (H.11) enfore power balane at node 1 and 2, re-
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spetively. We hoose node 1 as the referene node, i.e., we set δ01 = 0. Hene
−δ02/0.13 represents the energy ow from node 1 to node 2. Constraints (H.11d)
ensure that the sum of the day-ahead dispath p and the upward reserve r+ is not
greater than the maximum power output. Similarly, (H.11e) enfores that the
sheduled downward reserve r− is not greater than the dispath p. As a result
of (H.11f), the sheduled ow between the two nodes is within the transmission
apaity. Finally, non-negativity of the variables is enfored by (H.11g).
At the balaning stage, the atual wind power prodution an deviate from the
day-ahead foreast. Table H.2 reports foreast, maximum deviation (in absolute
value) and the resulting minimum and maximum values of prodution for the two
wind farms onsidered. We make the further assumption that prodution from
Table H.2: Day-ahead foreast, maximum deviation at the balaning stage
and resulting lower and upper bounds for prodution from eah
wind farm. Values in MWh
ŵ ∆wmax w w
Wind farm 1 20 15 5 35
Wind farm 2 25 20 5 45
the two wind farms annot deviate by∆wmax at the same time. On the ontrary,
the sum between the ratios of their deviation divided by the relative ∆wmax
annot be greater than Γ = 1.4. Constant Γ is referred to in the literature as
the budget of unertainty. Imposing this onstraint implies that, if the deviation
of one wind farm's prodution is equal to ∆wmax, then the other wind farm an
deviate at most by 0.4×∆wmax.
Under the non restritive assumption that the marginal ost for redispath is
equal to the day-ahead dispath ost, and assuming a load-shedding ost equal
to $ 200/MWh, the worst-ase reourse ost QW(p, r
+, r−, δ0) is equal to the
objetive funtion value of the following max-min problem, whih orresponds
to model (H.2):
max
∆w
min
p+,p−,
lsh,wsp, δ
32(p+1 − p
−
1 ) + 20(p
+
2 − p
−
2 ) + 12(p
+
3 − p
−
3 ) + 200(l
sh
1 + l
sh
2 )
(H.12a)
s.t. p+1 − p
−
1 + p
+
2 − p
−
2 +∆w1 − w
sp
1 + l
sh
1 = −
δ2 − δ
0
2
0.13
, (H.12b)
p+3 − p
−
3 +∆w2 − w
sp
2 + l
sh
2 =
δ2 − δ
0
2
0.13
, (H.12)
p+1 ≤ r
+
1 , p2 ≤ r
+
2 , p3 ≤ r
+
3 , (H.12d)
p−1 ≤ r
−
1 , p
−
2 ≤ r
−
2 , p
−
3 ≤ r
−
3 , (H.12e)
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lsh1 ≤ 110 , l
sh
2 ≤ 30 , (H.12f)
wsp1 ≤ 20 + ∆w1 , w
sp
2 ≤ 25 + ∆w2 , (H.12g)
− 60 ≤
δ2
0.13
≤ 60 , (H.12h)
p+1 , p
+
2 , p
+
3 , p
−
1 , p
−
2 , p
−
3 , l
sh
1 , l
sh
2 , w
sp
1 , w
sp
2 ≥ 0 , (H.12i)
s.t. −15 ≤ ∆w1 ≤ 15 , −20 ≤ ∆w2 ≤ 20 , (H.12j)
∆w1 = ∆w
+
1 −∆w
−
1 , ∆w2 = ∆w
+
2 −∆w
−
2 , (H.12k)
∆w+1 +∆w
−
1
15
+
∆w+2 +∆w
−
2
20
≤ 1.4 . (H.12l)
The minimization problem enfores a minimum-ost redispath in the ele-
tri energy system. Equations (H.12b) and (H.12) guarantee the nodal power
balane at the balaning stage. Symbols p+ and p− represent upward and
downward redispath, ∆w the deviation of wind power prodution from the
day-ahead foreast, wsp and lsh represent wind power spillage and load shed-
ding, respetively, while δ represent the atual nodal network state. Constraints
(H.12d) and (H.12e) enfore that the redispath is not greater than the amount
of upward and downward reserve established at the day-ahead stage, respe-
tively. Constraints (H.12f) and (H.12g) guarantee that load shedding and wind
power spillage are not greater than the atual onsumption and wind power pro-
dution. The atual transmission onstraints are enfored by (H.12h). Finally,
non-negative variables are dened in (H.12i).
The maximization problem in model (H.12) piks the worst ase realization of
deviation ∆w of the wind power prodution from the day-ahead foreast ŵ.
The feasible spae is polyhedral. Inequalities (H.12j) dene the intervals over
whih the deviation of wind power prodution an our. Equations (H.12k)
split the deviation into its positive and negative parts ∆w+ and ∆w−. Finally,
onstraint (H.12l) enfores the unertainty budget.
Table H.3(a) displays the results of model (H.11)(H.12) in terms of day-ahead
energy and reserve dispath. These results an be ompared to the ones obtained
using a similar model based on stohasti programming and reported in Table
H.3(b). The latter model is obtained by replaing QW(·) in (H.11) with the
expeted value of the reourse ost over a disrete set of senarios, rather than
with its worst-ase value determined by model (H.12). The senarios used in the
stohasti programming model are 100 random samples drawn from a uniform
distribution dened over the unertainty set (H.12j)(H.12l). While the day-
ahead energy dispath oinides, the following omments on reserve are in order:
1. As far as upward reserve is onerned, the robust optimization model
yields more onservative results than the stohasti programming model.
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Indeed, no realization of the wind power deviation within the unertainty
set results in load-shedding events with the former approah. On the
ontrary, with the latter approah load shedding an take plae if its ost
is oset in expetation by the savings in terms of reserve.
2. No downward reserve is sheduled with the robust optimization approah.
This is explained by the fat that there is no ost assoiated to wind power
spillage. Hene, the worst-ase realization of the wind power deviation is
always negative, i.e., an underprodution, whih requires no downward
redispath at the balaning stage.
3. With the robust optimization approah, units with the lowest aggregate
ost of reserve and prodution, e.g., unit 3, are preferred to units with lower
reserve ost but higher marginal osts, e.g., unit 1. This is a straightfor-
ward result of the fous on the worst-ase realization of the unertainty
in (H.12). On the ontrary, the stohasti programming model shedules
reserve from units with lower apaity ost and higher operating osts,
sine the latter are weighted by the probability of atual deployment of
the reserves.
Table H.3: Results for day-ahead dispath and reserve using the robust opti-
mization and the stohasti programming approah
(a) Robust Optimization
Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3
p (MWh) 0 30 65
r+ (MW) 0 21 5
r− (MW) 0 0 0
(b) Stohasti Programming
Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3
p (MWh) 0 30 65
r+ (MW) 9.60 8.47 0
r− (MW) 0 1.26 0
In the following setion, we assess the impat of the inreased robustness of the
proposed approah on the osts of dispath, reserve and redispath in a more
realisti setup.
H.4 Results and Disussion 305
H.4.2 Simulation Study
The results presented in this setion are obtained from a modied version of the
24-node IEEE Reliability Test-System in [8℄.
We inlude six wind farms at dierent loations throughout the grid. Table H.4
reports the nodal loation, as well as day-ahead foreast, maximum deviation at
the balaning stage and the resulting minimum and maximum power prodution.
The total foreast wind power prodution is 554MWh. We onsider the peak
hour, where onsumption totals 2850MWh, thus wind power is expeted to
over slightly less than 20% of the load.
Table H.4: Nodal loation, day-ahead foreast, maximum deviation at the bal-
aning stage and resulting lower and upper bounds for prodution
from eah wind farm. Values in MWh
Wind farm Node ŵ ∆wmax w w
1 3 120 55.20 64.80 175.20
2 5 96 40 56 136
3 7 140 60 80 200
4 16 52 52 0 104
5 21 36 33.60 2.40 69.60
6 23 110 66 44 176
Besides the intervals reported in Table H.4 and the budget onstraint of the type
of (H.12l), we introdue another type of linear onstraints for the deviation
of wind power prodution. The objetive of these onstraints is to limit the
dierene between deviations for adjaent wind farms, e.g., for units q1 and q2:
−ρq1q2 ≤
∆wq1
∆wmaxq1
−
∆wq2
∆wmaxq2
≤ ρq1q2 . (H.13)
We remark that solving the bilinear model (H.3) inluding onstraints of this
type is not straightforward, while in the proposed model (H.6) they an be
inluded with little eort. Table H.5 reports the values of ρ employed in this
study. Note that ρq1q2 is a measure of the spatial orrelation between wind
farms q1 and q2.
Capaity on the transmission lines onneting the node pairs (15, 21), (14, 16)
and (13, 23) is redued to 400MW, 250MW and 250MW, respetively. This
is done in order to introdue bottleneks in the transmission system. The pro-
dution ost of the units is linearized by making use of a pieewise-linear ap-
proximation. Four bloks with onstant marginal ost are employed for eah
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Table H.5: Values of ρ employed for onstraints (H.13) in the 24-node system
Wind farms ρ
1 2 0.4
1 4 0.3
2 3 0.5
4 5 0.4
5 6 0.5
power plant. As far as reserve provision is onerned, we assume that nulear
plants are totally inexible and thus unable to provide reserve. For oal units,
the reserve ost per MW is equal to one fourth of the marginal ost of its most
expensive blok. Oil units are assumed to be more exible and their reserve ost
is one tenth of the marginal ost of the most expensive blok. Notie, however,
that these units have the highest prodution ost among the plants onsidered.
Finally, the load-shedding ost is set to $ 1000/MWh.
H.4.2.1 Comparison with the Stohasti Programming Approah
In this setion we disuss the results in terms of system ost for the day-ahead
dispath and reserve shedules for the 24-node system, determined with the pro-
posed robust optimization model and with a stohasti programming approah.
The unertainty set in the robust optimization model is dened by the inter-
vals in Table H.4, onstraints of the type (H.13) with the parameters dened
aording to Table H.5 and a budget of unertainty Γ = 3.5.
For the model based on stohasti programming, 500 senarios drawn from
independent trunated Gaussian distributions model the wind power unertainty
at eah site. The Gaussian distributions are saled so that the upper and lower
bounds in Table H.4 represent the 95% ondene interval. Senarios falling out
of this interval, as well as the ones violating onstraints (H.13) or exeeding the
unertainty budget are disarded.
Table H.6 breaks down the system ost for the two approahes into day-ahead
osts (for dispath and reserve) and balaning osts (for redispath and load-
shedding). The latter are reported both in expetation, alulated over a vali-
dation set of 1000 senarios drawn from the same distribution as the one used
in the optimization of the stohasti programming model, and in the worst-ase
realization of the unertainty within the set desribed above.
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As one an notie, the reserve osts are omparable for the two approahes.
Indeed, the higher level of onservatism of robust optimization is almost om-
pletely oset by the ost for downward reserve in the stohasti programming
approah. However, the dispath ost and, notably, the expeted osts in the
balaning stage are lower for the stohasti programming approah, whih ben-
ets from the possibility of redispathing downward rather than spilling wind
power. In total, the stohasti programming approah outperforms the robust
optimization one in terms of expeted ost by about 2.8%. However, the stohas-
ti programming approah inurs a worst-ase ost as high as three times the
worst-ase ost with the robust optimization model.
Table H.6: Comparison of system ost with the robust optimization and the
stohasti programming approahes. Values in $
Cost Robust Optimization Stohasti Programming
Dispath 17 897.52 17 512.07
Upward reserve 489.72 355.59
Downward reserve 0 130.28
Total day-ahead 18 387.25 17 997.95
Expeted Worst-ase Expeted Worst-ase
Redispath 339.32 2989.46 147.82 2634.55
Load-shedding 0 0 72.83 43 586.85
Total balaning 339.32 2989.46 220.64 46 221.40
Total aggregate 18 726.56 21 376.72 18 218.59 64 219.34
H.4.2.2 Robustness of Deision to Varying Distribution Type
The degree of suboptimality of the robust deision highlighted in the previ-
ous setion might be an overestimation. In pratie, the atual distribution of
stohasti parameters an only be estimated by the deision-maker. Thus, the
senarios employed as input to stohasti programming models represent the
unertainty with a limited auray.
Table H.7 illustrates the expetation of the system ost inurred by the robust
optimization and by the stohasti programming models if the unertainty has
a dierent distribution than the one onsidered in Setion H.4.2.1. We now
onsider that deviations of wind power prodution at dierent loations follow
independent uniform distributions dened on the same support as the Gaussian
distribution employed in Setion H.4.2.1 to determine the stohasti program-
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ming solution. As one an notie, the expeted value of system ost is rather
stable if the solution obtained with the robust optimization model is employed.
On the ontrary, the ost inurred by the stohasti programming solution in-
reases by roughly $ 1000 ompared to the one in Table H.6, mostly owing to
inreasing load-shedding ost.
Table H.7: Comparison of system ost with the robust optimization and the
stohasti programming approahes under a dierent distribution.
Values in $
Cost Robust Optimization Stohasti Programming
Dispath 17 897.52 17 512.07
Upward reserve 489.72 355.59
Downward reserve 0 130.28
Total day-ahead 18 387.25 17 997.95
Redispath (exp.) 576.75 335.06
Load-shedding (exp.) 0 923.26
Total balaning (exp.) 576.75 1258.32
Total aggregate (exp.) 18 964.00 19 256.27
This omparison onrms the results in [4℄, whih shows the stability of results
of the robust approah to hanges in the shape of the distribution. In pratie,
if the atual distribution of the unertainty is more fat-tailed than the model
from whih senarios are drawn, as in the ase above, the performane of the
stohasti programming solution degrades faster than the one of the robust
optimization solution.
For ompleteness of the analysis, we onsider the inverse ase, where senarios
drawn from a uniform distribution are used as input to the stohasti pro-
gramming model. Then, the expeted system ost is determined over a set of
senarios drawn from a normal distribution and trunated onsistently with the
unertainty set. The expeted system ost for the two approahes is reported
in Table H.8. Notably, the amount of reserve in the stohasti programming
solution is signiantly higher in this ase than in the ase in Table H.6 where
unertainty is normally distributed. As a result, this solution is rather robust
when the atual distribution of the unertainty has lower weight on the tails,
suh as in this ase. Indeed, no load-shedding events are observed, and the total
expeted system ost is lower than that for the robust optimization solution.
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Table H.8: Comparison of system ost with the robust optimization and the
stohasti programming approahes under a dierent distribution.
Values in $
Cost Robust Optimization Stohasti Programming
Dispath 17 897.52 17 512.87
Upward reserve 489.72 433.42
Downward reserve 0 209.45
Total day-ahead 18 387.25 18 155.74
Redispath (exp.) 361.10 139.36
Load-shedding (exp.) 0 0
Total balaning (exp.) 361.10 139.36
Total aggregate (exp.) 18 748.34 18 295.10
H.4.2.3 Computational Results
In this setion, we briey disuss the omputational properties of the robust
optimization and of the stohasti programming approahes. The models have
been implemented in GAMS and solved using CPLEX 12, running on a laptop
equipped with a 4-ore proessor loking at 2.66GHz.
Solution times for the 24-node system are illustrated in Figure H.2. The robust
optimization model onverged in 29.11 s after four iterations of the utting-plane
algorithm. The solution time in this ase is plotted as a horizontal dashed line
in the gure sine robust optimization is senario-free. The solid line in the
gure represents the time for solving the stohasti programming approah as a
funtion of the number of senarios. As one an see, the omputation time for
the stohasti programming model inreases with the number of senarios. The
robust optimization model solves more quikly than the stohasti optimization
one as soon as the number of senarios is higher than 300.
H.5 Conlusions
In this work, we onsider the problem of jointly determining day-ahead energy
dispath and reserve apaity in an eletriity market with large penetration
of stohasti generation soures. The problem is ast as an adaptive robust
optimization model, the solution of whih minimizes the system ost in terms
of dispath, reserve and redispath in the worst-ase realization of the unertain
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Figure H.2: Computation time for the robust optimization approah, and for
the stohasti programming approah as a funtion of the number
of senarios
prodution.
We propose a novel reformulation of the problem that allows us to onsider
polyhedral sets of any type to model the support of the unertainty distribu-
tion. Suh a reformulation is employed as the subproblem within a well-known
utting-plane algorithm for adaptive robust optimization problems with right-
hand side unertainty. The proposed sheme, besides providing more exibility
in modeling unertainty with general polyhedral sets, retains properties of on-
vergene to the global optimum as well as of tratability of the methods proposed
in the literature on the subjet.
Through a ase-study based on the 24-node IEEE Reliability Test-System, we
assess the degree of suboptimality of the robust solution with respet to the
stohasti programming approah. System ost inrease in expetation by about
2.8%. However, the robust solution uts worst-ase ost by over two thirds. Fur-
thermore, we show that the proposed model is rather robust to hanges in the
probability distribution. Indeed, the robust solution an atually outperform
the stohasti programming one if the model for the distribution of the un-
ertainty used in the latter one underestimates the probability density on the
tails. Finally, we show that for the proposed model, the robust optimization ap-
proah has better omputational properties than a reasonably sized equivalent
stohasti programming model.
Future researh on the topi should be arried out in dierent diretions.
Firstly, the omplementary problem of modeling unertainty sets for spatially
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distributed stohasti prodution, whih is not onsidered here, should be stud-
ied. In parallel, dynami properties ould also be onsidered both in terms of
modeling unertainty sets, and by extending the model to a multi-period set-
ting. Furthermore, reformulations of the robust optimization problem should be
thought of in order to aount for unertainty sets with dierent struture, e.g.,
ellipsoidal sets. Finally, the ombination of the proposed model with methods
for determining ex-post the amount of downward reserve should be investigated
as well, in order to redue the gap of the robust approah with the stohasti
programming one in terms of expeted system ost.
H.6 Complete Min-Max-Min Optimization
Model
A desription of the symbols employed in these appendies is inluded in Table
H.9.
The omplete min-max-min model used in this work to determine the robust
energy and reserve dispath is the following optimization problem:
min
p,r+,r−,δ0
∑
k
Ckpk + C
+
k r
+
k + C
−
k r
−
k +QW(p, r
+, r−, δ0) (H.14a)
s.t.
∑
k∈Gi
pk =
∑
j∈Ni
Bij
(
δ0i − δ
0
j
)
+ ds(i) − ŵq(i) , ∀i , (H.14b)
δ01 = 0 , (H.14)
pk + r
+
k ≤ P
max
k , ∀k , (H.14d)
pk − r
−
k ≥ 0 , ∀k , (H.14e)
Bij
(
δ0i − δ
0
j
)
≤ Tmaxij , ∀i, j ∈ Ni ,
(H.14f)
pk, r
+
k , r
−
k ≥ 0 , ∀k , (H.14g)
where the worst-ase reourse ost for energy redispathing at the balaning
stage is yielded by the following max-min optimization model:
QW(p, r
+,r−, δ0) = (H.15a)
max
∆w,
∆w+,∆w−
min
p+,p−,
lsh,wsp, δ
∑
k
Ck
(
p+k − p
−
k
)
+
∑
s
V shlshs (H.15b)
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Table H.9: List of symbols
Symbol Type Desription
k index index for prodution blok
i, j index index for network node
q, u index index for wind farm
s index index for load
Gi set set of prodution bloks k at node i
Ni set set of nodes j onneted by a transmission line to node i
Wq set set of wind farms u neighboring wind farm q
s(i) set load at node i of the network (if any)
q(i) set wind farm at node i of the network (if any)
i(k) set node where prodution blok k is loated
i(s) set node where load s is loated
i(q) set node where wind farm q is loated
Ck parameter per unit ost of energy dispath and redispath for unit k
C+k parameter per unit ost of upward reserve for unit k
C−k parameter per unit ost of downward reserve for unit k
ds parameter load from onsumer s
ŵq parameter foreast wind power prodution for wind farm q
Bij parameter suseptane of line onneting nodes i and j
Tmaxij parameter apaity of line onneting nodes i and j
V sh parameter per unit ost of load-shedding
∆wmaxq parameter maximum foreast error for output of wind farm q
Γ parameter budget of unertainty for foreast error of wind power pro-
dution
ρqu parameter maximum deviation of foreast error between wind farms
q and u
pk variable energy dispath for prodution blok k
r+k variable upward reserve dispath for prodution blok k
r−k variable downward reserve dispath for prodution blok k
δ0i variable network state variable at node i at the day-ahead stage
∆wq variable foreast error for prodution from wind farm q
∆w+q variable positive part of foreast error for prodution from wind
farm q
∆w−q variable negative part of foreast error for prodution from wind
farm q
p+k variable upward energy redispath for prodution blok k
p−k variable downward energy redispath for prodution blok k
lshs variable load shedding for demand s
wspq variable wind power spillage for wind farm q
δi variable network state variable (voltage angle) at node i at the
balaning stage
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s.t.
∑
k∈Gi
(
p+k − p
−
k
)
+ lshs(i) +∆wq(i) − w
sp
q(i) =∑
j∈Ni
Bij
(
δi − δ
0
i − δj + δ
0
j
)
,
: λi , ∀i ,
(H.15)
δ1 = 0 , : ν , (H.15d)
p+k ≤ r
+
k , : µ
+
k , ∀k , (H.15e)
p−k ≤ r
−
k , : µ
−
k , ∀k , (H.15f)
lshs ≤ ds , : ǫ
sh
s , ∀s , (H.15g)
wspq ≤ ŵq +∆wq , : ǫ
sp
q , ∀q , (H.15h)
Bij (δi − δj) ≤ T
max
ij : σij , ∀i, j ∈ Ni , (H.15i)
p+k , p
−
k ≥ 0 , ∀k , l
sh
s ≥ 0 , ∀s , w
sp
q ≥ 0 , ∀q , (H.15j)
s.t. ∆wq = ∆w
+
q −∆w
−
q , ∀q , (H.15k)
∆w+q ≤ ∆w
max
q , ∀q , (H.15l)
∆w−q ≤ ∆w
max
q , ∀q , (H.15m)∑
q
∆w+q +∆w
−
q
∆wmaxq
≤ Γ , (H.15n)
∆wq
∆wmaxq
−
∆wu
∆wmaxu
≤ ρqu , ∀q, u ∈Wq , (H.15o)
∆w+q ,∆w
−
q ≥ 0 , ∀q . (H.15p)
(H.15q)
Notie that (H.14) is the omplete formulation of (H.1) for the problem at hand.
Similarly, (H.15) orresponds to (H.2).
H.7 Optimization Model Used Within the
Cutting-Plane Algorithm
In this setion, we arry out in detail the mathematial development that leads
to the single-level maximization problem (H.6).
Let us rst replae the right-hand side minimization problem in (H.15) with its
dual. Notie that the dual variables are indiated in (H.15) after a olon sepa-
rating them from the orresponding onstraints. We then swap the order of the
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resulting max-max problem, so that the right-hand-side maximization problem
is the one involving variables ∆w,∆w+,∆w−. These operations render the
following problem:
max
λ, ν,µ+,µ−
ǫsh, ǫsp,σ
∑
i
−λi
∑
j∈Ni
Bij
(
δ0i − δ
0
j
)
+
∑
k
(
µ+k r
+
k + µ
−
k r
−
k
)
(H.16a)
+
∑
s
dsǫ
sh
s +
∑
q
ŵqǫ
sp
q +
∑
i,j∈Ni
Tmaxij σij (H.16b)
+ max
∆w,∆w+,∆w−
−
∑
i
λi∆wq(i) +
∑
q
ǫspq ∆wq (H.16)
s.t. ∆wq = ∆w
+
q −∆w
−
q : γq , ∀q , (H.16d)
∆w+q ≤ ∆w
max
q : ξ
+
q , ∀q , (H.16e)
∆w−q ≤ ∆w
max
q : ξ
−
q , ∀q , (H.16f)∑
q
∆w+q +∆w
−
q
∆wmaxq
≤ Γ : η , (H.16g)
∆wq
∆wmaxq
−
∆wu
∆wmaxu
≤ ρqu : ωqu , ∀q, u ∈Wq ,
(H.16h)
∆w+q ,∆w
−
q ≥ 0 ∀q , (H.16i)
s.t. λi(k) + µ
+
k ≤ Ck , ∀k , (H.16j)
−λi(k) + µ
−
k ≤ −Ck , ∀k , (H.16k)
λi(s) + ǫ
sh
s ≤ V
sh , ∀s , (H.16l)
−λi(q) + ǫ
sp
q ≤ 0 , ∀q , (H.16m)
ν −
∑
j∈N1
B1j
λ1 +
∑
j∈N1
B1jλj

+
∑
j∈N1
B1j (σ1j − σj1) = 0 ,
(H.16n)
−
∑
j∈Ni
Bij
λi +
∑
j∈Ni
Bijλj

+
∑
j∈Ni
Bij (σij − σji) = 0 ,
∀i 6= 1 ,
(H.16o)
µ+k , µ
−
k ≤ 0 , ∀k , ǫ
sh
s ≤ 0 , (H.16p)
∀s , ǫspq ≤ 0 , ∀q , σij ≤ 0 , ∀i, j ∈ Ni , (H.16q)
whih is the omplete formulation of the mid and right-hand-side maximization
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problems in (H.4).
Then, we replae the objetive funtion of the right-hand-side maximization
problem in (H.16) with the one of its dual problem:
−
∑
i
λi∆wq(i) +
∑
q
ǫspq ∆wq =
∑
q
∆wmaxq
(
ξ+q + ξ
−
q
)
+ Γη +
∑
q,u∈Wq
ρquωqu .
(H.17)
Finally, we inlude the Karush-Kuhn-Tuker onditions for the right-hand-side
optimization problem, and ast (H.16) as the following single-level maximization
problem:
max
λ, ν,µ+,µ−, ǫsh, ǫsp,σ
∆w,∆w+,∆w−,
γ, ξ+, ξ−, η,ω
∑
i
−λi
∑
j∈Ni
Bij
(
δ0i − δ
0
j
)
+
∑
k
(
µ+k r
+
k + µ
−
k r
−
k
)
(H.18a)
+
∑
s
dsǫ
sh
s +
∑
q
ŵqǫ
sp
q +
∑
i,j∈Ni
Tmaxij σij (H.18b)
+
∑
q
∆wmaxq
(
ξ+q + ξ
−
q
)
+ Γη +
∑
q,u∈Wq
ρquωqu (H.18)
s.t. ∆wq = ∆w
+
q −∆w
−
q , ∀q , (H.18d)
0 ≤ ξ+q ⊥ ∆w
+
q −∆w
max
q ≤ 0 , ∀q , (H.18e)
0 ≤ ξ−q ⊥ ∆w
−
q −∆w
max
q ≤ 0 , ∀q , (H.18f)
0 ≤ η ⊥
∑
q
∆w+q +∆w
−
q
∆wmaxq
− Γ ≤ 0 , (H.18g)
0 ≤ ωqu ⊥
∆wq
∆wmaxq
−
∆wu
∆wmaxu
− ρqu ≤ 0 , ∀q, u ∈Wq ,
(H.18h)
γq +
∑
u∈Wq
ωqu − ωuq
∆wmaxq
+ λq(i) − ǫ
sp
q = 0 ∀q , (H.18i)
0 ≤ ∆w+q ⊥ −γq + ξ
+
q +
η
∆wmaxq
≥ 0 , ∀q , (H.18j)
0 ≤ ∆w−q ⊥ γq + ξ
−
q +
η
∆wmaxq
≥ 0 , ∀q , (H.18k)
λi(k) + µ
+
k ≤ Ck , ∀k , (H.18l)
− λi(k) + µ
−
k ≤ −Ck , ∀k , (H.18m)
λi(s) + ǫ
sh
s ≤ V
sh , ∀s , (H.18n)
− λi(q) + ǫ
sp
q ≤ 0 , ∀q , (H.18o)
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ν −
∑
j∈N1
B1j
λ1 +
∑
j∈N1
B1jλj

+
∑
j∈N1
B1j (σ1j − σj1) = 0 ,
(H.18p)
−
∑
j∈Ni
Bij
λi +
∑
j∈Ni
Bijλj

+
∑
j∈Ni
Bij (σij − σji) = 0 ,
∀i 6= 1 , (H.18q)
µ+k , µ
−
k ≤ 0 , ∀k , ǫ
sh
s ≤ 0 , ∀s , (H.18r)
ǫspq ≤ 0 , ∀q , σij ≤ 0 , ∀i, j ∈ Ni , (H.18s)
whih is the omplete formulation of the right-hand side maximization problem
in (H.6).
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